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ABSTRACT 
This study presents a conceptual framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes. Over the last 
decades, multiple incidents in these types of organisations indicate that the 
mere communication of risk information and safety procedures does not 
necessarily lead to risk aversive attitudes. Therefore, it might suggest that the 
traditional transfer of information is not fulfilling its aim, namely to keep the 
organisation safe. This doctoral thesis proposes a form of constitutive 
communication that involves all organisational members in an open safety 
dialogue as an alternative to this informational approach of communication. As 
such, it offers a way of taking into account the interpretive, subjective aspects of 
communication and shows how they interweave with formal communication 
structures to create the possibility of ongoing safe operations.  
An on-shore gas-receiving terminal on the European continent was the subject 
for two empirical research studies. Based on multiple methods, including 
qualitative interviews, ethnographic data analysis, repertory grid-based 
interviews, and social network analysis, this study indicates how a constitutive 
dialogue that creates a common mindset concerning safe operations among all 
staff can be installed and supported. Furthermore, it demonstrates how despite 
the fact that every individual in this organisation has different perceptions of the 
present risks, constitutive risk communication leads to coordinated safe 
behaviour. These findings offer new perspectives on the solution-oriented 
knowledge about the relationship between risk communication and risk savvy in 
organisations managing high-risk processes.  
The theoretical background to this phenomenon was supported by a literature 
review in the field of risk communication and risk perception in organisations 
managing complex interactive and tightly coupled processes. These findings, 
together with those of the empirical research projects, were compared with 
insights in the theoretical fields of High-Reliability Organisations (HRO) and 
Communication Constitutes Organisations (CCO), and result in a conceptual 
vi 
framework for a constitutive view on risk communication in organisations 
managing high-risk processes.  
This research offers a number of theoretical and practical contributions to the 
field of HROs, the field of CCO research. It not only confirms key insights into 
these theoretical fields, it is also the first study that links the use of CCO to 
organisations managing high-risk technologies. 
vii 
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PART I: LINKING DOCUMENT 
1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE 
1.1 Introduction 
In research as well as in industrial practice, great efforts are made to increase 
the safety at high-risk production systems (Grote and Künzler, 2000). Recent 
incidents, such as the gas explosion of a Fluxys pipeline in Ghislengien 
(Belgium, July 2004), the explosion at the BP Texas City Refinery which caused 
15 deaths and over 170 injuries (USA, March 2005), the explosion on BP’s 
Deepwater Horizon (Gulf of Mexico, April 2010), or a derailed train carrying 
highly toxic chemicals in Wetteren (Belgium, May 2013) killing one person, 
injuring 17 others and forcing nearly 300 people to be evacuated from their 
homes - just to mention a few - are all rooted in some kind of failure, be it 
human, systems or technical failure (Hopkins, 2005). Investigations following 
these disasters indicated that despite all the technological safety processes, 
quite often the root causes of these incidents lie in human error (Antonsen, 
2009). Although employees were well trained in safety procedures, they often 
did not take into account the importance of these processes (Rochlin, 1999) and 
did not act accordingly. A Safety Review Panel that was investigating the 2005 
explosion at the BP plant in Texas, for instance, indicated, in the so-called 
Baker Panel Report, systemic errors such as deficiencies in leadership, lines of 
communication, core values, and inconsistency in the messages about process 
safety, as the root causes of this tragedy (US Safety Review Panel, 2007). The 
Baker Panel listed ten recommendations “to improve BP’s corporate safety 
culture, corporate oversight of process safety, and process safety management 
systems” (US Safety Review Panel, 2007; p. xvi). All of these recommendations 
were well documented and clearly explained. Hence, it could be argued that if 
all BP staff worldwide had embraced these safety recommendations, the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, three years later, would 
never have happened. It indicates that, despite the recommendations from a 
Safety Review Panel after a disastrous event, the existing communication tools, 
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and the safety trainings, the use of communication to alter employees’ risk 
perception was underestimated (Weick, 2010) or failing. Apparently, there is a 
deficiency in the solution-oriented knowledge about the relationship between 
risk communication and risk perception. 
To date, the majority of organisations managing high-risk processes 
disseminate information about risks to their employees through safety 
procedures and guidelines (Bieder and Bourrier, 2013), which is in line with a 
solution-oriented understanding of how knowledge is conveyed. Additionally, 
safety campaigns are designed and implemented according to these guidelines. 
The simple but erroneous assumption is that if someone knows the risks, he or 
she will avoid them. However, this informational approach of communication 
(Koschmann, 2012), in which the risks are explained, is not changing 
employees’ behaviour (Paine, 1965) or mental models concerning risk, nor does 
it keep organisations accident free.  
In an attempt to evaluate the impact of risk communication in organisations 
managing high-risk processes on employees’ risk perception and subsequent 
risk aversive attitudes, this doctoral research asks three key questions: 1) what 
is the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
organisations managing high-risk processes, 2) how do people in these types of 
organisations perceive risks, and 3) how do people in organisations managing 
high-risk processes maintain safe operations? Each of these questions lay at 
the basis of a research project. In a first research project, the literature that 
focuses on the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
organisations managing high-risk processes was systematically reviewed. Its 
findings indicated how trainings, employees’ involvement in the decision making 
process, and hierarchical communication might have an impact on the 
employees’ information processing system, and consequently on their attitudes 
towards risks.  
This led to an empirical research project that focused on how individuals in an 
organisation managing high-risk processes interpret risk communication and 
perceive risk. It turned out that all employees in the studied company have 
 21 
different interpretations of the actual risks in their company. Although this 
research indicated that the mere dissemination of procedures, guidelines, and 
information about risks does not lead to a uniform view of risks among its staff, 
this company had been operating for more than twenty years without having 
faced a critical incident.  
Subsequently, I empirically examined, in a third research project, how this 
organisation maintains safe operations despite the divergent risk perceptions 
among its employees. The findings indicated how all staff are involved in a 
continuous open safety dialogue that constitutes a risk aversive and mindful 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) organisation. These three projects are depicted in 
the figure below (Figure 1-1) and lead to a conceptual framework that will be 
fully explained in Chapter 3 of this first part of the doctoral thesis. 
Based on the findings of my three research projects, and underpinned with the 
theoretical frameworks of High Reliability Organisations (HRO) and 
Communication Constitutes Organisations (CCO), this thesis offers an 
interpretivist view of a conceptual framework for risk communication in 
organisations managing high-risk processes. This framework aims to give an 
initial answer to the question how a communicative dynamic among employees 
might be supported and nurtured, with the aim of constituting an ongoing safety 
dialogue.  
Earlier research in the field of High Reliability Organisations (HROs) indicates 
how maintaining a high degree of operational safety does not depend on a mere 
disseminating of rules or procedures (see for instance: Weick and Roberts, 
1993; Klein et al., 1995; Rochlin, 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), but rather on 
“a free flow of information at all times” (Rochlin, 1999; p. 1554) embedded in “a 
pattern of heedful interrelations of actions in a social system” (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993; p. 357). Still, it was never indicated how these types of 
interrelations have to be designed, supported, or implemented in an 
organisation. Although the five principles supporting HRO (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) and the overarching notion of “mindful organising” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; p. 148) give directions for anticipating and containing incidents, they offer 
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no clear answers on the practical communicative aspects that enhance incident 
free operations.  
 
Figure 1-1 Schematic overview of this doctoral research 
The thesis is structured into four parts. The Linking Document, which is the first 
part of the thesis and the current document being read, describes the rationale 
for this research, the three research projects that were done, the findings of 
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each of the projects and how that all led to contributions to knowledge and 
relevant recommendations for practice. Parts II, III and IV of this thesis describe 
the various research projects in detail: the systematic review of the literature 
(Part II), and two empirical research projects (Part III and IV).  
In this linking document I will frequently refer to specific chapters or sections in 
Parts II, III and IV of this thesis. This might help the reader to explore some 
details or specific evidence for certain claims more rigorously.  
1.2 Personal motivation for undertaking this doctorate 
As a practitioner in the field of risk and crisis communication and management I 
consult to both major international corporations as well as smaller local 
enterprises in how to disseminate messages in such a way that they have an 
impact on employees’ safety savvy. In doing so for more than a decade, I have 
been confronted with two frustrations. The first one had to do with gut feeling, 
while the second one was based on inappropriate answers from the existing 
academic research. Over the next paragraphs I will explain both frustrations as 
the rationale for undertaking this doctoral research. 
1.2.1 The problem with gut feeling 
In a former era of my professional life, between 1993 and 2000, I had been 
working as a journalist for the Belgian Radio and Television Broadcasting 
Company (the BRTN). In this job I covered several small and large crisis 
situations, such as industrial fires, the bankruptcy of a large shipyard, the recall 
of medicines, or corruption in a major charity organisation, just to mention a few. 
Besides a handful of well-executed crisis communication actions, the majority of 
the organisations with which I worked were not able to communicate in a 
comprehensive and responsible way when faced by a crisis situation. When I 
left journalism and became a consultant for predominantly organisations 
managing high-risk processes, I discovered that none of these organisations 
had well developed crisis communication plans or even a decent strategy to 
address a possible crisis situation. I was even more surprised to find out how 
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these organisations spend millions of Euros on communication and public 
relations, but when they were confronted with a crisis situation they were 
ignorant of how to engage with their stakeholders via the media. But, what left 
me totally flabbergasted was my discovery that the majority of these 
organisations had neither a plan, nor decent strategy, to prepare their own staff 
in avoiding crisis situations. Besides a couple of safety procedures to comfort 
insurance companies and safety auditors, they seemed unaware of how to 
engage staff in safety behaviour.  
And then I came in with advice, mainly based on gut feeling, my experience as 
a journalist, and logical reasoning. The legitimate question I was asked over 
and over again was: “And your advice is based on what?” This question was 
predominantly raised by members of the executive team, rarely by 
communication managers. The latter mostly agreed on my advice, while the 
former were reluctant to accept it. This lead to a certain frustration; I was 
convinced of my recommendations, but I was lacking academic insights and 
empirical evidence to persuade some of my clients.  
1.2.2 The problem with existing academic research 
In an attempt to induce those executives among my clientele, I went to HEC 
Paris and Saïd Business School in Oxford for an executive masters’ course on 
change management. My rationale for undertaking this programme was that I 
would find enough academic insights to convince my reluctant clients. The 
reason for undertaking a masters’ in change management was that my main 
objective was to change my clients’ approach on risk communication and safety 
culture. And it did. Solely the fact I was studying at HEC and Saïd Business 
School gave me an intellectual and competitive advantage among the members 
of various executive teams. My business was going well, and I was able to set 
up various challenging projects on risk and crisis communication with multiple 
clients. As the initial frustration about the unsuitable gut feeling was fading 
away, a new one came into sight.  
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The literature I consulted so far was predominantly policy oriented or 
theoretically based, and the majority of the empirical research I found focussed 
mainly on how to communicate risks as well as crisis situations to the general 
public. I found little evidence of good practices on risk communication in 
organisations, and more specifically in organisations managing high-risk 
processes. Scholars such as Slovic, Fischhoff, and Morgan (Slovic et al., 2000; 
Slovic, 2000; Fischhoff and Kadvany, 2011; Morgan et al., 2002) have been 
examining various types of risk communication based on the psychometric 
model, and have been doing extremely valuable research in the affect heuristic 
domain of risks. However, all their research had been based on how civilians1 
react to possible danger or threats, and not on research among employees of 
hazardous industries. Earlier research by Geller (2001) indicated that 
employees of hazardous industries have a divergent perception of risks caused 
by the company they work for than other civilians. Moreover, most of the studies 
in the field of risk communication examine the affective and cognitive reactions 
to certain messages (Kasperson et al., 1988; Slovic at al., 2010; Morgan et al., 
2002), individuals’ information seeking behaviour (Fischhoff et al., 2000), or 
behavioural intentions (Peters et al., 1997; Burns and Slovic, 2010), but not how 
risk communication – and more specifically what kind of communication – might 
have an impact on risk aversive intentions. In other words, it is not because 
employees know the risks, and say that they will take safety measures into 
account, that they do actually behave in a safe way. This gap in the literature on 
how communication might foster risk aversive attitudes became the nucleus of 
my doctoral research. Therefore, the overall question for this doctoral research 
was: how do organisations that manage high-risk processes have to 
communicate risks in a way that it affects all employees’ risk perceptions and 
risk savvy, and eventually leads to safe operations? 
                                            
1 The term ‘civilians’ is widely used in the literature on organisational risk and crisis 
communication. It indicates those persons not belonging to the armed services, emergency 
services, or the concerned organisation(s). 
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1.2.3 In search for a positive deviant 
It was the late Jerry Sternin, a lecturer at the masters’ programme at HEC and 
Saïd Business School, who unintentionally induced me to dig deeper to find an 
answer to this business problem. When explaining to him the issue concerning 
the divide between communication and behaviour, as I observed in businesses, 
he smiled and said: “Knowledge is not changing behaviour. It is more the other 
way around.” His approach to change behaviour by finding positive deviants in 
organisations and communities (Pascale and Sternin, 2005; Pascale et al., 
2010) inspired and encouraged me to undertake this doctoral research. 
Based on my experience as a consultant, I had the feeling that one of my 
clients, a gas-receiving terminal, could be depicted as a ‘positive deviant’. 
Based on my observations, the way this organisation manages its high-risk 
processes, and its approach to involve all staff in some sort of safety 
conversation, was quite unique compared to other clients. That is why I choose 
this gas-receiving terminal as the object of my empirical research. In a first 
research project I examined how the terminal staff perceives risks, based on the 
received communication about the present risks, such as formal communication 
and safety procedures. In a second empirical research project I examined how 
the employees of this gas-receiving terminal engage in an ongoing dialogue 
about safety, and by doing so, constitute the reality of their organisation in such 
a way that ‘doing things in a safe way’ becomes second nature. This confirmed 
my earlier assumption that this company could be described as a positive 
deviant in the industry: one that has learned to change knowledge by doing 
things differently.  
1.3 DBA structure  
To help the reader understand the structure of this document and the specific 
approach of the research process that underpins this doctoral thesis, it might be 
helpful to explain the objective and the format of this doctoral thesis. 
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The research approach for a DBA focuses on topics at the intersection of theory 
and contemporary business issues (EDBAC, 2013). In that perspective this 
thesis aims to bridge both the knowledge and the practical gap between risk 
communication and safety savvy in organisations managing high-risk 
processes. In terms of the overall design, the Cranfield School of Management 
prescribes a structure in which a DBA candidate undertakes various research 
projects. 
Initially, a scoping study on the broad field of risk communication and its impact 
on risk perception were carried out. This study offered an overview of the 
dominant scholars and current theoretical frameworks in this domain. Building 
on this, Project 1 (P1) was a systematic review of the literature on the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations. Based on the findings of this 
review, an empirical research project (Project 2 or P2) was carried out in an 
organisation managing high-risk processes. This project examined the 
individual risk perceptions among all employees in this organisation. The final 
empirical research project (Project 3 or P3) analysed the constitutive role of 
communication in that particular organisation, and its impact on safety culture.  
For more clarity, Table 1-1 offers a brief overview of the review or research 
questions (RQ) that were raised in the different projects. 
Research Question What type of risk communication has a fundamental 
impact on risk perception and safety behaviour in 
organisations managing high-risk processes? 
Scoping Study • RQ: How does risk communication influence the 
construct of risk perceptions among organisational 
members? And what is the role of trust in this 
process?  
Project 1 • RQ: What is the relationship between risk 
perception and risk communication in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations? 
• Systematic Review of the literature based on CIMO-
logic (26 papers) 
Project 2 • RQ: How do people within an organisation perceive 
the same type of risks? What factors affect the 
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perception of these risks? 
• Repertory Grid and qualitative interviews (28 
employees). 
Project 3 • RQ: How do people in an organisation managing 
high-risk processes maintain safe operations? 
• Social Network Analysis, qualitative interviews, 
ethnographic and archival research (28 employees) 
Table 1-1 Overview of the research projects  
In the next chapter of this Linking Document (“Chapter 2 - Summary of the 
research findings and contributions”), I will elaborate on these various research 
projects, frame each of the research questions and their link to the overall 
research objective of this doctoral thesis, and describe the findings. The 
different approaches for each of the research projects will be discussed as well. 
Chapter 3 of this Linking Document offers an extensive analysis of the research 
findings in the context of the overarching theoretical frameworks. This analysis 
forms the basis of a conceptual framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes, while indicating 
my theoretical contributions to the existing knowledge. 
1.4 Definitions of key concepts 
For this doctoral thesis, I explored various themes and concepts, which might 
be helpful to define here. The terms “communication”, “risk”, “perception”, 
“safety behaviour”, “high-reliability organisations”, and “complex interactive and 
tightly coupled” are used in a particular way, and might require clarification to 
give the reader a better understanding of the content. In Chapter 3 of Part I, I 
will elaborate extensively on the theoretical frameworks that underpin these 
terms. 
1.4.1 Communication 
In this research I focus on organisational communication, which refers to all the 
communication activity that happens within organisations (Koschmann, 2010). I 
make a clear distinction between the “the flow of information from one person to 
another” (Dainton and Zelly, 2011; p. 2), and the interactive process between 
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two or more persons that create, sustain or manage meaning about an 
organisational issue (Conrad and Poole, 1998), where I perceive the first one as 
‘information’ and the latter one as ‘communication’. 
In other words, ‘communication’ might be used to indicate the transfer of 
information, as well as an interactive process between two or more persons. 
According to Putnam and Nicotera’s (2010), the latter interpretation might be 
seen as ‘communication-as-verb’, while the transferring form of communication 
might be interpreted as ‘communication-as-noun’. In this thesis I will adhere to 
the ‘communication-as-verb’ view on communication. This view on 
communication as an interactive process in organisations is embedded in the 
Process Organisation Theory, as described by Langley and Tsoukas (2010). 
This will be discussed more broadly in Part IV, paragraph 2.2 (page 232). 
1.4.2 Risk 
Generally, risk is defined in terms of two dimensions; the first concerns 
probabilities, the second concerns effects (Breakwell, 2007). Risk refers to the 
probability or chance individual people, governments and industries take, but 
this can be linked to positive and negative perceptions. If you ask people what 
comes to mind when they think about risk, they will most probably refer to 
health and environmental risks that can have a negative impact on their lives 
(Leiss, 2004). Effect, the second dimension of risk, is linked to a dominant view 
in the literature that refers to risk as a calculation of chance every individual, 
government or industries takes (Breakwell, 2007), and that is associated to both 
positive and negative outcomes (Leiss, 2004). In this mathematical view, risk 
can thus be measured, calculated, and controlled. I further elaborate on the 
term ‘risk’ in Part II, paragraphs 1.3.2 (page 106) and 1.3.5 (page 111). 
As I adhere to a more constructionist view on risk, I support Slovic’s argument 
that human beings invented the concept of risk to cope with the dangers and 
uncertainties of life (Slovic, 2000). Therefore, risk is more a concept constructed 
in the mind, perception and emotion of every individual (Slovic, 2000). 
Consequently the interpretation of risk can vary remarkably, or, as Gurabardhi 
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and Gutteling argue, the concept of ‘risk’ means different things to different 
people (Gurabardhi and Gutteling, 2002, p. 428), and in different situations 
(Ganzach et al., 2008, p. 323).  
Based on these insights, the definition that I am using is that risk is socially 
constructed, and thus both an individual and a collective interpretation of a 
concept that is based on the chance to lose or gain something, which can 
individually or collectively trigger associated perceptions that might have an 
impact on individual, group, institutional or societal level. 
1.4.3 Perception 
The term “perception” appears in various domains such as sociology, 
psychology, and philosophy (Mezias and Starbuck, 2003), and is often 
explained as a phenomenon in both the attribution theory and the cognitive 
theory (Scott and Marshall, 2005). Attribution theory deals with the rules that 
most people use when they try to infer the causes of behaviour they observe, 
and generally attribute their own behaviour to the situation in which they find 
themselves. The cognitive theory is a major cluster of theories in social 
psychology that focus on the links between mental processes, such as 
perception, attitudes or decision-making, and social behaviour. Looking for an 
appropriate terminology for ‘perception’, different alternatives are mentioned in 
the literature, such as sensemaking (Weick, 1993), cognitive frameworks 
(Labianca et al., 2000; Kahneman, 2011), schemas (Labianca et al. 2000), 
frames (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or mental models (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). I further elaborate on the term ‘perception’ in Part II, section 1.3.3 (page 
107) and Part III, section 2.2 (page 174). 
From a constructionist point of view, I am more focused on the dynamic role of 
perceptions and how that interferes or steers behaviour. Therefore, the 
definition that I am using is based on Barr and Huff’s (1997) view that 
perceptions are dynamic processes that lead to decisions and subsequent 
behaviour, and are largely based on individual and collective schemas, frames, 
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or mental models and the way people try to fit new information into these 
existing schemas, frames, or mental models. 
1.4.4 Safety behaviour 
In the context of risk and safety, accidents never simply occur; they are always 
seen as caused by someone or something (Hopkins, 2005). This means that 
someone behaves in such a way that it provokes harm. In an attempt to avoid 
harm, some form of safety behaviour might avoid the occurrence of an accident, 
or at least minimise its consequences. According to Antonsen (2009) a 
definition of safety consists of three elements: 1) it refers to a state or situation 
where the statistical risk seems to be acceptable or as low as possible, 2) it 
refers to a feeling of security and control, and 3) it refers to our ability to reduce 
or eliminate the likelihood of hazardous events occurring (Antonsen, 2009; p. 7). 
Therefore, the term ‘safety behaviour’ is interpreted in this research as the way 
someone acts or conducts himself/herself towards the presence of some hazard 
or risk, being knowledgeable of the practices needed to diminish or eliminate 
the potential risks. 
1.4.5 High-reliability organisations 
High-reliability organisations' (HROs) aim to maintain excellent safety records 
over a long time period despite operating in high-hazardous environments 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993; Lekka and Sugden, 2011). The concept of HROs 
emerged in the 1980s when scholars from the University of California, Berkeley 
(the so-called ‘Berkeley group’), studied how organisations operating with ‘high 
hazard’ technologies manage to remain accident-free for impressive lengths of 
time while meeting high production goals (Denyer et al., 2008; Shrivastava et 
al., 2009). The basic principles of HRO focus on how organisations can create 
mindful infrastructures that diminish or even postpone damage produced by 
unexpected events and impair reliable performance (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; 
p. 2). It argues that organisations can avoid failures by the early tracking of 
small failures, reluctance to oversimplification, remaining sensitive to 
operations, maintaining capabilities for resilience, and by deference to 
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expertise. High-reliability theorists emphasise the human errors school of 
thought (Reason, 1997), which suggest that failures can be attributed to people.  
Karl Weick, who could be seen as the HRO theorist (Antonsen, 2009), clarified: 
“If there is one flaw with the phrase ‘High Reliability Organization’, it is that 
these three words are too static. We’d all be better off if we kept referring to 
High Reliability Organizing. Systems, teams, groups, and the best laid plans all 
unravel. You have to keep redoing them” (USDA, 2004; p. 63 – emphasis in 
original text). In line with Weick’s remark, more recently Hopkins (2007) 
emphasised on identifying practices and processes that allow organisations to 
achieve high standards of reliability, rather than identifying criteria that 
organisations need to achieve to be classified as an HRO. In this research, I will 
explore the reliability-enhancing practices that are at play in a high-reliability 
organisation. A more elaborated view on HRO will be explained in Part IV, 
paragraph 1.3 (pages 228-230).  
1.4.6 Complex interactive and tightly coupled 
It was Charles Perrow who coined the concept of organisations managing 
complex interactive and tightly coupled systems (Perrow, 1999; p. 327). 
Coupling concerns the degree to which certain actions in one part of the system 
directly affect other parts in the system. In other words, the term “tight coupling” 
means, “there is no slack or buffer or give between two items. What happens in 
one directly affects what happens in the other” (Perrow, 1999; p. 90). Interactive 
complexity refers to how the different parts or components in a system interact. 
These “connections are not only adjacent, serial ones, but can multiply as other 
parts or units or subsystems are reached” (Perrow, 1999; p. 75). As a 
consequence, these complex interactive systems cannot be easily shut down or 
bypassed and fixed as soon as something is happening. The opposite of a 
complex interactive system is a linear interactive system. In a linear interactive 
system “production is carried out through a series or sequence of steps laid out 
in a line” (Perrow, 1999; p. 72), while the number of parts is irrelevant. 
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By using a two-by-two dimension of complex/linear interactions and tight/loose 
coupling systems, four quadrants will appear. The types of organisations that 
are situated in the ‘complex interactions/tight coupling’ quadrant include nuclear 
power plants and chemical plants. These are the kind of organisations my 
research focuses on.  
A more elaborated view on Perrow’s (1999) concept of complex interactive and 
tightly coupled systems, and its distinct difference with HRO, will be explained in 
Part II, under section 1.3.1 (pages 101-105).  
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2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will introduce each of the three research projects, and describe 
the rationale for examining the role each played in relation to the overall 
research question. A detailed overview of each of the research projects (P1, P2, 
and P3) can be consulted in Parts II, III, and IV of this doctoral thesis. First, I 
introduce the scoping study of the literature as an initial point of entrance into 
the literature on risk communication and risk perception. Subsequently, I 
describe each of the three research projects that underpin this thesis to provide 
an initial broader view of the context in which organisations managing high-risk 
processes operate. Next, I outline the specific approach for addressing the 
research question and the applied research methods, and offer the key findings 
of the research. Subsequently, I raise one or more remarks that will lead to the 
next research project. And finally, I make my claims by indicating my 
contribution to knowledge.  
In a separate chapter (Part I - Chapter 3) I will discuss the research findings in 
the broader context of the existing literature and applied theories, and propose 
a conceptual framework for a constitutive view on risk communication in 
organisations managing high-risk processes.  
2.2 Scoping study 
The aim of the scoping study was to have a broad multidisciplinary overview of 
the literature in the domains of risk communication, risk perception, and the role 
of trust in the common area between both fields of interest. The objective, 
however, was not to seek final answers to the issue of risk communication’s 
impact on safety behaviour, but rather an attempt to understand how risk 
communication might influence risk perceptions among organisational 
members. As recommended by Tranfield and his colleagues (2003), the 
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conducting of a scoping study prior to a systematic review of the literature is 
necessary to assess the relevance and size of the literature in the field of 
research and to delimit the subject area or topic.  
This scoping study resulted in an initial overview of basic definitions, models, 
and theories in the aforementioned domains. However, I discovered that the 
dominant amount of literature focuses on how civilians and not employees deal 
with risk perceptions and messages about risks. When it comes to risk 
communication in organisations, multiple scholars (for example: Douglas and 
Wildavsky, 1982; Peters et al., 1997; DiBella, 2001; Hudson, 2001, Coan, 2002) 
indicate communication as an essential tool to create and promote a safety 
culture. Unfortunately, they do not disclose the communicative mechanisms or 
the required design for achieving impact on safety behaviour.  
On the other hand, the scoping study uncovered how people generally perceive 
and interpret messages about risks, and how risk experts seldom manage to 
persuade lay people to taking precautionary measures (Breakwell, 2007; 
Terpstra et al., 2009) or avoiding risks (Slovic, 2000). Paul Slovic (2000; 2010) 
and his colleagues (Kasperson et al., 1988; Leiss, 1995; Slovic et al., 2002, 
Fischhoff and Kadvany, 2011) indicated the difference between the experts’ 
view and the public’s view on risks in multiple studies, and demonstrated how 
among the latter, opinions about various risks might vary based on perceived 
benefits. This indicates a divide between knowing the risks and the 
interpretation of those risks, as well as a gap between the individual evaluation 
of risks among various people. However, these scholars did not indicate an 
actual change in behaviour based on the interpretation of the risks, but rather 
the respondents’ expressed behavioural intentions.  
Therefore, a more profound analysis of the literature was required to investigate 
the relationship between risk communication and risk perception. To delimit the 
subject area (Tranfield et al., 2003) the organisations managing high-risk 
technologies were addressed in a systematic review of the literature.  
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2.3 Project 1 
2.3.1 Context 
The objective of the systematic review was to conduct a critical review of a body 
of literature concerning the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations in order to 
uncover what was known and unknown about the chosen topic, based on 
existing theories, empirical research texts and policy texts. Therefore, a closer 
look at the context, the interventions, and the mechanisms that influence or 
impact the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in these 
specific types of organisations was based on the following research question: 
what is the relationship between risk perception and risk communication in 
organisations with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems?  
2.3.2 Approach 
The rationale behind the systematic review was that by examining the literature 
on risk communication and risk perception in this very delimited area, 
recommendations could be made to improve practices in risk communication 
that will ultimately lead to a better safety culture. As the scoping study indicated, 
the existing research exploring the relationship between risk communication 
and risk perception predominantly focuses on the way civilians deal with 
messages about possible danger. Therefore, it was worthwhile to examine the 
literature that explores this relationship in an organisational context, and more 
specifically in organisations managing high-risk processes.  
In an attempt to examine the literature rigorously, the so-called ‘CIMO-logic’ 
(Denyer et al., 2008) was applied as a way to synthesise and structure the 
existing literature. Moreover, Denyer and his colleagues (2008) illustrated this 
logic for exploring the development of design propositions with earlier published 
research literature in the field of high-reliability organisations. This CIMO-logic 
involves a combination of a problematic Context, for which a certain Intervention 
type produces, through specified generative Mechanisms, the intended 
 37 
Outcome. The rationale is that by examining Context, Interventions, 
Mechanisms and Outcomes in the specific domain of risk communication and 
risk perception in organisations managing high-risk processes, 
recommendations could be made to improve risk communication practices in 
these types of organisations. For an extensive view on the rationale applying 
the CIMO-logic, see Part II, section 2.2 (pages 115-118). 
2.3.3 Research method 
As the objective of this systematic review was to develop a reliable knowledge 
base which aims to serve both academic and practitioner communities 
(Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 220), the aim was to uncover what is known and 
unknown about the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations based on 
existing theories, empirical research texts and policy texts. In an attempt to be 
as inclusive as possible, no difference was made between various ontological or 
epistemological perspectives in the literature. Although I adhere to an 
interpretivist perspective, it was important to place my research interests within 
the wider debate to synthesise different findings of this relationship.  
From a total number of 2956 reviewed articles, retrieved from various academic 
databases, 26 were selected for the systematic review. The selection was 
based on various criteria, such as source, content, and a severe quality 
assessment to assure the review was based on “the best-quality evidence” 
(Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 215). A separate set of quality appraisal criteria based 
on theory, literature review, method, integration, and contribution, was applied 
for all research papers that passed the initial assessment criteria (see Part II, 
section 2.4.4 on pages 126-128).  
In an attempt to offer more solution-oriented or prescriptive knowledge to 
increase the relevance for practice in management science, the various findings 
in the literature were catalogued according to the four pillars of CIMO (i.e. 
context, interventions, mechanisms and outcomes). A detailed overview of the 
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research process is described in Part II of this thesis, under section 2.5 (pages 
129-132). 
2.3.4 Findings 
The findings of the systematic review looked quite fragmented, as we cannot 
follow the simple reasoning that in order to achieve a specific outcome, we have 
to apply some kind of magic formula. Although Denyer and his colleagues 
propose to include “a combination of interventions (I1 … In) that invoke 
particular generative mechanisms (M1 … Mn) to produce a particular outcome 
(O) in a specific context (C)” (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 407), still, the interventions 
are described in an imprecise way. A “comprehensible hierarchical 
communication” (indicated by Hambach et al., 2011), for example, does not give 
a precise description of the form or content of this communication. 
As both the context (complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations) and 
the required outcome are known, the practical problem is situated in the 
interventions that invoke certain mechanisms. In other words, the key question 
for the systematic review of the literature was how managers have to 
communicate with their subordinates to provoke risk awareness that will lead to 
safe or risk aversive behaviour. These interventions and subsequent 
mechanisms, as revealed by systematically reviewing the literature, include: 
• Put safety trainings and learning systems in place, adapt them to the 
different levels in the organisation (based on knowledge, experience, 
etc.), champion these trainings, and make sure these actions are not 
perceived as a “top-down” initiative for the benefit of management to get 
high scores on safety audits (Grote and Künzler, 2000; Harvey et al., 
2001; Specht et al., 2006; Beus, et al., 2010), 
• Install a hierarchical communication, based on comprehensible content 
that resonates with the employees’ problem domain familiarity and their 
beliefs concerning the perceived levels of control or luck (Hambach et al. 
2011), 
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• Add people from throughout the organisation to the decision process. 
This requires a ‘no blame, no shame’ context where organisational 
members are respected and valued for their expertise and problem 
domain familiarity (Beus et al., 2010), 
• Introduce a ‘Human Risk Management System’ as it reveals the role 
social processes play when risks have to be communicated. The context 
in which employees in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations find themselves and how they perceive certain risks differ 
substantially from risk perceptions among civilians. In this, management 
has influence in supporting people in their sharing of a safety culture 
(Specht et al., 2006). 
On the receivers’ side of the risk communication, it appeared that individuals 
process information according to an associative or rule-based system (Dillon 
and Tinsley, 2008). This suggests that risk perception, based on received risk 
information, is a process that might differ among individuals (for more 
clarification, see Part II, sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 on pages 151-154). This 
insight was used to build my first empirical research project on. I will explain this 
in section 2.4 (Project 2). 
2.3.5 Contributions 
The aim of this systematic was to synthesise and structure existing insights on 
the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations. Therefore it offered a direction for 
further research, rather than contributions to knowledge. It suggests how 
individuals perceive and interpret risk messages according to their information-
processing system. Still, this conclusion was based on research that explored 
how both NASA-employees and survey respondents interpret messages about 
near misses, and its impact on decision-making under risk (Dillon and Tinsley, 
2008). Therefore, a deeper insight in the information-processing systems and 
subsequent individual risk perceptions among employees in an organisation 
managing high-risk processes was required. 
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2.3.6 Remarks 
From an interpretivist point of view, I was not expecting to receive a clear-cut 
answer from the literature on how to communicate risks to have an impact on 
employees’ risk perceptions and risk aversive attitudes. However, I was 
surprised about the ease with which various authors use the word 
‘communication’ in the context of transferring information from point A to point 
B. None of the reviewed papers made a critical reflection on the interactive 
cognitive and social processes that might influence the interpretation of the 
received information (Rochlin, 1999). This might indicate that my assumption 
about how risk communication should work - namely not simply as an 
information tool but as a means to create risk awareness - is wrong. On the 
other hand, it might suggest that all the reviewed literature simply takes for 
granted that transferring information is the most optimal way to adjust 
employees’ risk perceptions that ultimately will lead to safe behaviour. In an 
attempt to question this assumption and to acquire more insights on the effects 
of communication in these types of organisations, I undertook an empirical 
research project that focused on individual appreciation of risk. 
2.4 Project 2 
2.4.1 Situation 
The second project investigated the individual risk perceptions of all staff in an 
onshore gas-receiving terminal (GRT). Along with GRT being a good example 
of an organisation managing high-risk processes, it is a prime example of an 
organisation that puts considerable efforts and resources in communicating 
risks, safety guidelines and procedures. In all, there are over 500 Standard 
Operating Guidelines (SOGs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in 
use at this GRT. They have safety meetings on a daily basis, multiple safety 
trainings and crisis simulation exercises on a yearly basis. My assumption was 
that if this GRT has been doing a good job in communicating the risks, every 
single employee – or at least the majority – would have a fairly good idea of 
those risks. This assumption was based on the existing communication models 
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that all indicate how information might lead to adapted or new insights, 
knowledge generation, or even behavioural change (see for instance: Shannon 
and Weaver, 1949; Schramm, 1954; Berlo, 1960; Dozier et al., 1995; Hübner, 
2007). Therefore, the research questions that were raised for this empirical 
project were: do people within a complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation perceive the same type of risks differently? If so, what factors 
affect the perception of these risks? 
2.4.2 Approach 
In an attempt to examine individual risk perceptions, and whether these 
perceptions are in line with the communicated safety guidelines and 
procedures, I conducted an empirical research project among all employees of 
an onshore natural gas-receiving terminal in Belgium. This onshore gas terminal 
promotes a so-called ‘Risk Alerting Matrix’. This Alerting Matrix describes four 
domains (risks related to operations, to personal injuries, to emissions, and to 
criminal acts) and compels every employee to alert the management team in 
case something in one of these domains happens. This ‘Risk Alerting Matrix’ is 
frequently communicated and used in every training or crisis simulation 
exercise. My objective was to discover the extent to which the employees’ 
interpretations of risk matched this ‘Risk Alerting Matrix’. 
2.4.3 Research method 
In an attempt to address the research questions, the use of a Repertory Grid 
technique offered the possibility to uncover different constructs concerning risk 
as perceived by different individuals in this organisation. Repertory Grid stems 
from the Personal Construct Theory as proposed by George Kelly (1955). Kelly 
believed that, in an effort to make sense of their world, human beings 
individually develop constructions or theories of their world in relation to 
themselves. These constructions are not fixed, but they change according to 
new experiences (Kelly, 1955). By applying Repertory Grid-based interviews as 
a research method, it offered the possibility to make unarticulated or implicit 
individual constructs of sensemaking explicit (Cassell and Walsh, 2004). The 
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Repertory Grid technique was not only a powerful tool that helps respondents 
“articulate their views on complex issues” (Goffin, 2002; p. 199), it is also 
perceived as a valuable qualitative method for organisational research in the 
field of risk analysis (Gammack and Stephens, 1994; Cassell and Walsh, 2004) 
and management research in general (Goffin, 2002). In this case, the Repertory 
Grid technique was not used to rate participants’ responses and to analyse 
them according to factor analysis, but within an interview setting to obtain 
qualitative data. It also offered the possibility to tap into the individual’s tacit 
knowledge, and uncovered how each of them made sense of risks in his or her 
organisation.  
A more detailed overview of the research method is described in Part III of this 
thesis, under the sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 (pages 179-185). 
2.4.4 Findings 
The research design was set up in such a way that all staff, from CEO to 
maintenance personnel, were asked to indicate the risks they perceive as 
threatening to normal operations, and those risks with minimal or no impact to 
operations. The use of the repertory grid technique helped the interviewees to 
reflect on various aspects of risks and to express more precisely how they 
interpret those risks. The various risk elements and constructs offered by the 
interviewees are presented in two tables in Part III, on page 190 (Table 3-4) and 
page 191 (Table 3-5).  
In this research, various parameters were checked to identify plausible factors 
that influence risk perceptions. From the literature we know that trust in the 
communicator (Conchie and Burns, 2008; Schoorman et al., 2007), social group 
relationships (Kasperson et al., 1988), domain familiarity (Gutteling, 1993), and 
heuristics and biases (Kasperson et al., 1988; Kahneman, 2011) all have an 
impact on how individuals perceive risk. However, all of these findings are 
based on research among civilians in relation to governments who are 
communicating with them, and not with staff in organisations managing high-risk 
technologies.  
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It can be argued that trust between the communicator and the receiver of risk 
information at GRT is relatively high. It is a small group of colleagues (29 in 
total) who have known each other for a long time: 13.5 years on average, and 
almost 50 percent of them for 20 years. None of the 28 interviewees mentioned 
anything indicative of bad intentions or a lack of confidence in the words and 
actions of their colleagues. In a few cases operation supervisors and 
maintenance staff did finger-point at each other with regard to neglecting safety 
rules. It is my interpretation that this was not an expression of distrust, but 
rather an effort to emphasise how good they themselves knew the risks and 
safety rules in comparison to others. On the other hand, the question could be 
raised as to whether this high level of trust at GRT is weakening the 
organisation from a safety perspective. Earlier findings by Conchie and Donald 
(2006) who studied the role of trust and distrust in a similar type of organisation, 
i.e. an offshore gas installation operating on the UK Continental Shelf (Conchie 
and Donald, 2006) suggest finger pointing can be helpful. They revealed how 
attitudes of distrust “such as checking and scepticism have a functional role of 
ensuring a safe work environment” (Conchie and Donald, 2006; p. 1158).  In 
GRT what seemed to emerge was a similar ‘healthy’ level of distrust, in which 
individuals checked up on one another and were not afraid of pointing out faults. 
Concerning social group relationships and domain familiarity it can be argued 
that the majority of staff at GRT have a similar educational background (12 
undergraduates, 11 with a graduate degree, and two engineers), and a large 
group share common work experience, as 12 out of 28 were among the first 
employees who started working at this terminal back in 1992.  
When it comes to heuristics, however, there is a significant dissimilarity 
between the employees who had witnessed a life-threatening crisis situation at 
their previous job, and those who had not. Almost a quarter of all employees (6 
in total) indicated they had experienced a severe crisis situation, such as a fire 
on board of a ship, an explosion at a chemical plant that killed three blue-collar 
workers, an emission of a highly toxic product (H2S), or the safety operations at 
the Herald of Free Enterprise (a ship that capsized on the night of 6 March 
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1987, moments after leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge, killing 193 
passengers and crew).  
Five of these are operation supervisors, and one is a member of the 
maintenance team. Together, they mentioned 36 different risk elements, 
whereas 15 risks are directly linked to their experienced life-threatening 
situation. An overview of the differences between the different ZPT-employees 
who experienced a crisis situation and those who did not is presented in Figure 
5-1 on page 215. 
We see that those who experienced a crisis situation are sensitive to ‘Fires & 
leaks’ as well as the other employees, but they are much more concerned about 
‘Injuries & illness’, ‘Behavioural issues’, and problems with ‘Facilitating 
systems’. There might be a twofold explanation for this. Firstly, due to their 
crisis experience they have some kind of knowledge of how systems might 
break down, quite often by wrong manipulation and how this has an impact on 
personal injuries (4 out of 6 interviewees who witnessed a severe crisis situation 
at a previous job attributed these incidents to behavioural issues when dealing 
with systems that eventually lead to personal injuries). Secondly, it might be 
argued that these persons have a fairly good knowledge of the company’s 
procedures. As earlier indicated, these procedures predominantly focus on how 
to prevent systems’ failures and personal injuries, and thus give clear guidelines 
on safety behaviour. 
Comparing the constructs that were offered by all the interviewees and those 
who experienced a crisis situation, the differences are less explicit. The 
employees who experienced a life-threatening crisis situation predominantly talk 
about ‘Human factors’ and ‘Plant & process related issues’, and less about 
‘Tangible & non-tangible damage’ and ‘Organisational relation structures’. 
Moreover, the six employees who experienced a crisis situation came up with 
more constructs (56 in total, an average of 9,33 per person) than their 
colleagues (184 constructs in total, an average of 8,36 per person). (For more 
details see Figure 5-2 on page 216). 
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This indicates that the employees who had experienced a life-threatening crisis 
situation at a previous job have a different view of the actual risks in the 
organisation. Furthermore, these employees also acknowledge the importance 
of crisis experiences in their attitude versus risk at work. This is apparent in the 
following quotes:   
“That’s the big disadvantage here; we don’t face problems. Because nothing 
serious is happening here, no one has a sound knowledge of all the possible 
dangers on this plant. You do learn from your mistakes. But here, we don’t learn 
anything at all.” (Interviewee #26) 
There is evidence in the field of fire-fighters’ trainings that by increasing the 
reality level of the exercises, for instance by experiencing a real ‘flashover’ (this 
is when the majority of an exposed surface in a space is heated to its auto-
ignition temperature and emits flammable gases. Flashovers normally occur at 
500  °C) in a simulator, fire-fighters’ practical knowledge and risk awareness will 
increase massively (Daniels, 2006; Baumann et al., 2011). Therefore it could be 
argued that heuristics of real life-threatening situations do indeed have an 
impact on employees’ risk perception.  
Summarised, the results indicated that every single person in this GRT has 
divergent interpretations of the present risks. Although the majority of the 
employees referred to risks that appear in the ‘Risk Alerting Matrix’, and thus 
risks that GRT indicates as crucial in the sense of bringing the operations and 
likely the existence of the company in danger, no two individuals indicated 
exactly the same risks. Furthermore, it revealed that those employees 
occupying different roles in the organisation have very different perceptions of 
workplace risks. These differences are affected by various factors such as the 
level of experience and tacit knowledge. However, previous real life threatening 
experiences appeared to be a dominant predictor for a broader and more 
divergent view on the present risks. These findings suggest that the transfer of 
information concerning organisational risks does not achieve the initial aim of 
the risk communication, namely creating a common ground of knowledge 
concerning present risks in the organisation. Therefore, it refuted my earlier 
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assumption concerning the effect of risk communication, as it indicated how the 
transfer of risk information in an organisation managing high-risk processes 
does not lead to generic risk perceptions among the staff.  
2.4.5 Contributions 
This empirical research offered contributions to both practice and knowledge. 
On a practical level, the repertory grid method for discussing safety issues and 
risks was perceived by the management team of this gas-receiving terminal as 
a valuable tool for internal use. However, I am not aware of the effective 
implementation of the repertory grid technique in this company yet. In a session 
I held after finishing P2, in which I elucidated the findings of my research, two 
members of the management team indicated that the use of the repertory gird 
technique might offer the possibility to align various views concerning safety, 
management issues, and other daily topics of discussion, as it helps employees 
to articulate their ideas more clearly.  
On a theoretical level, this research contested the dominant way of looking at 
organisational communication (Dozier et al., 1995) that is based on ‘the 
mathematical model of communication’ (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This 
mathematical model is based on a mere transfer of information from a sender to 
one or more receivers. The gas-receiving terminal that was the focus of my 
research applied this model as well to disseminate the more than 500 safety 
procedures and guidelines. However, this research demonstrates that people 
do not “receive” information, but rather interpret it in their mental framework. 
This claim can be supported by the data of P2 indicating how the majority of the 
interviewees referred to descriptions of risks they experienced previously as life 
threatening (those who experienced a real life crisis situation), harmful (as they 
once had a minor injury), unhealthy (as one of their close colleagues was 
suffering from cancer), malicious (as some of the employees just went through 
a realistic simulation training of a criminal act), or systemic (such as a break-
down of the computer system). I will elaborate further on this contribution in the 
next chapter of this linking document (Part I - Chapter 3, pages 57-83). Finally, 
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it can be argued that besides the divergent risk perceptions among the 
interviewees at this gas receiving terminal, the method of Repertory Grid 
uncovered how employees who experienced a crisis situation came up with 
more constructs than their colleagues. 
2.4.6 Remarks 
Concluding that communication, in the sense of transferring information from 
management to employees, has no effect at all on the employees’ risk 
perceptions might be a bridge too far. Although all the staff of this gas-receiving 
terminal mentioned different risks, the most alluded to risks can be found in the 
domain of risks related to operations. That is no surprise as this domain is 
directly linked to the gas-receiving terminal’s core business. However, it might 
be argued that the informational approach of communication (Koschmann, 
2012) that is practised in this organisation is not fulfilling its initial aim: creating a 
common mindset about the actual risks.  
On the other hand, it raises the question of how this gas terminal has managed 
to coordinate safe operations over more than 20 years, while every single 
employee holds divergent interpretations of the actual risks in this gas terminal. 
This question formed the basis for the third and final research project. 
2.5 Project 3 
2.5.1 Context 
The previous empirical research project (P2) indicated how every single 
individual in an onshore gas terminal holds divergent interpretations of the 
present risks. This suggests that transmitting information through various forms 
of communication fails to create a uniform perceived interpretation of the 
potential risks in the organisation. Given that, these variable risk perceptions 
might actually endanger safe operations, as every individual perceives potential 
danger differently. On the other hand, the gas terminal that was the subject of 
this empirical research has been operating accident-free for more than twenty 
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years, which is at odds with the average number of fatal accident rates in 
onshore gas companies (OGP, 2012; DNV, 2013). Therefore it might be argued 
that this gas-receiving terminal was relying on pure luck, or that it has achieved 
some form of coordinated safety behaviour. In an attempt to uncover what 
exactly happens in this organisation, and how it has managed safe operations 
for over more than two decades, this research project explored the interactive 
processes between all the staff.  
2.5.2 Approach 
For this research, the work on high reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) was taken as the main theoretical source (for more details, see Part IV, 
section 1.3 on pages 228-230). Other theoretical sources that underpinned this 
research were the work on Process Organisation Studies (Langley and 
Tsoukas, 2010), and on Communication Constitutes Organisations (Putnam 
and Nicotera, 2010) (for more details, see Part IV, sections 2.2 and 2.3 on 
pages 232-234). All these theoretical sources are rooted in an interpretivist 
epistemology.  
In the next chapter of this linking document (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 on pages 
61-66) I will elaborate on these theoretical sources.  
2.5.3 Research methods 
As my research project aimed to uncover the networks of communicative acts 
about risks and safety, the research was designed to indicate how these 
interactions play out, who is interacting with whom, and how it is unfolding (for 
more details, see Part IV, section 3.4 on pages 238-244). According to 
Blaschke and his colleagues (2012), social network analysis is the most suitable 
research method for examining this constitutive character of communication 
(see Part IV, section 3.1 on pages 235-236). Besides the data acquired through 
social network analysis (SNA), three other sets of data were analysed: 1) 
qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews, 2) ethnographical data and 
3) archival data (for more details, see Part IV, section 3.4 on pages 238-239).  
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The research explored four dimensions, three were based on the theoretical 
HRO framework, and one was based on findings of my previous research 
project (P2). The three HRO dimensions, as theorised by Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2007), were anticipation, containment, and mindful organising. The one linked 
to my previous research examined the impact of social relationships on 
reporting safety issues. An overview of the various questions, linked to the two 
HRO dimensions and the social relationships, which were raised and analysed 
in the social network analysis, can be found in Part IV, section 4.1, Table 4-1 on 
page 247).  
The fourth dimension, mindful organising (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), was 
analysed through coding of the interview data. More details concerning the 
findings and how they were analysed can be found in Part IV, section 4.7 on 
pages 265-269.  
2.5.4 Findings 
The analysis of all the SNA, the qualitative interviews, and the ethnographical 
data, indicated how in this organisation literally everyone is talking to everyone 
about safety. Figure 2-1 (on page 50) offers an almost unique illustration of how 
the entire organisation has an ongoing conversation about safety and potential 
risks.  
Everyone in this organisation refers to others as an initiator of safety 
conversations, and at the same time everyone is also indicated as an initiator of 
these types of conversations. A detailed overview of the findings that support 
how everyone talks to everyone about safety in this organisation is presented in 
Part IV, section 4.4.2 on pages 253-255. 
Data indicated that these safety conversations are rooted in the safety 
procedures and guidelines, which in turn are the result of active conversations 
about how to improve safety related issues by refining existing procedures and 
guidelines (see Part IV, section 4.4.1 on page 251). The management team has 
a specific supporting role in the mindful organising processes (see Part IV, 
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section 4.8 on pages 269-270). While they have created a mental space for 
these types of conversations - they call it “the open safety dialogue” - the data 
indicated that the management team has a leading role in feeding, conducting 
and supporting these conversations (see Part IV, section 4.4.3 on pages 255-
256). Moreover, this open safety dialogue creates a certain culture in which 
employees feel comfortable to approach and correct each other when observing 
unsafe situations. More than 82 percent (23 out of 28 employees) indicated they 
would immediately address the person who is creating an unsafe situation (see 
Part IV, page 251). The data also indicated that there was no correlation 
between social relationships and safety reporting. In other words, even people 
with longstanding friendships, indicated they will address and correct their 
friends if they detect unsafe actions.  
 
Figure 2-1 Social network map, indicating employees’ engagement in 
safety conversations 
With regard to the overarching HRO principle of mindful organising, the 
interview data showed how all the attitudes and prerequisites for creating a 
safety culture are present among the staff, and how standardised processes are 
constantly discussed, aligned, and evaluated prior to starting a job. To achieve 
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high reliability, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) indicate ‘mindful organising’ as an 
overarching prerequisite. It is about a set of attitudes, such as “human 
alertness, experience, skill, deference, communication, paradoxical action, 
boldness, and caution” (Weick et al., 1999; p. 105-106), that aim to foresee the 
unforeseeable. This attitude of mindful organising encourages organisational 
members to detect flaws or minor mistakes that they may have missed before, 
and in this way it prevents an organisation from unwanted events. Hence, it 
describes a corporate culture in which safety values and expectations about risk 
averse behaviour and early (mindful) detections of flows are encouraged. In an 
attempt to instil and maintain such a corporate culture, Weick and Sutcliffe 
denote five elements that have to be put in place as a prerequisite to produce a 
culture of mindful organising. These elements are: thinking differently about 1) 
success, 2) simplification, 3) strategy, 4) plans, and 5) authority (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 148).  
In an attempt to gauge ZPT’s ability for mindful organising, all the interviews 
and ethnographical data were analysed and coded according to two sets of 
elements: the prerequisites for creating a culture of mindful organising (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007), and attitudes to foresee the unforeseeable (Weick et al., 
1999). In the next sections I will discuss each set of elements separately. A 
complete overview of all the data can be consulted on page 76, Table 3-1. 
2.5.4.1 Attitudes 
It might be argued that foreseeing something unforeseeable (Weick et al., 1999) 
is an almost impossible task, as the latter is intrinsically linked to something that 
is not possible to anticipate or predict. Therefore, Weick and his colleagues 
indicate a set of attitudes (human alertness, experience, skill, deference, 
communication, paradoxical action, boldness, and caution) which, when they 
are present among staff, might provide warning signs of possible flaws or 
danger (Weick et al., 1999).  
The interview data of this second empirical research project (P3) indicates how 
all these attitudes are present among staff, predominantly in combined sets. An 
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example of this is when someone recalls how he or she interacted with a 
colleague concerning something that involves deference to the other person’s 
expertise, based on a concept of being cautious in operations, and alertness. 
The following example illustrates how an Adjunct Operation Supervisor 
mentions communication, deference, alertness and caution in one single quote: 
“In fact, I do talk to everyone about safety. When I see someone from 
maintenance who might be involved in my project, I will definitely approach him 
about certain issues that might pop up. These guys know all the ins and outs of 
our plant, better than anyone else. Recently, a couple of contractors had to do a 
repair job on the metering installation. It was a rainy day, and I was worried 
about how to avoid water in the installation. I discussed this with my colleague 
and warned the on-call maintenance guy.” 
The most frequently mentioned elements are communication and experience. 
As already indicated in the findings of the social network analysis, the threshold 
level among employees for approaching each other to indicate potential 
dangerous behaviour of risks is very low. One member of the maintenance staff 
articulated it in this way: “When I see someone doing something stupid, I will 
immediately say ‘you’re not doing a good job, pal!’ This will be reported anyway. 
And if it concerns serious misconduct, I will immediately inform our HSEQ 
manager; to say ‘that guy over there is definitely not doing it right’. In my view, 
that’s what needs to be done. Irrespective of who’s doing something stupid.”  
Formal communication in terms of alignment concerning the safe execution of 
jobs is also mentioned quite often. It illustrates how standardised processes are 
constantly discussed, aligned, and evaluated prior to the start of a job, and thus 
clearly indicates a mindful attitude. “Every morning, the COO passes by, just to 
check if we are expecting anything special that day. The same story with our 
CTO. And our morning meeting of course where we discuss various issues,” an 
Adjunct Operation Supervisor recalled. One operation supervisor added: “A 
recurring topic at the morning meetings is the question how we might improve 
safety. Quite often Jan, our HSEQ manager, starts this conversation by 
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introducing a randomly chosen issue. It also happens that a minor incident 
becomes the theme for an in-depth discussion on how to improve things.” 
The element of ‘experience’ is predominantly linked to know-how of the job, 
such as “I will explain to them what I experienced, and how I solved it, more in 
the sense of making sure they will not fall into the same trap as I once did” 
(according to an Operation Supervisor). Still, experience is also often linked to 
insights and knowledge acquired in trainings and subsequently applied to the 
job: “Trainings and exercises clearly indicate the [safety] direction we’re aiming 
for”, and “We all have more or less the same level of knowledge, based on the 
trainings we all followed here in the company. But luckily, everyone has different 
skills. Both, skills and knowledge, give us all the required experiences to 
manage this plant safely” (mentioned by two different Maintenance staff 
members). 
2.5.4.2 Culture 
When it comes to thinking differently about success, simplification, strategy, 
plans, and authority (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), it is remarkable how many 
employees at ZPT mention authority (21 out of 28) and strategy (18 out of 28). 
In almost all the interviews, both aforementioned elements are linked to 
management actions, initiatives or vision. The following quotes support this: 
“there is no blaming culture in this company” (a manager), “We don’t have a 
‘normal’ hierarchy in this organisation; new entrees can learn as much from 
employees who have been working here for more than fifteen years, and vice 
versa. You will find that attitude in our management team as well” (an operation 
supervisor), and “Our management team made it very clear that safety is 
everyone’s responsibility” (maintenance labourer). This last quote is confirmed 
by “We are all safety officers in this organisation” (an adjunct operation 
supervisor).  
It might be argued that the elements for producing a culture of mindful 
organising, as described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), are predominantly 
linked to management actions. Envisioning success, simplifying processes, 
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adapting and implementing a strategy, making organisational plans, and 
exerting authority, are all typical leadership or management tasks. That might 
explain why predominantly members of the management team referred to these 
elements to produce a culture of mindful organising (see Table 3-2). 
A concluding consideration is linked to Antonsen’s (2009) connotation of “a 
‘good’ safety climate” (p. 17). Antonsen argues that a common mindset about 
safety can only flourish in a “‘good’ safety climate […] where managers at all 
levels are highly committed to safety; where the workforces express satisfaction 
with and adherence to the organisation’s safety system; where everyone is risk 
averse; where there is no pressure towards maximising profits at the expense of 
safety and where operators as well as managers are highly qualified and 
competent” (Antonsen, 2009; p. 17). In various interviews, both in P2 and P3, 
several employees quoted the company’s unofficial catchphrase “time and 
money are no excuses for executing a safe job”, while underlining the 
management team’s dedication to safety no matter what. That clearly supports 
Antonsen’s description of a safety climate.  
2.5.5 Contributions 
This research project (P3) offered two theoretical contributions. First, it 
empirically confirmed Weick and Roberts’ concept of ‘heedful interrelations’ 
(1993) in an organisation managing high-risk processes. Weick and Roberts 
describe heedful interrelations as a collective investment in “time and effort to 
organise for controlled information processing, mindful attention, and heedful 
action” (Weick and Roberts, 1993, p. 357). The findings of my P3 indicate how 
these heedful interrelations among all staff lead to a mindful way of dealing with 
the present risks. When Weick and Roberts (1993) introduced the concept of 
‘heedful interrelations’, their arguments were based on extensive qualitative 
research in military organisations (more specifically nuclear-powered aircraft 
carriers, see: Roberts et al., 1994). However, the focus of their research was 
not coordinated behaviour, it was based more on the cognitive factors that 
affect the decision processes. Therefore, Weick and Roberts did not indicate 
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how these ‘heedful interrelations’ lead to collective conversations concerning 
safety in organisations managing high risks. They demonstrate how pilots of 
aircraft carriers develop mental processes that allow them to make the right 
decisions in milliseconds, based on controlled information processing, mindful 
attention and heedful action. Instead, my research shows how heedful 
interrelations (Weick and Robberts, 1993) – or open safety dialogues (see Part 
IV, pages 245-246) - encourage employees to engage in an organisation-wide 
conversation (see Part IV, pages 253-255) on safety and risk avoiding initiatives 
(see Part IV, pages 251-253).  
Secondly, this research is the first of its kind that empirically explores the role of 
Communication Constitutes Organisations (CCO) in an organisation managing 
high-risk processes (see Part IV, section 6.4, pages 277-278). A couple of 
similar studies have been published or presented, but all with a different 
approach concerning the type of organisation (such as fire fighters, terrorist 
organisations, etc.) or theoretical approach (such as a situational boundary-
making approach, analysis of critical incident narratives, or workgroup-level 
safety climate research). Moreover, none of these studies indicate how CCO 
plays an active role in maintaining safe operations. 
2.5.6 Remarks 
In a recently published study, Lekka and Sugden (2011) argue that although the 
HRO characteristics are particularly important for organisations operating in 
high-hazard industries, “previous research has predominantly focused on non-
profit organisations” (Lekka and Sugden, 2011; p. 443) such as schools or 
hospitals. Thus, little research has examined commercial organisations. In that 
perspective, this empirical research might offer valuable contributions to the 
already existing HRO literature, and opens new avenues for further research. I 
will elaborate further on these two subjects (contributions and further research) 
in the following chapters of this linking document. 
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3 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will propose a conceptual framework for creating a constitutive 
view on risk communication in organisations managing high-risk processes. 
This framework is based on the findings of my three research projects and 
supported by the literature in the fields of HRO and CCO. It describes a process 
in which conversations about safety related issues create a common mindset 
for enhancing safe operations within a complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation.  
In referring to my data in the next sections, the following abbreviations are used: 
- ADM: member of the administration team 
- AOS: member of the adjunct operations supervising team 
- MNG: member of the management team 
- MT: member of the maintenance team 
- OS: member of the operations supervising team 
The numbers behind the abbreviations indicate a person in that specific team. 
For confidentiality reasons, the names have been changed. Throughout this 
chapter I have used italics for a specific purpose. This is to signify that 
interviewees have expressed quotes or words that I have italicised.  
Before clarifying this conceptual framework, I will first explain how risk 
communication is traditionally perceived and implemented in most 
organisations, and why this fails to achieve its main objective, namely creating 
safe behaviour. Although I did not study the behavioural effects of 
communication, it might be argued that organisational communication aims to 
create some kind of action (Shockley-Zalabak, 2009) or a “desired conduct” 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949; p. 5) at the receiver’s level. Therefore, I will focus 
on the type of communication that creates a safety culture in which safe 
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behaviour eventually becomes an integral part of that culture, rather than a 
consequence of receiving information. 
3.2 The issue with communication 
Currently, the majority of management books in the field of risk management or 
business continuity management proclaim communication to be key in creating 
awareness and disseminate data about the potential risks that might endanger 
an organisation (see for instance: Reason, 1997; Groeneweg, 2002; Morgan et 
al., 2002; Breakwell, 2007; Elliott et al., 2010). The reasoning behind this type of 
communication, which is based on a transfer of information, is that when people 
know how and what to do, they will act accordingly. However, this view on 
communication is based on the so-called Shannon-Weaver Communication 
Model (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). This linear transmission model of 
information is based on a mathematical theory of communication that was 
presented by Claude Shannon in 1948 in the Bell System Technical Journal, 
aimed at improving the use of communication between a sender and a receiver 
over a telephone line. One year later, Shannon and his colleague Warren 
Weaver published the book The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949), based on Shannon’s initial article in the Bell 
System Technical Journal, albeit applied to communicative practices in general. 
To date, this theory is an integral part of the curriculum in many masters’ 
programmes in communication science around the globe, and is generally 
accepted as the most prominent communication theory (Miller, 2003). Multiple 
communication theorists, such as Schramm (1954), Berlo (1960), Dozier et al. 
(1995), and Hübner (2007), just to mention a few, have built their theories on 
the basic pillars of this Mathematical Theory of Communication (Shannon and 
Weaver, 1949). 
The issue with this mathematical model of communication is that it focuses on 
how information might be transferred between sender and receiver in the most 
optimal and clear way, while avoiding technical, semantic and effectiveness 
problems (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). Technical has to do with the means of 
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communication (such as text, radio, telephonic transmission, etc.), the semantic 
with the interpretation of meaning on the receiver’s side, and the effectiveness 
is “concerned with the success with which the meaning conveyed to the 
receiver leads to the desired conduct on his part” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; 
p. 5). My main argument against this mathematical model of communication is 
that although a single individual might create and transfer information, he or she 
cannot steer the understanding, and thus control the aimed effectiveness of the 
communication as described by Shannon and Weaver. The results of my first 
empirical research project (Project 2) illustrate how messages about the present 
risks do not lead to the same understanding of risks among all employees.  
When we translate this mathematical model of communication to risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes, we distinguish a 
sender (in this case the management team, supported by the communication 
department), a receiver (in this case all organisational members), a message (in 
this case about the risks and how to work safely), a communication channel 
(this might be a meeting, posters, safety video, written procedures, and the 
like), and a feedback mechanism in which employees might turn back to the 
sender of the communication for more clarification concerning the given 
information. This process, based on the so-called Shannon-Weaver 
Communication Model (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) is presented in Figure 3-1.  
 
Figure 3-1 Risk communication process based on the Mathematical Model 
of Communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) 
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Contrary to this model, findings of my P2 and P3 indicate that individuals do not 
‘receive’ information; they interpret information based on experiences (P2 
showed how employees with real life-threatening crisis experiences had a 
broader view of the present risks, see Part III, section 5.2.2 on page 213) and 
interpersonal and collective conversations. Over the next sections I will 
demonstrate, based on the data of P2 and P3, how literally everyone in the 
organisation has conversations about safety issues with everyone else, and 
how through these conversations they ‘made sense’ of what needed to be done 
from a safety perspective in the organisation. By doing so, these employees 
construct a certain meaning based on the perceived messages (van Woerkum, 
2011). Interpretation of information is thus a mental process in which we create 
meaning based on one or more perceived messages, but it does not 
necessarily lead to the desired “conduct” (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; p. 5). 
This process has its origin in social and psychic systems, and is based on 
communicative elements (Luhmann, 1995). According to Luhmann, 
communication is an emergent reality that arises from the interactions between 
different individuals and through a combined synthesis of three different 
selections: “selection of information, selection of utterance of this information, 
and a selective understanding or misunderstanding of this utterance and its 
information” (Luhmann, 1992; p. 252). In other words, it takes at least two 
individuals to co-produce the understanding of utterance of information (Seidl, 
2009).  
Therefore, it might be argued that although an organisation applies the five 
principles of HRO, when it predominantly relies on this mathematical model for 
communicating risks, it will not achieve the overarching prerequisite of ‘mindful 
organising’. According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), mindful organising is a 
different mindset that creates a corporate culture in which safety values and 
expectations about risk aversive behaviour and early detections of flaws are 
encouraged. This requires understanding of utterance of information (Seidl, 
2009), which is not achieved by merely transferring information (Koschmann, 
2013). 
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Linking back to the gas-receiving terminal I examined for this doctoral research, 
I looked at how employees made sense of the present risks in their organisation 
and how they interact with each other in terms of safety. However, I did not 
investigate how they moved from sensemaking to action. Yet, it might be 
argued that this company’s longstanding safety records (see: “2.5.1 Context”) 
are not solely based on pure luck, but on a corporate culture that values safety 
and risk aversive attitudes.  
Over the next sections I will elaborate on this by presenting a conceptual 
framework which indicates how conversations about safety related issues might 
constitute a culture that enhances safe operations in an organisation managing 
high-risk processes. As this framework is based on a concept of how 
conversations constitute a collective attitude towards the present risks in the 
organisation, I will first discuss two theoretical domains in the existing literature; 
on CCO (Communication Constitutes Organisations) and on coordinated 
behaviour. Subsequently (see: “3.5 Towards a conceptual framework”), I will 
introduce the various elements of the conceptual framework while supporting 
every step to both the theoretical elements, as well to the data retrieved from 
my research projects. 
3.3 Communication that constitutes organisations 
3.3.1 Theoretical background 
In the domain of Process Organisation Studies communication is perceived as 
actively creating the social reality of an organisation, in other words 
‘Communication Constitutes Organisations’ or ‘CCO’ (for an overview on the 
CCO perspective in organisation studies, see: Blaschke et al, 2012). CCO 
draws on the view of organisations as “networks of conversations” (Ford, 1999; 
p. 485), where through “telephone calls, meetings, planning sessions, sales 
talks, and corridor conversations […] people inform, amuse, update, gossip, 
review, reassess, reason, instruct, revise, argue, debate, contest, and actually 
constitute the moments, myths and, through time, the very structuring of the 
organization” (Boden, 1994, p.6). From this point of view, communication is 
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perceived as central to the social construction of the organisation’s reality 
(Hübner, 2007) as it takes an active stance in mutual interactive processes.  
CCO distinctively differs from the ‘informational view of communication’ as 
proposed in the earlier explained mathematical model of communication 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949), whereas in the latter the focus is on expression 
and the process is a straightforward transfer of information (Koschmann, 2013) 
within an organisation. CCO, on the other hand, perceives organisations “as” 
communication, opposed to communication that happens “within” organisations. 
Instead of viewing communication as merely the transfer of information, this 
approach considers communication as the fundamental process that shapes 
social reality which is a rather complex process of continually creating and 
negotiating the meanings and interpretations that shape our lives (Koschmann, 
2013). Therefore, this approach is more a ‘constitutive view of communication’ 
as it coordinates organisational members’ interpretation of their working 
environment, the way they act in it, as well as the organisation itself (Cooren, 
2012).  
Therefore, the insight that this CCO theory brings to my particular phenomenon 
is that employees do in fact have conversations about multiple topics that 
concern the organisation. One of the topics is about safety and how to do things 
in a safe or safer way. These conversations might be influenced by a formal 
transfer of information (for instance the dissemination of guidelines and 
procedures), but also by common experiences on the shop floor, trainings and 
exercises, or stories they get from friends and colleagues in other plants.  
However, it is too big a leap to conclude that all conversations solely concern 
safety issues. Employees discuss other things as well, such as football, beer, or 
what was on the television last night. Moreover, it is too simplistic to accept that 
only shared conversations that shape social reality will lead to collective action. 
The question can be raised what facilitates the fact these conversations are 
about safety, and not just about social or private activities? Therefore, in one of 
the following sections (see: 3.4 Understanding coordinated behaviour) I will look 
at the concept of ‘activity coordination’ (McPhee and Zaug, 2001) in an attempt 
 63 
to link CCO to collective coordinated behaviour in organisations managing high-
risk processes. First, I will describe observed examples of how communication 
constitutes the organisation. These observations are taken from my 
ethnographical data at GRT. 
3.3.2 Observed micro processes 
Based on ethnographical data collected over the two empirical research 
projects at GRT, this section will present two observed examples of micro 
processes that illustrate how communication constitutes this particular 
organisation.  
Besides trainings, the dissemination of safety procedures and guidelines, and 
formal safety reporting, I witnessed on a daily basis multiple informal 
conversations about safety and potential risks among staff members. In this 
rather small organisation, I observed that everyone seems to talk to everyone. 
On several days I witnessed how staff sat at a large round table over lunch, 
having a chat about various topics concerning safety. On April 2012, five 
employees (the CEO, two maintenance labourers, an operation supervisor, and 
the receptionist), were discussing the new safety fence that was under 
construction. This informal conversation started with the receptionist 
questioning why so much money had been invested in a high-tech safety fence. 
And why, one of the maintenance labourers added, did it have to be built by a 
British construction firm? The CEO made a joke saying the Brits had more 
experience with cunning terrorists than Belgians do. The operation supervisor 
then explained the rationale from Head Quarters to improve the protection 
measures on each site, according to European and American safety 
requirements. What followed was a vivid conversation about the why of safety, 
the precautionary measures each organisation dealing with sensitive products 
has to take, and their moral and public responsibility regarding safety for both 
own employees and third parties. Everyone at the table got involved in this 
discussion. Examples of previous malicious attacks on other production plants 
were described and translated to the GRT situation. It was impressive to see 
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how they all slowly but steadily reached a common understanding of the need 
for a solid safety fence. Two weeks later, when I was doing my repertory grid 
interviews, other co-workers than those who attended this conversation over 
lunch, mentioned exactly the same examples and a similar rationale arose for 
protecting the terminal against potential terrorist threats.  
A second micro process example that illustrates the communicative constitution 
of the gas-receiving terminal that was the subject of my empirical research, was 
a conversation at a morning meeting of the operational and maintenance staff in 
February 2013. After reviewing the various subjects of the previous day and the 
work orders for that day, the HSEQ manager (Health, Safety, Environment, and 
Quality) moved the conversation into another direction. “Based on an anomaly 
we recently experienced at the second process train, I gave the procedure for 
maintaining these trains a closer look,” he said. “May I suggest we take a 
couple of minutes to reflect on this?” What happened next was an in-depth 
technical discussion among all present on the applicability of this procedure. At 
the end of the meeting all agreed to give this a further thought. During the day, I 
witnessed two employees (a maintenance worker and a deputy operation 
supervisor) sitting together in a meeting room, with that particular procedure in 
print on the table, and a white board full of colourful flowcharts. Two days later I 
happened to pick up a conversation in the lunch area between various 
employees and the HSEQ manager concerning this particular procedure and 
viable options for improvement. 
Both examples illustrate how certain topics concerning safety are food for in-
depth discussions outside official meetings, and how the interactions between 
various actors constitute the very reality of the organisation and the way it deals 
with safety. These examples typified the kind of conversations and interactions 
about safety I witnessed during my three-year engagement with GRT. 
3.4 Understanding coordinated behaviour 
Charles Perrow, who has done seminal work in the field of risk management in 
tightly coupled and complex interactive organisations (Perrow, 1999), argues 
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that in environments where exceptions and problems frequently arise, a kind of 
coordinated adjustment is required (Perrow, 1967). McPhee and Zaug (2001) 
contend that this process of adjusting and solving immediate problems requires 
a distinct type of communication, namely ‘activity coordination’. This is when 
organisational members are “interacting to align or adjust local work activities” 
(McPhee and Zaug, 2001; 587). In a later paper, McPhee and Zaug (2009) link 
this activity coordination to Mintzberg’s coordination process of mutual 
adjustment. That is to say members mutually adjust, and by doing so they 
coordinate their activity “not just on related tasks but within a common social 
unit with an existence that goes beyond the work interdependence itself” 
(McPhee and Zaug, 2009; p. 39).  
According to Mintzberg (1993) collective behaviour in organisations can be 
achieved through five coordinating mechanisms: mutual adjustment, direct 
supervision, standardisation of work processes, of outputs, and of input skills. 
He argues that mutual adjustment is based on achieving coordination by the 
simple process of informal communication, and “the need to maintain a small 
face-to-face work group to encourage mutual adjustment when the work is 
complex and interdependent” (Mintzberg, 1993; p. 69).  
In an attempt to link Mintzberg’s concept of mutual adjustment to the CCO 
perspective, McPhee and Zaug’s (2009) refer to Fairhurst and Putnam’s (2004) 
work on discourse and organisations. In their framework for examining different 
perspectives on CCO, Fairhurst and Putnam offer various concepts to address 
a constitutive form of communication in organisations. One is “the perpetual 
states of becoming orientation” that focuses on “communication as a dynamic 
process that creates, sustain, and transforms organisations” (Putnam et al., 
2009; p. 8). In other words, the focus is on the organisational activities that 
aggregate social interaction among its members. This aggregation of social 
interaction is what I understand as Mintzberg’s (1993) concept of mutual 
adjustment which leads to coordinated adjustment of activity (McPhee and 
Zaug, 2001).  
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The practical implementation of this coordinated adjustment of activity (McPhee 
and Zaug, 2001) has to be done through some kind of co-orientation in which 
organisational members relate to each other through a common object of 
concern (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004). This ‘ common object of concern’ has to 
be indicated by the management team, as it is not only their legal but also their 
moral role to keep the organisation, their assets, the employees, and the 
environment safe (as described by the directors of this company in their annual 
report, see: Gassco, 2013; p. 8). As the aim is to translate words into activity, 
the conversation through co-orientation can establish a basis for action while 
maintaining “the coordination of members of the organisation in responding to a 
mixed material and social environment” (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004; p. 397). 
In the context of this doctoral research, it means that through the existing 
conversations concerning risks and safety behaviour in the organisation, all 
members are already mutually adjusting interpretations and actions concerning 
these topics.  
The conceptual framework I will present over the next sections explicitly 
combines key elements from both theoretical perspectives on HRO and CCO, 
as well as findings from two empirical research projects. By doing so, it provides 
an answer to the ‘how’ of creating a safety culture in organisations managing 
high-risk processes. Although it supports the idea of ‘mindful organising’ (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007) it adds new insights to the practical implementation of a 
safety culture, whereas Weick and Sutcliffe offer a more holistic approach for 
creating a safety culture.  
3.5 Towards a conceptual framework 
Over the next sections I will introduce the various elements of my conceptual 
framework. The framework itself is visualised in Figure 3-2, at the end of this 
section. The framework consists of seven elements, whereas the first three 
(procedures and guidelines, training and exercises, and common language) are 
the results of initiatives taken by a management team, the last three elements 
(common mindset, correcting each other, and reporting) are the results of 
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initiatives taken by employees. Both sets of elements are linked to each other 
by collective conversations about safety.  
3.5.1 Procedures and guidelines 
By law, every organisation is obliged to conform to safety and health 
regulations, be it on a national level (for instance the 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act in the UK, or the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 in the 
USA) or on an international level (for instance Article 153 of the Safety and 
Health Legislation of the European Union). European-based organisations 
working with hazardous products have to adhere to the so-called Seveso I, II or 
III directives2. These directives impose very strict standards for effective 
enforcement of safety rules. To confirm these standards, such organisations 
create very demanding operational procedures and guidelines, often referred to 
as SOPs and SOGs (Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Operating 
Guidelines), as a means to control risk (Moss, 2001). The gas-receiving 
terminal that was the topic of my two empirical research projects has 247 SOPs 
and 300 SOGs in use. The majority of these guidelines and procedures are 
about the safe use of tools on the plant (see P2) and are formally introduced by 
the management team in general, and controlled and refined by the Health 
Safety Environment and Quality (HSEQ) manager. For him, procedures and 
guidelines are more than just rules of thumb; they are essential for executing 
operations in a safe way. This was illustrated in one of the interviews at P3: “It 
might not be the case we forget a procedure because yesterday everything 
went fine, so today we do the same thing eyes closed. No, never! Even if we 
work with the same team tomorrow, we might be in another mood. Therefore: 
procedures, procedures, and procedures. Period!” (HSEQ manager). 
These SOPs and SOGs are not only perceived by management as pivotal for 
safe operations, the data of P2 indicated how every individual in this 
organisation was aware of the procedures and guidelines and its importance for 
keeping the plant safe. They described guidelines and procedures as “critical for 
                                            
2 For more information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/ 
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staying alert to what might go wrong” (OS3), or as a means for anticipating 
liability. One member of the maintenance team indicated, “they always have to 
be up-to-date and correct. If something were to happen one day, they will check 
all the plans and procedures, and each and every one of us will be liable for any 
shortcoming” (MT3). 
It could be argued that the dissemination of procedures and guidelines looks 
very familiar to the mathematical model of communication, as described in 
Figure 3-1 (see page 59). However, the conceptual framework tries to capture 
additional dynamics, which contribute to how the procedures and guidelines are 
interpreted and are actually enacted in the organisation. Although all the 
procedures and guidelines are transferred to all employees by means of 
electronic devices, and therefore they might refer to the informational form of 
communication, the creation and constant adaptation of these procedures and 
guidelines is based on a collective form of conversation. This was evident in the 
daily morning meetings, as well as in the formal safety meetings, where 
employees discuss minor events and work related issues, and how these 
experiences might add to the improvement or correction of existing procedures. 
These conversations are fed with experiences from both real events and 
exercises and trainings. I will elaborate on that in section 3.5.7 (“Reporting”). 
3.5.2 Training and exercises 
In an attempt to disseminate the content and rationale of these SOPs and 
SOGs all staff are involved in formal and regular trainings and safety exercises 
(DNV, 2013). This is in line with what Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) emphasise on 
learning and training as it keeps employees sensitive to the possible 
consequences of the high-risk processes in their organisation.  
In the systematic review of the literature (P1), adapted safety trainings and 
learning mechanisms were identified as key interventions for risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes. Findings of my 
first empirical research project (P2) indicate how employees with an experience 
of real crisis situations in their previous job emphasise the value of trainings and 
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crisis simulation exercises. One of the interviewees asserted: “Crisis exercises 
are critical, however, the reality is completely different.” P2 indicated how 
employees who experienced a life-threatening crisis situation are not only 
sensitive to the major risks in the organisation, but much more concerned about 
preventing injuries and safety behavioural issues than their colleagues with no 
real crisis experience. There might be a twofold explanation for this. Firstly, due 
to their crisis experience they have some kind of knowledge on how systems 
might break down, quite often by wrong manipulation and how this has an 
impact on personal injuries. Four out of six interviewees who witnessed a 
severe crisis situation attributed these incidents to behavioural issues when 
dealing with systems that eventually lead to personal injuries. Secondly, my 
research indicated how these persons who experienced a crisis situation have 
an extensive knowledge of the company’s procedures.  
Although exercises and trainings may never completely match reality, their aim 
is more than a mere creating of awareness or sensitivity among employees to 
the possible consequences of the high-risk processes (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007). Crisis simulations, for instance, also create automatisms that are 
required to anticipate and contain critical issues that might arise in operations 
(see for instance: Harvey et al., 2001; Lambert and Baaij, 2011; Brugghemans 
and Marynissen, 2013). In that sense, it creates knowledge by acquaintance 
rather than knowledge by description (Baron and Misovich, 1999), whereas the 
latter is achieved through a transfer of information, while knowledge by 
acquaintance is achieved by experience. Therefore, having a collective 
experience in a crisis simulation might offer the participants the necessary 
automatisms that can be helpful when dealing with a real crisis situation.  
The theoretical basis for this is rooted in the Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) model, as it indicates how people use prior experiences to categorise 
situations as a means to make decisions (Klein, 2008). The core concept of 
recognition-primed decision making is that in critical situations, employees 
make decisions based on a process of recognition of key elements in the 
situation that are linked to previously encountered situations stored in memory 
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(Tissington and Flin, 2005). Consequently, the RPD model is a blend of intuition 
and analysis; whereas, employees who are faced with a crisis situation make 
decisions using pattern matching and mental simulation to determine whether 
the decision could work in the current situation (Lipshitz et al, 2001; Klein, 
2008). Pattern matching is the intuitive part; and by using pattern matching, 
people can quickly match the current situations to patterns they know and 
hence generate solutions and decisions. The core objective of simulation 
exercises and trainings is to generate a maximum amount of patterns.  
3.5.3 Common language 
Besides keeping employees sensitive to the possible consequences of the risks 
in their organisation, this knowledge by acquaintance through trainings and 
exercises also offers staff a kind of ‘common language’. This language differs 
from the traditional information that employees receive through a mathematical 
form of communication, as it is based on shared experiences and not on an 
imposed communicated concept that has no or minimal links to the employees’ 
vocabulary. By collectively reflecting, interacting, and addressing simulated 
problems, employees acquire specific skills and shared experiences3. 
Moreover, as interpretations and approaches of critical issues are expressed in 
work group interactions, participants automatically develop and share symbols 
and meanings concerning risks (Alvesson, 2002), and how to address them. 
These symbols, based on lessons learned, will be adopted in new artefacts4, 
such as procedures, and “will establish new networks of actors and determine 
whether their subsequent actions are viewed as competent, or not” (Elliott and 
Macpherson, 2010; p. 579).  
Langley and Tsoukas call this linkage between an experience and how people 
give meaning to that event a “narrative form of knowing” (Langley and Tsoukas, 
                                            
3 As an external consultant involved in the interventions of an exploded Fluxys high-pressure 
gas pipeline in Belgium (July 2004), I witnessed how members of the crisis management team 
(who had all been through multiple crisis exercises) had a ‘déjà-vu’ experience during the 
events following the explosion. In the debriefing sessions, they all witnessed how these prior 
trainings offered them a kind of ‘common mindset’ to address this critical situation.  
4 Interestingly, this is what I saw the employees of this gas-receiving terminal do in my 
consulting work. 
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2010; p.7). This notion of incorporating linkages and giving meaning is achieved 
when two or more people’s interactions involve existing metaphors-in-use for 
setting-up organisational wide dialogues (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010).  
The data of P3 indicated how a large majority of the interviewees uses this 
“narrative form of knowing” (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010) as they indicate skills 
(19 out of 28 employees), experiences (23 out of 28 employees) and oral 
alignment concerning safety and risks (26 out of 28 employees) - all features 
people do acquire through trainings and exercises - as pivotal for safe 
operations. This can be illustrated by the following quote: “We can only improve 
our learning through exercises, or real crisis situations. And that’s the odd thing, 
exercises aim to help us avoid crises. The better we learn from these trainings, 
the more we really understand the procedures, and eventually the more skilled 
we will be in jointly avoiding or containing dangerous situations” (OS3).  
Furthermore, P3 revealed how everyone at this gas-receiving terminal talks to 
everyone else about safety, and how these conversations are partly based on 
trainings concerning safety procedures and guidelines. This might be illustrated 
by the following example, given by an Operation Supervisor, in which he 
recalled a minor incident and how they were using a common language (he 
used the expression “same wavelength”) for discussing the problem:  
“During the night and over the weekends, it’s just me and my adjunct 
who are on the plant. When something happens, we can rely on the on 
call duty manager. That particular weekend we had an alert in the land 
valve station or LVS (this is the station outside the premises where the 
sea pipe comes on land, note researcher). My adjunct went to the LVS 
and detected a burning smell. We called the on call duty manager and for 
more than half an hour we had a conversation on how to solve the issue. 
Immediately we were on the same ‘wavelength’. We went through the 
procedures, examined plausible actions, and tried to make sense of the 
situation. At the end we jointly agreed to diminish the pressure in the 
LVS, keep a close eye on the conditions of the LVS, and bring in an 
external technical team in the morning. Although the procedures didn’t 
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give us a ready-made answer to the problem, they helped us to achieve 
agreement through a common vision, call it knowledge base. A couple of 
days later, we discussed how to adapt a few procedures based on this 
experience.” (OS2) 
This example indicates how common knowledge of procedures and shared 
experiences lead to a “narrative form of knowing” (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010; 
p.7) which in turn results in coordinated actions and interactions between team 
members (Weick, 2011) to address a critical situation. In my view this adds a 
new perspective to what McPhee and Zaug (2009) call ‘activity coordination’, as 
they do not stress the importance of a prior common language created through 
formal structures (such as SOPs and SOGs), and trainings and exercises. In 
other words, McPhee and Zaug focus on the interactions that align or adjust 
local work activities (McPhee and Zaug, 2001) as such and in the moment of 
this activity, and not what might lead to these interactions.  
Finally, note the phrase in the aforementioned quote: “A couple of days later, 
we discussed how to adapt a few procedures based on this experience”. This 
indicates that the dissemination of procedures and guidelines is not based on a 
mathematical form of communication, but on active conversations about how to 
improve safety related issues by refining existing procedures and guidelines. 
The previous three elements (SOPs and SOGs, training and exercises, and 
common language) form the more formal ‘left’ side of my conceptual model 
(which will be explained in Figure 3-2 on page 79). The following set of 
elements (collective conversations, common mindset, correcting each other, 
and reporting) forms a more informal ‘right’ side of the conceptual model. All of 
these elements are revealed in my data. This will be explained in the next 
sections. 
3.5.4 Collective conversations about safety 
The data of P3 indicates how everyone in the organisation refers to others, and 
at the same time is indicated by others as an initiator of conversations about 
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safety (see Figure 2-1 on page 50). This phenomenon is based on the 
management team’s initiative “to keep this place safe by engaging every single 
individual in an open safety dialogue” (CEO’s quote in P3). Or as a new entry in 
the organisation (AOS3) framed it: “From day one you’re inculcated with this 
safety dialogue. Immediately! Initially, I was joking to my family that we talk 
more than work.” These collective conversations have to be seen as the core of 
this conceptual framework, as these conversations lead to the coordinated 
adjustment of activity (McPhee and Zaug, 2001) as well.  
The ethnographical data of P3 indicates how this organisation has structures 
that enable these conversations to happen, including two formal and various 
informal meetings on a daily basis. In the morning meetings various topics 
concerning safe operations, maintenance works, minor incidents that happened 
over the last 24 hours, and the like, are discussed among members of the 
operations staff, maintenance staff, and the HSEQ manager. In the 
management meeting afterwards, the main issues from the morning meeting 
are reiterated. Both the ethnographic and the SNA-data of P3 show that every 
day all members of the management team spend a considerable amount of time 
on the shop floor talking about safety, and informally interacting with employees 
about their work, their job satisfaction and sometimes about their personal 
sorrows (multiple employees indicated for instance the CEOs ability to ask 
“compassionate questions” (Interview OS2), or long standing cordial 
relationships with members of the management team). 
These conversations, both collective and individual, are predominantly rooted in 
the organisation’s vision to avoid “silent deviations” (a term the CEO used in his 
interview in P3), meaning two or more people hiding some kind of information. “I 
do not presume that silent deviations do not exist in our organisation, but we 
make every effort to uncover this by making everything open for discussion” 
(CEO). This ingrained attitude to alert or report minor incidents or dangerous 
situations, even in a very informal way, was illustrated by someone from the 
administration team: “It might happen that I just alert a person who’s doing 
something stupid, like standing on a chair instead of a ladder. That’s such a tiny 
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thing you simply don’t report. Or maybe I will, during lunch to the HSEQ 
manager or someone from operations. Albeit in an informal way” (ADM3). 
Moreover, almost one third of the employees (12 out of 28 employees) 
spontaneously mentioned that their organisation does not have a ‘blame and 
shame culture’, but rather one that “creates an environment in which I will check 
on everyone’s safe behaviour, just as everyone is allowed to check mine” 
(OS7). This underlines the organisation’s aim to avoid silent deviations by 
creating an environment in which everyone is encouraged to look out for 
potential flaws. 
Therefore, it might be argued that the object of concern in this organisation is 
safe operations and preoccupation with failure. This forms the common ground 
for ‘co-orientation’ (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004) among all organisational 
members. Through continuous mutual adjustments (Mintzberg, 1993) of 
meaning concerning risks, formal and informal reporting, the avoidance of 
unsafe behaviour, and the elimination of potential risks in “an open safety 
dialogue” (quote CEO), they create, sustain, (Conrad and Poole, 1998) and 
transform this organisation (Putnam et al., 2009) into a high-reliability one 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  
In this research I confirmed the existing theory on how communication 
constitutes organisations, as I could indicate how every individual has 
conversations with others concerning their work and the organisation itself. 
However, I extended the existing theory by indicating the role of the 
management team in the way they create the possibility to have these overall 
constitutive conversations towards safety related conversations. They achieve 
this by introducing some form of organisation-wide co-orientation (i.e. open 
safety dialogue) through formal (i.e. reporting, safety meetings) and informal 
(i.e. exchanging views and experiences with the HSEQ-manager) alignments 
and actions. Moreover, the management team offered a clear vision concerning 
the avoidance of ‘silent deviations’ in the organisation, and sustained that with a 
no-blame, no-shame mentality. In summary, although CCO predominantly 
focuses on how employees have conversations that constitute the organisation, 
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it does not indicate how a management team can support this process by 
incorporating these collective conversations into a more standardised activity of 
discussing safety topics. 
3.5.5 Common mindset 
Although P2 indicated that all members of this gas-receiving terminal have 
different interpretations of the present risks in their organisation, the data of P3 
demonstrates how they have a continuous conversation about safety that might 
explain their long-standing safety records (see Part IV, section 4.4.2 on page 
253). These open safety dialogues create a kind of mindset or culture that is 
difficult to capture in words, as “culture is not primarily ‘inside’ people’s heads, 
but somewhere ‘between’ the heads of a group of people” (Alvesson, 2002; p. 
4). This culture best resembles Weick and Sutcliffe’s concept of ‘mindful 
organising’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), which is an overarching prerequisite for 
high-reliability organisations as it supports a different mindset about those 
things that can bring an organisation into jeopardy. The encoding of the P3 
interviews revealed how all the attitudes and prerequisites for producing a 
culture of mindful organising (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) are 
present in this gas-receiving terminal (see Table 3-1 on the next page). 
However, the interviewees did not equally mention all the elements. ‘Thinking 
differently about authority’ and ‘thinking differently about strategy’ were 
described more (21 and 18 out of 28 interviewees respectively) than the other 
three prerequisites for producing a culture for mindful organising (i.e. plans, 
simplification, and success). Concerning the attitudes that aim to foresee the 
unforeseeable, the most mentioned elements are communication (26 out of 28 
employees), experience (23), deference (21), and skill (19).  
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Table 3-1 Encoding of the P3 interviews, based on attitudes and 
prerequisites for producing a culture of mindful organising (Weick et al., 
1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007)  
A detailed description of the analysis of the data, as presented in Table 3-1, is 
described in Part IV of this doctoral thesis, in the sections 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 on 
pages 267-269. 
According to Antonsen (2009), this common mindset about safety can only 
flourish in “a ‘good’ safety climate”. He describes a “‘good’ safety climate” as 
“one where managers at all levels are highly committed to safety; where the 
workforces express satisfaction with and adherence to the organisation’s safety 
system; where everyone is risk averse; where there is no pressure towards 
maximising profits at the expense of safety and where operators as well as 
managers are highly qualified and competent” (Antonsen, 2009; p. 17). In 
various interviews, both in P2 and P3, multiple employees quoted the 
company’s unofficial catchphrase “time and money are no excuses for 
executing a safe job”, while underlining the management team’s dedication to 
safety no matter what. That supports Antonsen’s description of a safety climate, 
and confirms the attitudes and prerequisites for producing a culture of mindful 
organising (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
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3.5.6 Correcting each other 
Through the continuous open safety dialogues, and the common mindset about 
safety, employees are encouraged to directly approach each other if they pick 
up on a safety issue that might create a potential dangerous situation. More 
than 80 percent of interviewees indicate they will immediately address and 
correct the person who creates an unsafe situation. The following quotes 
illustrate this attitude:  
“You don’t go tell everyone when you see a safety issue. You 
immediately address the person himself” (AOS4). 
“Everyone approaches everyone when it concerns safety related issues. 
We are all grown-ups. If I do something wrong, I will definitely get a 
remark. And if the CEO does something wrong, he will be corrected for 
sure. That’s the way we do things around here” (OS4) 
“I expect everyone in this company to correct me immediately” (CEO), 
This attitude is supported by a no blame, no shame mentality. The main 
objective is not to punish or blame anyone who makes a mistake (“you will 
never be reprimanded” (OS4)) but “rather to engage [him or her] in the 
conversation on how to avoid this in the future” (MNG2). The management team 
of this organisation clearly states that every individual is responsible for 
immediately reporting mishaps or risks, for taking appropriate action, and for 
learning. Or as a member of the maintenance team reframed it: “making 
mistakes is not the end of the world, as long as you report them immediately 
and learn from your mistake” (MT3). That is why “everyone checks each other. 
Probably unconsciously” (MT4).  
Besides the formal hierarchical lines for giving work orders or for reporting, this 
organisation has created an informal way of approaching each other concerning 
safety related issues, independently of the formal reporting structure. It might be 
argued that acts of giving work orders or reporting can be perceived as a 
transfer of information, and thus, a mathematical approach of communication 
between a sender and a receiver. I am arguing however that the informal way of 
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approaching each other concerning safety issues is more a constitutive form of 
communication in which one person approaches the other one, regardless of 
rank or position. In the way they correct each other employees “discuss the 
possible consequences of that action” (MNG4) and by doing so they support 
and “confirm [their] mutual role as safety officers” (AOS1) in this organisation. In 
other words, the act of approaching and correcting each other is a way of co-
orientating towards safety in the organisation, as well as a mental mindset to be 
preoccupied with failure (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  
3.5.7 Reporting 
As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the formal and informal reporting of 
events is crucial in this gas-receiving terminal. The procedures specify that 
every incident, anomaly or flaw has to be reported in writing. This is not 
dissimilar from other organisations managing high-risk processes. The 
distinctive approach in this gas-receiving terminal is in how the reporting forms 
the basis for collective conversations about safety in the morning meetings, the 
daily management meetings, and the monthly safety review meetings. In turn, 
these conversations may lead to new initiatives concerning safety measures, 
which eventually will be translated in the further development of procedures or 
guidelines, or into a reformulation of an existing SOP or SOG. According to the 
CEO of this company, “if a mistake is based on the wrong interpretation of a 
procedure, than we need to reinterpret and change the procedure.”  
Reporting is perceived by the employees as a way “to focus on safety” (OS5), to 
maintain “clear agreements on how we do things around here” (MT3), and to 
“improve the procedures continuously” (MT5). Furthermore, the data from the 
social network analysis in P3 indicated that social relationships outside of work 
or good friendships among employees have insignificant impact on reporting 
safety issues. Employees expect to be treated as “grown-ups” (OS4) who “can 
all learn something from each other” (OS2). 
This confirms and combines the existing theories, as HRO emphasises on 
reporting as a means of being sensitive to operations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
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2007), while CCO stresses collective conversations concerning safety and how 
to improve activities (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004) in a safe way. 
3.6 Contributions 
This process in which each step leads to another, and the process itself 
becomes a perpetual way of acting, is illustrated in Figure 3-2 on the next page. 
My data revealed that it is a permanent process of reporting, discussing, 
alignment, and co-orientation towards safe operations which in itself is the basis 
for a constitutive approach of risk communication in an organisation managing 
high-risk processes.  
 
Figure 3-2 Constitutive view of risk communication in an organisation 
managing high-risk processes 
The theoretical and the empirical support for this conceptual framework of a 
constitutive approach of risk communication are detailed in the table below 
(Table 3-2). 
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 Element Theoretical link Empirical support 
A SOPs & SOGs Standard Operating Procedures 
and Guidelines are essential means 
to control risks (Moss, 2001) 
Guidelines and procedures are 
perceived as “critical for staying 
alert to what might go wrong” (P2) 
and are the basis for a collective 
form of verbal alignment (P3) 
B Trainings & 
Exercises 
HRO emphasises on learning and 
training to keep employees 
sensitive towards the possible 
consequences of the high-risk 
processes (Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007). Recognition-Primed 
Decision indicates how employees 
use prior experiences to categorise 
situations (Klein, 2008) and make 
decisions based on recognition of 
key elements linked to previously 
encountered situations (Tissington 
& Flin, 2005). 
Safety trainings and learning 
mechanisms are key interventions 
for risk communication (P1). 
Employees who experienced a 
real crisis situation emphasise on 
the critical value of trainings and 
crisis simulation exercises (P2). 
 
C Common 
Language 
Langley and Tsoukas refer to a 
“narrative form of knowing” 
(Langley & Tsoukas, 2010; p.7) 
when two or more people’s 
interactions involve existing 
metaphors-in-use for setting-up 
organisational wide dialogues. 
A large majority of the 
interviewees indicates skills, 
experiences, and oral alignment 
concerning safety and risks (all 
features people do acquire 
through trainings and exercises) 
as pivotal for safe operations (P3).  
D Collective 
conversations 
The collective conversations among 
organisational members lead to 
coordinated adjustment of activity 
(McPhee & Zaug, 2001) that forms 
the common ground for ‘co-
orientation’ (Taylor & Robichaud, 
2004). It is a process of continuous 
mutual adjustments (Mintzberg, 
1993) of meaning concerning risks, 
formal and informal reporting, the 
avoidance of unsafe behaviour, and 
the elimination of potential risks in 
an open safety dialogue.  
P3 indicates how everyone in the 
organisation refers to others, and 
at the same time is indicated by 
others as an initiator of 
conversations about safety. The 
ethnographical data of P3 
indicates how this organisation 
has structures that enable these 
conversations to happen, 
including two formal and various 
informal meetings on a daily basis. 
E Common 
mindset 
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) 
describe a series of attitudes and 
prerequisites for producing a 
culture of mindful organising, which 
is an overarching prerequisite for 
HROs.  
The various data of P2 and P3 
demonstrates how employees 
have a continuous conversation 
about safety that creates a kind of 
common mindset. Interview data 
(P3) revealed how all these 
attitudes and prerequisites for 
producing a culture of mindful 
organising are present in this 
organisation. 
F Correcting 
each other 
Approaching and correcting each 
other is a way of co-orientating 
(Taylor & Robichaud, 2004) 
towards safety in the organisation, 
as well as a mental mindset to be 
preoccupied with failure (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  
More than 80 percent of the 
interviewees (P3) indicate they will 
immediately address and correct 
the person who creates an unsafe 
situation.  
G Reporting HRO emphasises on reporting as a Reporting is perceived by the 
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means of being sensitive to 
operations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007), while CCO stresses on 
collective conversations concerning 
safety and how to improve activities 
(Taylor and Robichaud, 2004) in a 
safe way. 
employees as a way to focus on 
safety, to maintain clear 
agreements on how to do things, 
and to improve the procedures 
continuously (P3).  
Table 3-2 Theoretical and empirical support for the conceptual framework 
This conceptual framework represents two different sets of activities. The left 
circle includes procedures and guidelines, training and exercises, and a 
common language based on skills and experiences. The management team 
instigates all of these elements. The right circle comprises a common mindset, 
correcting each other, and reporting. These elements might be seen as 
initiatives that are taken by the employees, although the management team 
formally supports them. This support is illustrated by the management team’s 
clear vision concerning the avoidance of ‘silent deviations’ in the organisation, 
sustained with a ‘no-blame, no-shame’ mentality. The two circles are linked to 
each other by the element ‘collective conversations about safety’. From the 
literature on CCO we know that organisations are networks of conversations 
(Ford, 1999) in which employees constitute the very structuring of the 
organisation (Boden, 1994), and communication is perceived as central to the 
social construction of the organisation’s reality (Hübner, 2007). My conceptual 
framework goes one step further in indicating how a management team can 
benefit from these constitutive conversations by creating the possibilities to 
have a more standardised activity of discussing safety topics. By doing so, the 
formal way of discussing safety related issues would become part of day-to-day 
informal conversations. Therefore, Figure 3-2 elaborates on the formal sender-
receiver approach of transferring information (as presented in Figure 3-1 on 
page 59), which enhances an informal constitutive approach of discussing 
safety issues (as presented in the right circle). 
This constitutive view of risk communication, as presented in the conceptual 
framework, offers a number of theoretical contributions. Table 3-3 gives an 
overview of these contributions.  
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Kind of 
contribution 
Clarification Indicated 
in 
Detailed 
description 
Confirming and 
extending existing 
HRO theory 
 
My research confirms how real-life crisis 
experiences, trainings, and exercises are key 
for keeping employees sensitive towards the 
possible consequences of high-risk 
processes.  
The method of Repertory Grid uncovered how 
employees who experienced a crisis situation 
came up with more constructs than their 
colleagues who did not experienced a life-
threatening situation at work. 
P1 + P2 Part I, p. 
44-47 
Part II, p. 
159-161 
Part III, p. 
213-217 
 
Extending existing 
CCO theory  
 
McPhee and Zaug's (2009) concept of 
‘activity coordination’ focuses on alignment of 
work activities in the moment of this activity, 
not on what might lead to these alignments. 
My research indicates the importance of a 
prior common language created through 
formal structures (such as SOPs and SOGs), 
and trainings and exercises, which leads to 
‘activity coordination’.  
P3 Part IV, p. 
275-277 
Confirming and 
adjunction of 
existing HRO and 
CCO theories 
My research indicated a link between the act 
of approaching and correcting each other, 
which refers to the CCO-concept of co-
orientation (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004) 
towards safety in the organisation, and the 
HRO-principle of being preoccupied with 
failure (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
P3 Part IV, p. 
251-253 
Confirming and 
adjunction of 
existing HRO and 
CCO theories 
My research shows how reporting safety 
issues is linked to the HRO principle of being 
sensitive to operations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) as well as to collective conversations 
concerning safety and how to improve 
activities in a safe way (Taylor and 
Robichaud, 2004). By doing so, I confirmed 
and combined both existing theories. 
P3 Part IV, p. 
253-255 
Table 3-3 Theoretical contributions of the conceptual framework 
The key difference with the informational process of communication based on 
the Mathematical Model of Communication (Shannon and Weaver, 1949), as 
presented in Figure 3-1, and my conceptual framework for a constitutive view of 
risk communication, is that the latter is not a linear transfer of information, but a 
continuous interactive process of creating, discussing, and interpreting meaning 
based on a common objective of interest, namely safety. 
It might be argued that this framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication as presented in Figure 3-2 cannot be installed over night. The 
data captured in the final empirical research project (P3) indicated the pivotal 
role of the management team, and more specifically the role of the CEO, in the 
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process of creating a safety culture. This crucial role of the CEO might be 
illustrated in Table 3-1 (on page 76). This table indicates all the codes for each 
employee that have been captured in the analysis of the interview data. The two 
sets of codes refer to the attitudes and prerequisites to produce a culture of 
mindful organising (Weick et al., 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). It is 
noteworthy that the CEO of this company (indicated as MNG2) is the only 
person who mentioned all these items of mindful organising.  
As this research was not focused on the role of leadership in organisations 
managing high-risk processes, nor on behaviour, these areas are subjects for 
further research. In the final chapter of this linking document (see: “5.3 Areas for 
further research” on pages 91-93) I will elaborate on viable avenues for further 
exploration of these themes.  
In the next chapter, I will translate my findings into practical recommendations 
for organisations managing high-risk processes. 
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4 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
In this section I will indicate two practical implications that are based on my 
research. The first is based on my conceptual framework for a constitutive view 
of risk communication in organisations managing high-risk processes. The 
second implication refers to the academic world and indicates possible ways for 
including my research findings, and more specifically the constitutive role of 
communication, into the existing curricula in colleges offering courses in 
communication science, business science, risk management, and the like.  
Before elaborating on the aforementioned implications, I will make a distinction 
between Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) and my conceptual framework for a 
constitutive view of risk communication in organisations managing high-risk 
processes. BBS has become increasingly common in organisations over the 
last two decades, especially in the oil and gas industry (Antonsen, 2009). 
However, BBS is somewhat blind to the interpretivist view of enhancing a safety 
culture as it predominantly emphasises auditing and training. Therefore, I will 
address a number of fundamental differences between BBS and my conceptual 
framework in an attempt to make a clear distinction between both approaches. 
4.2 Differences between the conceptual framework and BBS 
In management practices, Behaviour Based Safety (BBS) is quite often cited as 
a standard for implementing or improving the safety culture in organisations. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) under the US 
Department of Labour, for instance, recommends BBS training on their website 
as an efficient tool for changing human unsafe behaviour.  
Rooted in the broader field of organisational behaviour, BBS “focuses on what 
people do, analyses why they do it, and then applies a research-supported 
intervention strategy to improve what people do” (Geller, 2001; p. 88). Although 
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it aims to achieve the same safety culture as my conceptual framework, it differs 
substantially on various domains.  
First and foremost, BBS predominantly focuses on blue-collar workers who 
execute process activities (Geller, 2001), while my conceptual framework 
includes all organisational members in a safety dialogue, as safety is not only 
required for workers, but is every single individual’s matter of concern. 
Secondly, BBS starts from extensive research on organisational members’ 
behaviour, whereas senior or line managers intervene as experts in observing 
and reporting on workers’ safe behaviour. My conceptual framework, on the 
contrary, starts from tapping into the already existing conversations among 
employees about safety, and prefers expertise to experts. Thirdly, BBS uses a 
reward and punishment system in which safe behaviour is rewarded (be it with 
a bonus system, or with formal recognition) and unsafe behaviour is penalised 
(be it with a fine, or with public rebuke). The risk of this blame and shame 
mentality might lead to underreporting accidents and near accidents, and 
straying towards manipulation instead of improving safety culture (Antonsen, 
2009). My proposed framework, on the other hand, tries to motivate employees 
into being open-minded about safety. And finally, BBS emphasises the directive 
and formal role of leaders in creating a safety culture through auditing, training, 
interventions, and guidelines (see for instance: Geller, 2001; Roughton and 
Mercurio, 2002). Furthermore, BBS-leaders are advised to use persuasive 
communication strategies (Geller, 2001). This is strikingly opposing to my 
conceptual framework as it rejects the idea of persuasive communication, but 
emphasises an open safety dialogue in which the leadership team has a rather 
supportive and participative role. 
Table 4-1 offers an overview of the main differences between BBS (as 
described by Geller, 2001, p. 88-94) and my conceptual framework for a 
constitutive view of risk communication. 
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BBS Conceptual framework 
Focus intervention on observable behaviour Focus intervention on existing safety 
conversations 
Look for external factors to understand and 
improve behaviour  
Starts from the existing constitutive 
conversations in the organisation 
Direct with activators and motivate with 
consequences  
Clear vision concerning the avoidance of 
‘silent deviations’ in the organisation 
Focus on positive consequences to motivate 
behaviour  
Promotes a ‘no-blame, no-shame’ mentality 
Applies the scientific method to improve 
intervention: DO IT (Define, Observe, 
Intervene, Test)  
Improvement of safety is based on a 
continuous process of reporting, discussing, 
alignment, and co-orientation towards safe 
operations  
Use theory to integrate information, not to limit 
possibilities  
Uses formal reporting and informal 
conversations about improvements of 
procedures and guidelines 
Design interventions with consideration of 
internal feelings and attitudes  
Interventions are based on deference to 
expertise and the aim to be reluctant to 
simplifications 
Table 4-1 Differences between BBS and the conceptual framework for a 
constitutive view of risk communication  
 
4.3 Practical use of the framework 
My conceptual framework for a constitutive view of risk communication in 
organisations managing high-risk processes can be transformed into a practical 
approach for executive management teams. It proposes how standardised 
safety procedures and guidelines might become part of the daily informal 
conversations among employees. This can be achieved by combining two 
distinct sets of activities: one set of elements that is instigated by the 
management team and another that is based on activities taken by the 
employees. The link between both lies in the collective conversations 
employees already have. The conceptual framework indicates how a 
management team might benefit from these conversations by incorporating 
them into a more standardised activity of discussing safety topics. By doing so, 
the formal way of discussing safety related issues would become part of day-to-
day informal conversations. 
This conceptual framework might be very powerful for management teams of 
organisations managing high-risk technologies, as they not only recognise all 
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the elements of the framework, but also work with most of these concepts on a 
daily basis. This does not mean that working with or recognising concepts 
equals proper use. Therefore, the notion of how to incorporate and support the 
collective conversations about safety might be the subject for further training 
and implementation in the organisation’s strategy. 
4.4 Directions for adapting curricula 
Over the last decades, innumerable professionals have been taught all kinds of 
mathematical communication models. However, when confronted with 
organisational questions that require some kind of behavioural change, they feel 
disoriented and clueless about how to engage staff. This observation comes 
from my personal experiences in multiple organisations worldwide. Still, they 
keep on using the traditional sender-receiver communication models. Even 
though these models did not meet the expectations in the latest communication 
campaigns, the same obsolete methods are used over and over again. 
According to van Woerkum, these people “should be recalled [to college], like 
Toyota does, for a minor but crucial repair: that [communication] model should 
be removed” (van Woerkum, 2011; p. 10 – translated from original Dutch text).  
I would like to join van Woerkum by appealing for broadening existing curricula 
in academic institutions offering various courses in which communication in 
general, and the applied use of communication theory in particular has a 
prominent role. The findings of my research, and more specifically the 
constitutive role of communication and the conceptual framework that 
emphasise collective conversations rather than a transfer of information, inhibit 
valuable insights for future business leaders, such as Masters in Management, 
Masters in Communication, MBAs, DBAs, PhDs in management, and the like. 
Offering new insights, such as CCO, to the existing curricula might help future 
managers and leaders to expand their view on organisations as networks of 
communicative processes (Blaschke et al., 2012) and how they might 
participate in these constitutive conversations. This might be done in very 
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practical classes in which participants learn to capture ongoing conversations, 
and how they might relate and contribute to this.  
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5 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
5.1 Introduction 
This study presents a conceptual framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes. As this 
framework is built on two evolving fields of research, namely HRO and CCO, 
there are multiple aspects that require further exploration. Moreover, I am very 
well aware that this doctoral thesis intrinsically embodies limitations. In the 
following paragraphs I will highlight these limitations as well as some areas for 
further research. 
5.2 Limitations 
A first limitation concerns my framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes itself. Although 
this framework is based on research findings and theoretical insights from 
multiple scholars in various fields of the social sciences, it is still a theoretical 
one that needs to be tested and validated in further research. 
A second limitation is an empirical one, and linked to the scope of data 
gathering. This research was done in a small but independent division of an 
internationally operating company. As all the positions and levels any other 
company have are represented in my sample, it did not only give the advantage 
to examine 100 percent of the population, but also to have a depth rather than a 
breadth analysis of the data. Still, it is recommended to widen the empirical 
scope of this topic to organisations managing high-risk processes with a greater 
number of staff and with even more complex high-risk processes. 
Linking to the previous limitation, it might be argued that other methods than 
used in this research can offer new or innovative insights into these interactive 
processes. However, as Blaschke and his colleagues (2012) indicate, the range 
of methodologies to analyse the relation between communication and 
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organisation are rather limited. Still, it might for instance be recommendable to 
apply action research to study how these organisations create a safety culture 
in difficult environments (Antonsen et al., 2007) by using co-orientation 
techniques (Taylor and Robichaud, 2004) to achieve collective safety 
conversations for instance.  
A fourth limitation is that this research examined some kind of ‘positive deviant’ 
(Pascale and Sternin, 2005; Pascale et al., 2010) in terms of supporting a safety 
dialogue among staff. Therefore, the presented framework for creating a safety 
culture in organisations managing high-risk processes is based on one 
particular organisation, a sole example in the field of organisations managing 
high-risk processes. It might be the case that this gas-receiving terminal is 
rather an exception than the norm in the industry. This limitation links to a 
recommendation for further research, and will be discussed in the next section. 
A fifth and theoretical limitation concerns the rather new and evolving fields of 
Process Organisation Studies (Hernes, 2007) and Communication Constitutes 
Organisations (Putnam and Nicotera, 2010). Only recently (in July 2013) the 
Board of the European Group of Organizational Studies (EGOS) approved a so-
called “Standing Working Group” in the field of Organisation as Communication. 
Over the next five years, this group will address new theoretical and practical 
insights in the constitutive relation between organisation and communication 
(OAS, 2013). This means considerable research is needed to uncover all the 
implications of CCO. One might argue, for instance, that in large organisations 
with multiple divisions or physically divided branches the conversations – and 
thus the safety conversations as well – vary. This might have an impact on the 
approach to create an open dialogue concerning collective conversations about 
safety in these types of organisations. 
5.3 Areas for further research 
Although most of the aforementioned limitations comprise directions for further 
research, as every limitation opens new directions for further exploration and 
development, this section points to other areas that require more scrutiny 
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regarding the conceptual framework for a constitutive view of risk 
communication in organisations managing high-risk processes.  
Findings from my first empirical research project (Project 2) indicated how 
people with experience of a real life-threatening crisis situation seem to be more 
sensitive to risks and safe behaviour. This finding was also confirmed in 
research I was involved in, separate from this doctoral thesis, examining a real 
crisis situation as experienced by a team of fire-fighters, and its impact on the 
post risk aversive behaviour of these men (Brugghemans and Marynissen, 
2013). Still, there is a much-needed area to explore on the design and impact of 
crisis simulations and safety drills in organisations managing high-risk 
processes.  
The role of management is frequently mentioned in the literature on 
organisations managing high-risk processes (see for instance: Groeneweg, 
2002; Specht et al., 2006; Antonsen, 2009; Lekka and Sugden, 2011; Clarke, 
2013) and in risk communication literature in general (see for instance: 
Gurabardhi et al., 2005, Conchie and Burns, 2008; Hambach et al., 2011). 
Although my research indicates the pivotal role of the CEO of this gas-receiving 
terminal in the creation of a safety culture, there is an urgent need for more 
insights into the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of management in these types of 
organisations.  
Linked to this, there is still a long way to go to acquire more evidence-based 
insights in how the process of communication that constitutes (Putnam et al., 
2009) mindful organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) generates safe or risk 
aversive behaviour in organisations that manage high-risk processes. To date, 
there is little empirical research in this field that might help to disseminate best 
practices or recommendations. Although there has been research in the field of 
discourse analysis (see for instance: Fairhurst and Putnam, 2004; Zoller and 
Fairhurst, 2007; Fairhurst, 2009; Fairhurst and Uhl-Bien, 2012) that offers 
directions for practice, still, it has never been applied to the field of high-
reliability organisations or companies managing high-risk processes in a 
complex environment. Therefore, the link between how employees make sense 
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of the present risks in their organisation and how that leads to safe behaviour 
could be the focus for further research. 
As mentioned before in the limitations section, my empirical research was 
based on a single independent division of an internationally operating company 
in gas and oil industry. It is highly recommended to examine other organisations 
dealing with high-risk processes, while comparing the results with the 
theoretical and practical findings of my research. Furthermore, it might be 
questionable whether this conceptual framework for creating a safety culture is 
applicable as well in other industries such as nuclear power plants, air control 
centres, or military activities; as they are heavily structured around procedures 
and guidelines (Perrow, 1999; Rochlin, 1999). However, based on the insights 
derived from my research and the analysis of the existing HRO and CCO 
literature, I would argue that especially these types of industries might benefit 
from using my conceptual framework. My proposed framework indicates how a 
whole set of elements supports the collective conversations about safety that 
leads to the co-creation of safety guidelines and procedures.  
5.4 Conclusions 
A critical reader might wonder whether this gas-receiving terminal that was the 
subject of my research is ‘too good to be true’. Although it might be described 
as a ‘positive deviant’ in the way it has a constitutive view of risk 
communication, it does not differ from any other organisation when it comes to 
envy, egos, power, and politics. Still, the organisational members of this gas-
receiving terminal seem to handle these elements as subsidiary to having an 
open safety dialogue. 
This doctoral thesis offers a conceptual framework to support a constitutive form 
of risk communication in organisations managing high-risk processes with the 
aim to create a safety culture in this type of organisations. Although this 
framework offers substantial new insights to the existing literature domains of 
risk communication, CCO, HRO, and organisations managing high-risk 
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processes in general, it contains several limitations and challenges for further 
research.  
Together with present and future alumni of the Cranfield executive DBA 
programme, and with a dozen practitioners and academics in the field of 
organisations managing high-risk processes, I recently founded a European 
network. As discussed at the inauguration meeting in August 2013, we aim to 
explore and develop various topics in this field over the next years. One of them 
will be the applied research into the design and evaluation of crisis simulations 
in HROs. Therefore, I am delighted that this doctoral thesis is not the end of an 
intellectual enriching process, but rather the start of new challenging one. 
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PART II: SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
ABSTRACT 
Past research on the relationship of risk communication on risk perception is 
predominantly focused on the way civilians deal with risk perceptions and 
messages about possible danger. Little research on this particular domain is 
done in organisational contexts, or more specifically in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations. Evaluations of recent industrial incidents indicate 
that despite all existing communication tools and safety trainings the importance 
of risk communication and its impact on the employees’ risk perception is 
underestimated. This might indicate a deficiency in the solution-oriented 
knowledge about the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception. 
This research systematically reviews the existing literature on the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in the domain of organisations 
with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems since 1990. In order to 
research the literature rigorously, the so-called ‘CIMO-logic’ (Denyer et al., 
2008) is applied. CIMO-logic involves a combination of a problematic Context, 
for which a certain Intervention type produces, through specified generative 
Mechanisms, the intended Outcome. The rationale is that by examining 
Context, Interventions, Mechanisms and Outcomes in the specific domain of 
risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations, recommendations can be made to improve risk 
communication practices in these organisations. The main finding indicates 
various leadership capabilities as dominant interventions that generate two 
distinct information-processing mechanisms. These interventions are, among 
others, adding different expertise to a decision process, the introduction of 
adapted safety trainings, and comprehensible hierarchical communication that 
refers to the employees’ problem domain familiarity. Based on the reviewed 
literature, directions for future research are indicated. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Need for deeper insights  
In research as well as in industrial practice, great efforts are made to improve 
safety, not only at systems’ level, but also on individual-centred measures to 
increase the safety at high-risk production systems (Grote and Künzler, 2000). 
Recent incidents, such as the explosion of a Fluxys gas-pipeline in Ghislengien 
(Belgium, July 2004), the explosion at the BP Texas City Refinery which caused 
15 deaths and over 170 injuries (USA, March 2005), the crash of Turkish 
Airlines flight TK1951 near Schiphol Airport (The Netherlands, February 2009), 
or the explosion on BP’s Deepwater Horizon (Gulf of Mexico, April 2010) - just 
to mention a few - are all rooted in some kind of failure. Investigations following 
these disasters indicated that despite all the technological safety processes, 
quite often the root causes of these incidents lie in human error. Although 
employees were well trained in safety procedures, they often did not take into 
account the importance of these processes (Rochlin, 1999) and did not act 
accordingly. For instance a Safety Review Panel that was investigating the 
explosion at the BP plant in Texas mentioned systemic errors in their 350 page 
report such as deficiencies in leadership, internal communication, core values, 
and inconsistency in the messages about process safety as the root causes of 
this tragedy (US Safety Review Panel, 2007). 
Hence, there is a disconnection between conveying safety information and 
people acting on that information. In a search for the root causes of the disaster 
at the Bhopal methyl isocyanate (MIC) plant of Union Carbide in 1984, Weick 
(2010) concludes that one of the reasons that led to that disaster was the lack 
of sensemaking regarding the safety procedures on the part of those who were 
supposed to control this plant. All the operators at the MIC plant in Bhopal 
received the standard safety procedures, but no one checked if the operators 
properly understood them and if they made sense to them. This sheds light on 
the divide between knowing and acting, or the divide between one person giving 
information and others knowing what it means, and then being able to act upon 
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it. It also illustrates the importance for deeper insights into the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations. In the next paragraphs I will elaborate on the 
different concepts I have introduced so far, such as complex interactive and 
tightly coupled systems, risk, perception, and risk communication.  
As a consultant in the field of risk and crisis communication, I am often 
confronted with managers who communicate to their subordinates about the 
need for safety, the existing risks and how to deal with them, but often with little 
to no success. It is my observation that organisations struggle to find the right 
‘tone of voice’ to connect with the people’s perception concerning the risk issue 
at hand. Reason (1997) suggests that open communication impacts safe 
behaviour, and reduces the number of accidents in the workplace. However, 
there is little empirical evidence to support this proposition. Although many 
scholars (e.g., Slovic, 2000; Morgan et al., 2002; Breakwell, 2007; Slovic, 2010) 
suggest answers to the question of how communication can have an impact on 
perception, and subsequently behaviour, most of the propositions formulated 
are based on findings in empirical research among civilians in general. When it 
comes to communicating risk in organisations with the intention to influence 
safety perceptions and subsequent attitudes in the workforce, very little 
empirical research has been conducted (Conchie et al., 2006). An important 
question central to this issue relates to how perceptions are confirmed, 
constructed, or influenced by communication.  
In her book The Psychology of Risk, Glynis Breakwell devotes a full chapter on 
risk communication. Breakwell states that “one thing that makes [risk 
communication] interesting, if not unique, is that it seems very difficult to do 
well” (Breakwell, 2007, p. 130). Morgan and his colleagues go even further by 
stating that “one cannot find a clear analysis of what needs to be 
communicated, nor solid evidence that messages have achieved their impact. 
Nor can one find tested procedures for ensuring the credibility of 
communication” (Morgan et al., 2002, p. 3). Both quotes illustrate the urgent 
need for a profound understanding of risk communication in organisations. 
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In the next sections I will introduce what is known about risk, risk perception, 
risk communication, and theories defining organisations that deal with risks. The 
majority of these findings stem from a scoping study I carried out on this topic. 
According to Tranfield and his colleagues (2003), a scoping study is necessary 
in management research to assess the relevance and size of the literature and 
to delimit the subject area or topic. In October 2010, this scoping study, entitled 
An exploration into how risk communication influences risk perception, and the 
role of trust in that process, was presented to the supervisory panel and 
accepted for further elaboration in the form of a systematic review. 
First, I will demarcate the field of this research, and explain the concept of 
complex interactive and tightly coupled systems. 
1.2 Complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations 
In this systematic review I focus on organisations that have to perform in 
specific settings where they constantly face a potential for error that might have 
a disastrous consequence on third-party victims (innocent bystanders) and 
fourth-party victims (fetuses and future generations) (Perrow, 1999). These 
organisations have no choice but to function reliably, in order to avert serious 
harm (Weick and Sitcliffe, 2007). It could be argued that all of these 
organisations have five characteristics in common: 
1. They use high levels of energy to transform input into output (Shrivastava 
et al., 2009), 
2. These organisations have to perform at high tempo for a long time 
without damaging themselves or others (Klein et al., 1995), 
3. In the event of a fatal failure, the consequences will not only have a 
massive impact on the organisation and its members, it will have a 
severe impact on third-party victims, the environment, and even the 
sector in which they operate as well (Shrivastava et al., 2009), 
4. The processes these organisations control are tightly coupled and deal 
with complex interactive systems (Perrow, 1999), 
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5. When danger occurs to these organisations, they often cannot stop the 
production process immediately, fix the problem, and continue their 
operations (Klein et al., 1995). 
Table 1-1 maps out a number of different types of organisations that all face 
certain risks. It becomes apparent that only a limited number of these 
organisations meet all the five previously defined criteria. These organisations 
are nuclear power plants, chemical hazardous plants, aircrafts, and offshore 
and onshore gas plants. All of the other examples lack one or more 
characteristics. 
 High levels 
of energy in 
production 
process 
High level of 
performance 
 
High impact 
in case of 
failure 
Tightly 
coupled 
processes 
and 
interactive 
systems 
Process 
cannot be 
stopped in 
case of 
danger 
Nuclear 
power plant 
X X X X X 
Chemical 
hazardous 
plant 
X X X X X 
Offshore / 
onshore gas 
plant 
X X X X X 
Aircraft X X X X X 
Air control 
system 
 X X  X 
Mining   X   
Hospital  X X  X 
Fire brigade   X   
Power grids X X X   
R&D firm   X  X 
Bank   X  X 
Table 1-1 Organisations facing risks based on five characteristics  
According to Perrow, the organisations that meet all five criteria are 
organisations that manage complex interactive and tightly coupled systems 
(Perrow, 1999; p. 327). Coupling concerns the degree to which certain actions 
in one part of the system directly affect other parts in the system. In other 
words, the term ‘tight coupling’ means, “there is no slack or buffer or give 
between two items. What happens in one directly affects what happens in the 
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other” (Perrow, 1999; p. 90). Interactive complexity refers to how the different 
parts or components in a system interact. These “connections are not only 
adjacent, serial ones, but can multiply as other parts or units or subsystems are 
reached” (Perrow, 1999; p. 75). As a consequence, these complex interactive 
systems cannot be easily shut down or bypassed and fixed as soon as 
something is happening. The opposite of a complex interactive system is a 
linear interactive system. In a linear interactive system “production is carried out 
through a series or sequence of steps laid out in a line” (Perrow, 1999; p. 72), 
while the number of parts is irrelevant. 
Figure 1-1 illustrates the four quadrants, formed by a two-by-two dimension of 
complex/linear interactions and tight/loose coupling systems (Perrow, 1999; p. 
327). The type of organisations as presented in quadrant 2 (complex 
interactions/tight coupling) are the kind of organisations this systematic review 
focuses on. 
Figure 1-1 Interaction/Coupling chart (taken from Perrow, 1999; p. 327) 
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In the next paragraph (1.3.1 Theories) I will elaborate on different theories in the 
domain of organisational risk. It will become apparent that this notion of 
‘complex interactive and tightly coupled systems’ is accepted by and used in the 
different theories on organisational risks. 
1.3 Literature domains 
In this section I will introduce the main findings from the scoping study 
concerning the key domains in the literature under review: theories, risk, risk 
perception, communication, and risk communication. I will also highlight the 
distinct theoretical views in the literature on organisations managing high-risks.  
1.3.1 Theories 
The literature on organisations dealing with complex interactive and tightly 
coupled systems can be broken down into beliefs concerning the root causes of 
an incident, and a theoretical approach in the nature of accidents and how to 
avoid, trap or mitigate failures through organisational design and management 
(Denyer et al., 2008).  
Three schools of thought focus on the root causes of a failure or error: one that 
adheres to human error, a second one to mechanical or technical failure, and a 
third one to systems failure. An accident might thus be attributed to a mistake 
made by one or more operators (human error), a technical failure in an 
operation (such as a faulty valve that leads to a sudden eruption of toxic 
substances), or a wider systems failure such as deficiencies in leadership, lack 
of trust or inconsistent communication. To avoid or mitigate these failures, there 
are two opposing theoretical approaches (NAT and HRO), and one (OST) that 
attempts to resolve the longstanding debate between the former ones.  
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) argues that tightly coupled and interactively 
complex organisations cannot prevent accidents. It is in their very nature that 
complex and tightly coupled structures inevitably trigger system-wide accidents 
(Perrow, 1999). And once that chain reaction is set in motion, due to its 
complexity and tight-coupled structure, human beings are unable to intervene. 
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Therefore, NAT heavily focuses on the structure of the systems. However, it 
predicts that every once in a while every system will break and cause accidents. 
This theory was explained in Charles Perrow’s seminal work Normal Accidents 
(Perrow, 1984; Perrow, 1999). 
The theoretical field of High-Reliability Organisations (HRO) also emerged in 
the 1980s when scholars from the so-called ‘Berkeley group’ at the University of 
California studied how organisations operating with high-hazard technologies 
manage to remain accident-free for impressive lengths of time while meeting 
high production goals (Denyer et al., 2008; Shrivastava et al., 2009). Although 
HRO has a different view on managing risks than NAT does, it accepts the 
notion of complex interactive and tightly coupled systems (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; p. 90-92). However, HRO focuses on how organisations can “create 
mindful infrastructures that diminish or even postpone damage produced by 
unexpected events and impair reliable performance” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; 
p. 2). HRO argues that organisations can avoid failures by the early tracking of 
small failures, reluctance to oversimplification, remaining sensitive to 
operations, maintaining capabilities for resilience, and by deference to 
expertise. High-reliability theorists emphasise the human errors school of 
thought (Reason, 1997), which suggest that failures can be attributed to people. 
Table 1-2 illustrates the -quite often- opposing views, based on Shrivastava et 
al. (2009). Although this table only offers the main differences between NAT 
and HRO, it indicates a different view on organisational accidents, and how to 
anticipate or postpone them. 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) High-Reliability Organisations (HRO) 
Accidents cannot be prevented Accidents may be postponed 
Focus on structure Focus on processes 
Human beings are unable to intervene once 
the chain reaction is set in motion owing to 
interactive complexity and tight coupling 
Human beings and organisations are 
assumed to cause disaster and are accorded 
the power to intervene 
Complex and tightly coupled structures 
inevitably trigger system-wide accidents 
Organisational initiatives can prevent 
accidents 
Importing a notion of reliability from the Organisations must be 'mindful' 
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engineering discipline 
Systems can be divided into four levels: 1) an 
individual part (e.g., a valve), 2) functionally 
related collections of individual parts, 3) 
arrays of units make a subsystem, 4) 
combined subsystems make a system. 
Failures at the first two levels are called 
‘incidents’, disruptions at levels 3 and 4 are 
‘accidents’ 
Reliability is the ability to maintain and 
execute error-free operations through 1) the 
early tracking of small failures, 2) reluctance 
to oversimplification, 3) remaining sensitive to 
operations, 4) maintaining capabilities for 
resilience, and by 5) deference to expertise 
Focus on systems levels 3 and 4 Introduction of several constructs that may 
have relevance for non-HROs 
NAT predicts that every once in a while 
systems will break down and cause accidents, 
no matter how much effort and wisdom is 
invested to avoid system accidents 
HRO predicts safety for organisations that are 
totally committed to high-reliability practices 
Point to the moment when accidents 
eventually take place 
Focus on accident-free environments that 
have existed for a long period 
Table 1-2 Normal Accident Theory versus High-Reliability Organisations 
The third theoretical perspective on organisational accidents and how to 
mitigate or postpone them is offered in the Open Systems Theory (OST). In an 
attempt to resolve the longstanding debate between NAT and HRO, 
Shrivastava et al. (2009) introduce the concept of open systems. Based on the 
four quadrants of the NAT, formed by a two-by-two dimension of complex/linear 
interactions and tight/loose coupling systems, Shrivastava and his colleagues 
reframed these dimensions into high/low energy levels and a high/low 
knowledge gap. In the high knowledge gap/high energy level quadrant, we find 
nuclear power plants, aircrafts, chemical plants, space missions, etc. This is 
very similar to Perrow’s (1999) concept of tight coupled/complex interactions. 
Although both NAT and OST focus on organisations that are tightly coupled and 
interactively complex, OST excludes military early warning systems and nuclear 
weapon systems as they do not involve transformation processes. DNA 
recombinant technologies are omitted as well “as they do not involve high levels 
of energy” (Shrivastava et al., 2009; p. 1381). 
Figure 1-2 illustrates the adapted two-by-two dimension of complex/linear 
interactions and tight/loose coupling systems (Perrow, 1999) into a two-by-to 
dimension of low/high energy levels and low/high knowledge gap (Shrivastava 
et al., 2009). 
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Figure 1-2 Knowledge/Energy chart (taken from Shrivastava et al., 2009; p. 
1381) 
Furthermore, Shrivastava and his colleagues interpret open systems as 
containing the following properties (Shrivastava et al., 2009; p. 1376-1380): -­‐ Permeable boundaries: an open system is distinguished from its 
environment by an arbitrary boundary. However, these boundaries are 
permeable, indistinct and dynamic. -­‐ Energy transformation: through these permeable boundaries, open 
systems receive inputs from the environment, transform these inputs into 
outputs, and exchange their outputs for new inputs. This input-
transformation-output cycle is a dynamic process that involves 
conversion of energy from one form to another. -­‐ Negentropy: one of the fundamental laws of nature is that energy can 
neither be created nor destroyed; it can only be made to change its form. 
Some unusable energy does not escape to the external environment; it 
accumulates within the system itself. This accumulation of unusable 
energy within the system is a form of entropy. Entropy can thus be 
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defined as a measure of disorder or randomness in energy. Entropy in 
any closed part of the universe tends to increase with the passage of 
time. However, open systems appear to defy this because the amount of 
order in them always exceeds the amount of disorder. Thus open 
systems are said to have negative entropy, i.e. they are negentropic. -­‐ Homeostasis: open systems rely on feedback loops to maintain 
equilibrium with an ever-changing external environment. Both positive 
and negative feedback ensure survival of a system even as the system 
continues to grow. This property that maintains equilibrium and allows for 
stable expansion is called homeostasis. -­‐ Requisite variety: this is the variety of numbers in which a system can 
exist. Variety is a measure of complexity. A complicated system has a 
large variety, meaning it can occupy a large number of states. It can be 
claimed that a system needs variety to combat variety. The law of 
requisite variety tells us that a system can insulate itself from the 
complexity of the external environment by making itself complex 
The brief examination of the distinctive theories in the field of complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations has identified several ontological 
differences. However, NAT, HRO, and OST all accept the notion of complex 
interactive and tightly coupled systems.  
From an interpretivist point of view, I rather adhere the theory of high-reliability 
organisations and the human error school of thought that focuses on the root 
causes of a failure. However, it is important to place my research interests 
within the wider debate in order to synthesise different findings of the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception, and its effects on 
organisational safety behaviour. As indicated by Denyer and Tranfield (2006) 
this kind of analysing distinct epistemological and ontological differences can 
provide important and effective means of creating practical management 
knowledge.  
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1.3.2 Risk 
Generally, risk is defined in terms of two dimensions; the first concerns 
probabilities, the second concerns effects (Breakwell, 2007). Risk refers to the 
probability or chance individual people, governments and industries take, but 
this can be linked to positive and negative perceptions. Effect, the second 
dimension of risk, is linked to a dominant view in the literature that refers to risk 
as a calculation of chance every individual, government or industries takes, and 
that is associated to both positive and negative outcomes. In this view, risk can 
be measured, calculated, and controlled. Scholars such as Perrow (1999), 
Groeneweg (2002), and Leiss (2004) are a few of the authors that defend this 
view on risk.  
A more interpretivist view on risk is presented by Slovic (2000), who argues that 
human beings have invented the concept of risk to cope with the dangers and 
uncertainties of life. Therefore, risk is not something tangible, but rather a 
concept that is constructed in the mind, perception and emotion of every 
individual (Slovic, 2000). Consequently the interpretation of risk can vary 
remarkably among individuals, or, as Gurabardhi and Gutteling argue, “the 
concept ‘risk’ means different things to different people” (Gurabardhi and 
Gutteling, 2002, p. 428), in different situations (Ganzach et al., 2008).  
Regardless of how people perceive risk and the way to deal with it, be it as a 
tangible calculation of chance to win or lose, be it as a concept or a mental 
construction, most people cannot and do not like to deal with the negative 
consequences of risk (Slovic, 2010). One of the reasons why is the complexity 
of risks (Meijnders et al., 2009). Very often the statistical analyses by those 
involved in risk assessment do not make sense to lay persons. Although 
civilians become more educated about risks, they become harder to understand 
(Leiss, 2004; Slovic, 2010). A second motivation for aversive reactions to risk 
can be wealth; the more we have to lose, the more we are afraid of the negative 
impact of risks (Leiss, 2004). A third aspect that leads to an aversive attitude 
towards risk is a mental shift with regards to the origin of disasters (Coan, 
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2002). When less than five decades ago a natural catastrophe or major incident 
happened, it was perceived as an act of god. Nowadays this faith in a higher 
power has decreased and the media and victims are eager to go after the 
offender, and subsequently compensation (Marynissen et al., 2010). This might 
be illustrated by the following example. At the time I was writing this systematic 
review project, Belgium was confronted with a disaster at a large open-air music 
festival, called Pukkelpop. In the late afternoon of 18 August 2011, a local 
tornado tore down a large marquee and several trees, with more than 50,000 
music fans desperately looking for a place to shelter. Five festival-goers, 
predominantly youngsters, were killed instantly, and more than 140 others were 
injured. Some of them were badly injured, and were fighting for their lives. 
Within a couple of hours after this tragedy which was caused by a force of 
nature, the public opinion started questioning the responsibility of the festival’s 
organising committee, and even the role of the mayor and the rescue teams in 
their response to prevent or to intervene at the place of disaster. 
Based on these insights, the definition that I am using is that risk is socially 
constructed, and thus both an individual and a collective interpretation of a 
concept that is based on the chance to lose or gain something, which can 
individually or collectively trigger associated perceptions that might have an 
impact on individual, group, institutional or societal level. 
In the next section I will elaborate on how risk is perceived and what the mental 
models about risk provoke on individual and collective level. 
1.3.3 Perception 
The term “perception” appears in various domains such as sociology, 
psychology, philosophy, and even in the field of biology (Mezias and Starbuck, 
2003), and its origin is rooted in the attribution theory and the cognitive theory 
(Scott and Marshall, 2005). Attribution theory deals with the rules that most 
people use when they try to infer the causes of behaviour they observe, and 
generally attribute their own behaviour to the situation in which they find 
themselves. The cognitive theory is a major cluster of theories in social 
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psychology that focus on the links between mental processes such as 
perception, attitudes, decision-making, and social behaviour. Looking for an 
appropriate terminology for ‘perception’, different alternatives are mentioned in 
the literature, such as sensemaking (Weick, 1993), cognitive frameworks 
(Labianca et al., 2000; Kahneman, 2011), schemas (Labianca et al. 2000), 
frames (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), or mental models (Johnson-Laird, 
1983). 
Definitions of the term “perception” vary as well. In an effort to avoid linguistic 
differences, Mezias and Starbuck assume that “the term perception has its 
fundamental meaning: apprehension by means of the senses or of the mind” 
(Mezias and Starbuck, 2003, p. 4). According to Labianca and his colleagues 
perceptions are “generalized cognitive frameworks that give form and meaning 
to experience, and contain general knowledge to a domain” (Labianca et al., 
2000, p. 237). Barr and Huff also look at perception as cognitive representations 
individuals use, but they perceive it as a more dynamic process, as “a method 
to make sense of and act within their environments in order to make the right 
decisions” (Barr and Huff, 1997, p. 329). Buchanan and Huczynski support this 
view and state “perception is the dynamic psychological process responsible for 
attending to, organizing and interpreting sensory data” (Buchanan and 
Huczynski, 2010, p. 236). 
Therefore, the definition that I am using is based on Barr and Huff’s (1997) view 
that perceptions are dynamic processes that lead to decisions and subsequent 
behaviour, and are largely based on individual and collective schemas, frames, 
or mental models and the way people try to fit new information into these 
existing schemas, frames, or mental models. 
Linking these insights to risk perception, Slovic states that perceptions of risk 
are inversely correlated to perceived benefit (Slovic, 2010, p. xxi). In other 
words, if the benefit of a certain risk is perceived as high, the perception of this 
risk will be assessed as rather low. These insights were the basis for further 
research in the role feelings serve as important cues for judging risk and 
benefit, and lead to the theory of affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002). According 
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to Slovic, “affect refers to specific feelings of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ 
experienced with or without conscious awareness” (Slovic, 2010, p. 70). In other 
words, human beings form their decisions primarily based on feelings and not 
on reasoning, as feelings occur rapidly and automatically. This is what I refer to 
in the following paragraph about ‘affect heuristic’. 
The scoping study identified a gap in the literature when it comes to applying 
the theory of affect heuristic in organisational settings. All of the research on 
affect heuristic I examined is focused on public perceptions of risks and 
benefits. As we can accept that all organisational members are members of a 
community as well, the question can be raised if the conclusions made by the 
theory of affect heuristic are also applicable in organisational settings? Or there 
might be other rules, restrictions, or mechanisms in place that impact a risky 
decision-making process in a way it is no longer solely based on feelings. 
Therefore, the question can be raised whether organisational communication in 
general, and risk communication in particular, can moderate or impact these 
feelings for the benefit of both the individual and the organisation? 
1.3.4 Communication 
In this systematic review, communication is considered as the process of 
establishing meaning (Scott and Marshall, 2005) by use of the verbal and non-
verbal exchange of information, formal as well as informal (Barnes et al., 2007). 
The literature on organisational communication is more dominated by a desire 
for social order (Shockley-Zalabak, 2009) and good organisational citizenship 
behaviour (Al Eslami Kandlousi et al., 2010). This behaviour is based largely on 
individual and collective schemas, frames, or mental models. The aim of most 
organisational communication practices is to transfer information in order to fit 
the new data into the existing schemas, frames, or mental models of those who 
receive the information (Marynissen, 2011). In the literature these schemas, 
frames, or mental models are perceived as the basis for perceptions. The key 
question, though, is how perceptions are confirmed, constructed, or influenced 
by communication.  
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The problem with the literature on organisational communication is less linear 
than presented. Individuals never receive one single, clear pronounced 
message concerning an organisational issue. Donnelon and her colleagues 
introduce the concept of “equifinal meanings” for different interpretations of a 
message, but similar behavioural implications (Donnelon et al., 1986, p. 44). 
Although organisational members collectively act in the same way, each of 
them has a different understanding of the conveyed information. However, the 
concept of equifinal meanings is based on the interpretation of one single 
message and the respondents’ reported intention for action. This example 
illustrates how a large part of studies, theories or methodologies are based on 
clinical-type experiments using a single message from one source. 
Consequently, they are inadequate to understand in full the relationship 
between communication and perception. 
The second theme is the dual mode of thinking that forms organisational 
members’ perceptions: the heuristic and the cogitative (Taleb, 2010). Most 
organisational communication theories are based on the paradigm in which 
receivers of information process that information in a rational way, while 
research in the field of neurobiology (Lehrer, 2009) indicates that rationality is 
dominated by emotions. This dominant cognitive perspective has its origin in 
Plato’s view of the rational brain as the charioteer who controls two horses; a 
well-bred and thus well-behaved one, whereas the emotional brain is of an 
ignoble breed and is thus an obstinate one. With this metaphor, Plato (1995) 
divided the mind into two spheres: a rational and an emotional one. The 
charioteer, who represents the mind, is seen as torn between reason and 
emotion. Recent research in the field of neurobiology (see for example: 
Damasio, 1994; Schwartz and Begley, 2002; Bechara and Damasio, 2005; 
Lehrer, 2009) proves that Plato’s view of a rational brain was wrong and with 
him the majority of the twentieth century scientists who based their hypothesis 
on the premise that human beings interpret, decide and act based on a pure 
cogitative processes. According to Gilkey and his colleagues we cannot even 
make strategic and tactical management decisions without being influenced by 
our emotions (Gilkey et al., 2010). If we link this to the theory of affect heuristics 
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(Slovic et al., 2002), and try to picture it in organisations, the burning question is 
how communication can influence this emotional process in a way to alter 
existing perceptions of present risks among its members?  
The third difficulty is that organisational members are constrained to well-
established, ingrained schemas (Labianca et al., 2000; Balogun and Johnson, 
2004). Due to these existing schemas, the scattered information from multiple 
sources, and the inability to process that information through purely cognitive 
reasoning (Lehrer, 2009), organisational members form inaccurate perceptions 
of their organisation and environment (Mezias and Starbuck, 2003). 
Furthermore, risk perception and risk communication are linked to a specific 
cultural context in which hazards are framed (Dake, 1992). However, most 
research on risk perception and risk communication ignores this cultural context 
in which hazards are framed and debated (Dake, 1992; Harvey et al., 2002). 
These findings should have a significant impact in the way organisations deal 
with communication in general, and risk communication in particular. If we 
assume that existing perceptions prohibit organisational members from 
processing information in the intentional way of the sender, the impact on safety 
behaviour might be disastrous. Therefore, understanding the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in organisations is of the 
utmost importance in order to drive appropriate safety behaviour. 
1.3.5 Risk communication 
A first observation is that the literature on risk communication is heavily focused 
on potential risks in the environmental, public health, and technological 
domains, and how to convince, influence or discuss these topics with an 
external audience. However, when it comes to communicating risk in 
organisations with the intention of influencing safety behaviour of the workforce, 
very little empirical research has been conducted (Conchie et al., 2006, p. 
1098). Two of the world’s leading analysts of risk, risk perception, and risk 
communication, Vincent Covello and Paul Slovic, predominantly focus on the 
impact of communication on risk perception among civilians in general, but not 
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on organisational members in particular (e.g., Covello et al., 1987; Slovic, 2000; 
Slovic et al., 2002, Covello and Wolf, 2003; Slovic, 2010). 
A second observation is that communication in risk literature is dominantly 
perceived as “a tool utilized to represent a subjective interpretation of an 
external and objective reality” (Coan, 2002; p. 233) or “to maintain an 
organisation’s image” (Coombs, 1995, p. 448). These views are based on 
theories such as Michael Porter’s seminal “Five Forces Model” (Porter, 1980) 
that is based on a control view of the environment (Kumar and Becerra-
Fernandez, 2007) in which information and communication technologies are 
seen as strategic tools to control staff and risks. From an interpretivist point of 
view, communication is not a tool owned by an organisation to control people or 
to protect its image or reputation, but rather a process owned by internal and 
external stakeholders who construct an interpretation of their relation with that 
particular organisation through dialogue and sensemaking (Boden, 1994; 
Mumby and Clair, 1997). Christensen and his colleagues describe this as “the 
co-construction of communicated meaning” (Christensen et al., 2005, p. 165). 
This brings us to a third scrutiny in the literature: a divide in opinion on how to 
communicate about risk. Lay people judge risk perceptions in qualitative terms 
based on gut feelings and emotions (Slovic, 2010), while risk assessment 
experts use quantitative expressions of the hazardous impact of certain risks 
(Leiss, 2004). In other words, civilians and experts use different criteria and 
often a different language to judge the same facts. This feeds the debate about 
risk communication strategies, involvement of stakeholders in the risk 
evaluation process, and the flow of information concerning risk, and has 
eventually resulted in two very different perspectives on risk management and 
risk communication (Gurabardhi et al, 2005). Some scholars see risk 
communication basically “to revolve around one party trying to get another party 
to accept a representation of a hazard” (Breakwell, 2007, p. 130) by means of 
transferring information. This group constitutes the so-called “traditional 
technical view” in risk communication (Gurabardhi and Gutteling, 2002, p. 425). 
The other group, the so-called “democrats”, look at risk communication as a 
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constructive exchange of information between all the actors involved in the risk 
process in order to reach an open, clear, and honest dialogue (Gurabardhi and 
Gutteling, 2002, p. 422). The argument that pleads for the democratic approach 
to risk communication is that many people do not have the knowledge and 
expertise to evaluate and understand large numbers. The result is that people 
become insensitive as the numbers linked to certain risks get larger. According 
to Slovic this can be explained by the fact that numbers fail to trigger emotions 
and feelings necessary to motivate action (Slovic, 2010, p. 69). 
This raises the question whether this democratic view on risk communication is 
recommendable as well in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations? One can presume that organisational members who received 
appropriate training and have experience with this have a certain level of 
knowledge to interpret numbers and quantitative information. Therefore the 
need for a deeper understanding of the role and design of risk communication in 
organisations is required. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Based on the insights in the domains of risk, perception and communication that 
emerged from the literature, and based on my own experience as a practitioner 
in the field of risk and crisis communication, the following implications have 
emerged: 
- The conclusions made by the theory of affect heuristic might be applicable in 
organisational settings as well. However, there might be other rules, 
restrictions, or mechanisms in place that impact risky decision-making 
processes, 
- Organisational communication in general, and communication about risk in 
particular, might impact the organisational members’ perception process and 
can help them make more conscious decisions concerning certain risks, 
- Mindful organisations, as described by HRO, attribute a key role to the 
design of communication structures,  
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- The so-called ‘democratic view’ on risk communication is very much in line 
with the notion of ‘deference to expertise’, the fifth principle of HRO. 
These implications are the basis for the research question and the questions 
that will be used to systematically review the literature on risk communication 
and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations, 
while being vigilant for the specific cultural context in which hazards are framed 
and debated (Dake, 1992; Harvey et al., 2002).  
In the next chapter I will introduce the methodology used for the systematic 
review of the literature. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter I will first describe the review objectives, present the review 
questions, and introduce the review process and protocol as described by 
Tranfield et al. (2003). Then I will explain how I decided on the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria for use with full text papers, along with the quality appraisal 
criteria for all selected papers. Finally I will give a detailed description of the 
search process itself, based on all the inclusion/exclusion criteria and the quality 
appraisal criteria. 
2.2 Review objective 
The objective of this systematic review (SR) is to conduct a critical review of a 
body of literature concerning the relationship between risk communication and 
risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations in order 
to develop a reliable knowledge base which aims to serve both academic and 
practitioner communities (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 220). The desired outcome is 
to uncover what is known and unknown about the chosen topic, based on 
existing theories, empirical research texts and policy texts. 
As stated in the introduction chapter, there is little empirical research on the 
specific mechanisms or moderators that might influence the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception among staff in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations. While this question might be 
worthwhile from an academic point of view, a practitioner community might be 
eager to know how risk communication can impact staff behaviour. Therefore, a 
closer look at the context, the interventions, and the mechanisms that influence 
or impact the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
these specific types of organisations is recommended for a systematic review, 
based on the following research question: 
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“What is the relationship between risk perception and risk communication in 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations?”  
To examine the literature rigorously, the so-called ‘CIMO-logic’ (Denyer et al., 
2008) was applied as a way to synthesise and structure the existing literature. 
In an attempt to offer more solution-oriented or prescriptive knowledge to 
increase relevance for practice in management science, Denyer and his 
colleagues (2008) offer a design proposition based on synthesising previously 
published research. The CIMO-logic involves “a combination of a problematic 
Context, for which the design proposition suggests a certain Intervention type, 
to produce, through specified generative Mechanisms, the intended 
Outcome(s)” (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 393). Table 2-1 illustrates the four 
components of the CIMO-logic as described by Denyer et al. (2008, p. 397). 
Component Explanation 
Context (C) The surrounding (external and internal environment) factors and the nature 
of the human actors that influence behavioural change. They include 
features such as age, experience, competency, organisational politics and 
power, the nature of the technical system, organisational stability, 
uncertainty and system interdependencies. Interventions are always 
embedded in a social system and, as noted by Pawson and Tilley (1997), 
will be affected by at least four contextual layers: the individual, the 
interpersonal relationships, institutional setting and the wider infrastructural 
system.  
Interventions (I) The interventions managers have at their disposal to influence behaviour. 
For example, leadership style, planning and control systems, training, 
performance management. It is important to note that it is necessary to 
examine not just the nature of the intervention but also how it is 
implemented. Furthermore, interventions carry with them hypotheses, 
which may or may not be shared. For example, ‘financial incentives will 
lead to higher worker motivation’.  
Mechanisms (M) The mechanism that in a certain context is triggered by the intervention. 
For instance, empowerment offers employees the means to contribute to 
some activity beyond their normal tasks or outside their normal sphere of 
interest, which then prompts participation and responsibility, offering the 
potential of long-term benefits to them and/or to their organisation.  
Outcome (O) The outcome of the intervention in its various aspects, such as  
performance improvement, cost reduction or low error rates.  
Table 2-1 CIMO-logic: the components of design propositions (taken from 
Denyer et al., 2008; p. 397) 
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Linking this CIMO-logic to my research question offers the following review 
questions: 
1. How does context influence the relationship between risk communication 
and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations? 
2. What interventions influence the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations? 
3. What mechanisms are triggered by an intervention in a certain context 
that influence the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations? 
4. What is the outcome of these interventions and mechanisms in a certain 
context on the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations? 
The research question and the review questions can be illustrated in the figure 
below (Figure 2-1).  
 
Figure 2-1 Research question underpinned by CIMO-logic 
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It is noteworthy that Denyer and his colleagues used published research in the 
field of high-reliability organisations (HROs) to illustrate the design of the so-
called ‘CIMO-logic’. 
In this SR the focus will be on the relationship between risk communication and 
risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. By 
systematically reviewing the literature I want to uncover what is already known 
about this relationship.  
The focus is on the individual level; thus, both the sender and the receiver of the 
communication who interpret formalised communication that eventually turn into 
artefacts such as procedures, safety rules, guidelines, or codes of conduct 
(Elliott and Macpherson, 2010). Referring to Slovic (2000) risk is not something 
tangible, but rather a concept that is constructed in the mind, perception and 
emotion of every individual. Therefore I consider perceptions primarily as 
individual constructions. Even though meanings and perceptions can be 
influenced by and created through interaction, every individual goes through a 
personal sensemaking process (Thomas et al., 1993; Weick, 2001) in order to 
create an individual meaning that might be shared with a group and can be 
adapted or readapted on an individual basis. Although the level of analysis will 
be on the individual organisational member, I will not neglect the insights the 
literature offers on the interventions, mechanisms, and effects of risk 
communication on group level or organisation level. The rationale is that teams, 
as well as organisations, consist of individuals who might affect individual and 
group perceptions. 
Furthermore, I only consider those risks that are directly linked to the day-to-day 
activities of an organisation, and where a perception of a plausible risk might 
have an impact on the processes, systems, products, or services of that 
organisation. Risks such as terrorism, pandemics, and natural hazards (e.g., 
earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.) are not in the scope of this SR. Nor are the 
perceptions of risk communication to an external audience (e.g., civilians, 
neighbours) the focus of this SR. 
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2.3 Systematic review process 
This systematic review is conducted using the methodology as described by 
Tranfield et al. (2003, p. 214), and has been outlined in Table 2-2. 
Stage I – Planning the review 
Phase 0 - Identification for the need for a review  
Phase 1 - Preparation of a proposal for a review  
Phase 2 - Development of a review protocol  
Stage II – Conducting a review 
Phase 3 - Identification of research 
Phase 4 - Selection of studies 
Phase 5 - Study quality assessment 
Phase 6 - Data extraction and monitoring progress  
Phase 7 - Data synthesis  
Stage III – Reporting and dissemination 
Phase 8 - Report and recommendations  
Phase 9 - Getting evidence into practice  
Table 2-2 The stages of a systematic review (taken from Tranfield et al., 
2003; p. 214) 
Stage I of the SR-process, the planning of the review, was finished and signed 
off by the supervisory review panel before I started with Stages II and III.  
In the following sections I will discuss the identification of the keywords and 
search string, the selection of the sources and the databases, as well as the 
assessment criteria. 
2.4 Review protocol 
A review protocol is “a plan that helps to protect objectivity by providing explicit 
descriptions of the steps to be taken” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 215). In this 
 120 
section I will elaborate on the outlines for conducting the systematic review and 
the different steps I took in the review process.  
2.4.1 Review panel 
The purpose of the review panel is to provide expert guidance on the protocol 
for the review, the appropriateness of selected papers, and an overall reflective 
consulting on the process. Besides the review panel, who are all experts in the 
areas of methodology and theory, I could also rely on both my cohort leader, Dr 
Carlos Mena, for practical issues, and the social science information specialist 
of the Kings Norton Library, Mrs Heather Woodfield, for guidance regarding the 
search engines to find the right documents. All panel members are from the 
Cranfield School of Management, and have been described in Table 2-3.  
Name Organisation Expertise 
Prof. Donna Ladkin Cranfield SOM Leadership and ethics, Lead 
supervisor 
Dr. Colin Pilbeam Cranfield SOM Panel Chair 
Prof. David Denyer Cranfield SOM Systematic Review specialist, 
Panel member 
Dr. Ruth Sealy Cranfield SOM CPD, Panel member 
Dr. Carlos Mena Cranfield SOM Cohort leader, DBA cohort 
09-13 
Mrs. Heather Woodfield Kings Norton Library, 
Cranfield University 
Social science information 
specialist 
Table 2-3 List of members of the review panel 
2.4.2 Consultation groups 
According to the SR-requirements, as stated by Tranfield et al. (2003, p. 214), I 
formed two consultation groups; one including both practitioners and academics 
working in the field of risk and crisis communication, and one including 
academics and alumni from HEC (Paris) and Saïd Business School (Oxford).   
The first consultation group meets twice a year at the so-called ‘PM expert 
meetings’ (PM refers to my company’s name). These are meetings with 
practitioners in the field of risk and crisis communication, and the field of risk 
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and safety management. The participants belong to different kinds of 
organisations, such as hospitals, security services, the food industry, and 
(petro)chemical industries. Other participants are academia in the broad field of 
organisational behaviour, and some in the field of risk and crisis communication. 
A final component of this expert group are experts in these fields working as 
independent consultants or as advisors to legislative bodies. At these sessions 
work in progress is presented and discussed. The first meeting was held on 4 
March 2011 at the Royal Military Academy in Brussels, where I met fellow 
researchers and faculty members in the field of risk and crisis communication.  
The second consultation group is ‘the Change Leaders’, an alumni group from 
the HEC (Paris) and Saïd Business School (Oxford) Masters Programme on 
change management. Twice a year this group meets for a couple of days to 
reflect on certain themes in the field of change. However, a full day is used to 
present recent or ongoing research. As faculty members of both universities 
support these venues, this consultation group forms an excellent sounding 
board to discuss possible ways in the systematic review process with peers and 
HEC and Oxford faculty. 
I was privileged to present results of the scoping study and an initial draft of the 
systematic review protocol. Members of both consultation groups actually 
suggested academic and practitioner oriented readings in the field of risk 
communication to me. 
2.4.3 Sources, search terms, and databases 
In this section I will discuss the protocol plan for literature sources, the search 
terms, and the selected databases. 
2.4.4.1 Literature sources 
As a practitioner in the field of risk and crisis communication I am obliged by my 
clients, who run highly reliable operations on a global scale, to have extensive 
knowledge of all key books and major publications, both practitioner and 
academic oriented, in my domain of expertise. As we often conduct research 
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projects for legislative bodies (both on a local and European level) and 
commercial organisations, a profound knowledge of the available literature and 
a broad range of sources is a condition sine qua non.  
In 2010 I co-authored a book on risk and crisis communication (Marynissen et 
al., 2010). The theoretical background for this practitioner-oriented book was 
discussed and aligned with Prof. Jan Van den Bulck and Prof. Jan Gutteling, 
both highly respected academics in the field of (risk) communication 
(Marynissen et al., 2010, p. 200).  
Based on this background knowledge, I identified a broad range of sources of 
literature as a starting point for my review. These sources include broad 
categories such as academic research, academic and practitioner-oriented 
books, as well as practitioner-oriented articles and websites (see Table 2-4). 
Some literature was recommended by members of the consultation groups, 
other sources derived from the scoping study. These sources gave me a good 
overview of the current topics and discussions in the field of risk communication 
and risk perception. A detailed list of secondary sources of published academic 
research and practitioner-oriented insights is presented in Appendix A.  
Sources Value to the review 
Academic journals Primary source of published academic 
research 
Academic books Secondary source of published academic 
research 
Conference papers and proceedings Primary source of unpublished academic 
research 
Practitioner research reports and papers Primary source of practitioner oriented 
insights and data 
Table 2-4 Broad category of sources of literature 
A search of conference programmes over the past 3 years (2008-2011) from 
“Academy of Management”, “Society for Risk Analysis”, and “Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology” was conducted to locate unpublished 
studies.  
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Based on the references published in academic and practitioner-oriented books, 
I identified a number of key academic journals that are relevant sources of 
literature in the fields of risk communication and risk perception. These journals 
are presented in Table 2-5. A full list of the academic journals that offered 
articles for this systematic review is presented in Appendix B. 
Journal Rating5 
Academy of Management Journal  4 
Academy of Management Review  4 
Group and Organization Management  3 
Journal of Applied Psychology  4 
Journal of Risk Research  None 
Journal of Safety Research None 
Management Science  4 
Risk Analysis 3 
Safety Science  2 
Table 2-5 Key sources of literature in the fields of risk communication and 
risk perception 
My decision to focus on academic research, and not on academic books, nor on 
published practitioner research and books resulted from two reasons: a 
limitation of time, and a quality concern. There simply was not enough time in 
the research project to evaluate and assess the vast amount of literature to find 
relevant pieces that are additive to knowledge captured in the academic 
literature. Furthermore, none of the consulted books (see Appendix A) 
specifically cover the field of risk communication in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations. They all deal with risk management, or risk 
communication with civilians. And when it comes to the quality concern, the 
practitioner content in the domain of risk communication is dispersed and 
dominantly based on gut feeling, assumptions, and dodgy interpretations of 
consultancy work.  
  
                                            
5 According to Journal Recommendations for Academic Publications, Cranfield University SoM, 
Eighth Edition, April 2011. 
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2.4.4.2 Search terms 
In order to find the right keywords, I divided my SR-question into four domains:  
1. Risk 
2. Communication 
3. Perception 
4. Organisation 
For each of these domains, I went back to the literature I used for the scoping 
study, and collected those words that could be relevant. I also selected words 
referring to various domains I did not include in the review, such as terrorism, 
climate change, pandemics, et cetera. Both the search terms and the words 
referring to domains I excluded were combined in an overall search string that 
contains four AND-strings, and one AND NOT-string. This search string is listed 
below in Table 2-6. 
[risk]  
AND 
[communicati* OR informati*] 
AND 
[perception OR sens* OR interpret* OR schema OR (mental AND model)] 
AND 
[organi* OR group OR team OR (high AND hazard) OR (high AND reliabilit*) OR seveso] 
AND NOT 
[flood OR pandemic OR financ* OR market OR climat* OR stock OR gambl* OR influenza OR 
natur* OR consumer OR comput* OR software OR internet OR medic* OR cancer OR HIV OR 
politic* OR terror*] 
Table 2-6 Overall search string 
A suggestion, made by the panel chair, was to adapt the search string on 
organisation. His rationale was that because the review is about organisations 
that are highly reliable, therefore it would be more appropriate to use “AND” 
instead of “OR”. However, by changing this search string into [organi* OR group 
OR team OR (high AND hazard) AND (high AND reliabilit*) OR seveso] only 
one scholarly journal article appeared in the ProQuest database. A second 
attempt, changing the search string into [organi* OR group OR team OR ((high 
AND hazard) AND (high AND reliabilit*)) OR seveso] resulted in 189 scholarly 
journal articles, whereas my initial search resulted in 195 scholarly journal 
articles. Therefore I decided to keep the initial overall search string, as it 
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resulted in a slightly higher number of scholarly journal articles, and thus a 
higher probability for finding the maximum amount of useful literature in this 
domain under review. 
Subsequently, I accomplished the search process in four steps: 
1. I entered the search string to interrogate the different databases (see: 
“2.4.3 Sources, search terms, and databases”). These raw results are 
illustrated in Table 2-7, 
2. I searched the full texts where available, otherwise I used title and 
abstract, and selected scholarly journals (I will expand on this in 2.4.4 
Assessment criteria), 
3. When the search results exceeded 300 hits using full text, the search 
was limited to title and abstract only, 
4. Relevant articles were downloaded or requested from the Cranfield 
University library. 
Database Results 
AIB/Inform 195 
EBSCOhost 18 
Science Direct 75 
Table 2-7 Raw results of interrogating the databases 
The search process was extended to citations and references of the selected 
articles. This will be discussed in a later section (see: “2.5 The search 
process”). 
2.4.4.3 Databases 
Several online databases are important sources of relevant literature and a way 
to access aggregate data from the other sources. The search engines I used for 
this review are:  
• ProQuest: ABI/INFORM Dateline, ABI/INFORM Global, ABI/INFORM 
Trade & Industry 
• EBSCOhost Research Database: Business Thesaurus, Environmental 
Thesaurus, ERIC-Thesaurus 
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• ScienceDirect: (excluding Journal of Adolescent Health, Midwifery, Child 
Abuse & Neglect, Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, Nurse Education Today, International Journal of Drug 
Policy, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Aging Studies, and 
excluding the topics: midwife, road safety, physically abused, postpartum 
depression, pregnant adolescent, pregnant woman, primiparous woman, 
child, organic farming, platform migration")  
• Web of Knowledge 
• Cranfield University library catalogue: primary source of Cranfield 
University’s collection 
These databases were selected because they are all top aggregators of 
academic research. 
2.4.4 Assessment criteria 
The initial broad selection criteria for use with titles and abstracts of papers 
retrieved from searches were based on the following inclusion and exclusion 
criteria: 
Inclusion: articles in peer reviewed journals, book chapters, conference papers, 
and unpublished research: 
• Risk perception and risk communication are linked to a specific cultural 
context in which hazards are framed (Dake, 1992). I will therefore focus 
on one culture, in particular the literature from Western Europe and North 
America, 
• Based on literature that offers insights, models, theory, or empirical 
research, 
• Based on research in organisations with complex interactive and tightly 
coupled systems, 
• Literature focused on intra-organisational communication and risk. 
Exclusion:  
• Articles published before 1990, as the majority support a one-way risk 
communication flow (Gurabardhi et al., 2005), 
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• Articles that deal with climate issues, gambling, software or hardware 
risks, medical or pharmaceutical risks, or health issues, 
• Literature on crisis management, crisis communication, (Crisis) PR, 
public affairs, inter-organisational risk management and communication, 
crisis handling, crisis response strategy, business continuity 
management, risk management, contingency planning, cyber risk, 
terrorism. 
 
Based on these initial criteria, a list of selection criteria for use with full text 
papers was elaborated. This list is presented in Table 2-8. The literature 
obtained from the databases as explained earlier was assessed against the 
above selecting criteria using a simple scoring template: 
• Yes: the inclusion criteria are fully met (value=3)  
• Somewhat: the inclusion criteria are partially met (value=2)  
• No: the inclusion criteria are not met (value=1)  
• Not Applicable: the inclusion / exclusion criteria are not applicable for this 
paper (value=0) 
Papers with 0 or 1 scores were excluded from further review. 
Search term Inclusion Exclusion 
Risk Risks as the unit of analysis  Risk as peripheral variables, not 
linked to organisational operations 
or environment (i.e., gambling, 
pandemics, etc.)  
Communication Communication as the unit of 
analysis  
Telecommunications 
Information Transfer of information by means 
of any form of communication  
Not related to organisational 
communication  
Perception Perception as the unit of analysis  Not perception coloured by 
religion  
Sensemaking Mental scanning of the 
environment for clues, 
interpretation, and decision for 
taking action and performance  
Understanding without a link to 
undertaking action  
 
Interpretation Sensemaking  Not related to linguistics  
Schema Interpretation  Not related to technical plans  
Mental model Interpretation  Not related to technical plans  
Organisation The organisation as the focus of 
analysis  
Not related to projects  
Group The group as the focus of 
analysis  
Not related to projects  
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Team The team as the focus of analysis  Not related to projects  
High hazard Related to high organisational 
risks  
Not related to commodities  
High reliability Related to high organisational 
risks  
Not related to IT  
Seveso Related to high organisational 
risks and EU-directive 
82/501/EEC  
Not related to the Italian town 
called Seveso  
 
Table 2-8 Selection criteria for use with full text papers 
2.4.5 Quality assessment 
According to Wallace and Wray a critical approach to the reading of a journal 
article or book “is essential if we are to assess the value of the work it reports” 
(Wallace and Wray, 2006, p. 4). In order to base this review on “the best-quality 
evidence” (Tranfield et al., 2003, p. 215), I applied the following quality appraisal 
criteria for all research papers that passed the assessment criteria and the 
selection criteria for use with full texts (as described in 2.4.4): 
Theory: Does the paper test, create, or extend theory to the relationship 
between risk communication and perception in a meaningful way? Does the 
study support or improve my understanding of an existing theory? Are major 
concepts clearly elaborated or explained? 
Literature review: Does the paper cite appropriate literature and provide proper 
credit to existing work on the topic? 
Method: Do the sample, measures, methods, observations, procedures, and 
statistical analyses ensure internal and external validity? Are the statistical 
procedures used correctly and appropriately? Are the major assumptions of the 
statistical techniques reasonably well met? 
Integration: Does the study provide a good test of the theory and hypotheses, or 
sufficient empirical grounds for adding on to existing theory or building new 
theory? Is the chosen method (qualitative or quantitative) appropriate for the 
research question and theory? 
Contribution: Does the paper make a new and meaningful contribution to the 
literature in terms of theory, empirical knowledge, or management practice? 
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All the papers that are used in this systematic review are evaluated according to 
this quality appraisal. They are described in Appendix D. 
2.4.6 Conclusion 
As I am looking for a specific body of literature, the one on how risk 
communication has an impact on employees’ risk perception, the number of 
world leading (4 star rated) or internationally excellent (3 star rated) journals in 
the field of risk management or risk communication is rather limited. Therefore I 
decided to broaden the scope to other peer-reviewed journals as well. The 
Journal of Risk Research, for example, is exemplary for a peer-reviewed but 
non-rated academic journal. This journal published a number of articles by 
highly respected academics in the field of risk perception and risk 
communication over the last decade (e.g., Gurabardhi et al, 2005; Specht et al, 
2006; Conchie and Burns, 2009). I therefore decided to include a limited 
number of articles published in non-rated peer reviewed journals in this review.  
2.5 Search process 
To identify the most relevant literature in an unbiased way (Tranfield et al., 
2003) I conducted the search process in a very systematic way. The different 
steps in this process are illustrated in Figure 2-2, and have been described in 
more detail below. 
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Figure 2-2 Search process 
• The overall search string, as described in Table 2-6, was entered in three 
databases: EBSCOhost, Science Direct, and ABI/Inform, 
• Based on the inclusion/exclusion criteria, as described in 2.4.4, the 
appropriate texts were selected based on title and abstract. 
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• The literature that passed these inclusion/exclusion criteria (‘Accepted 
texts’) went through a second round of evaluation based on the full 
content of the paper. For this second evaluation, the selection criteria for 
use with full text papers (as presented in Table 2-8) were applied.  
• For the literature that passed these inclusion/exclusion criteria, the Web 
of Knowledge database was used to conduct a search of all the citations. 
The same selection criteria for use with full text papers were applied to 
review the papers produced by this citation search. In the event the Web 
of Knowledge database did not include the paper, I used Google Scholar 
to identify the citations. 
• For the literature that passed the selection criteria for use with full text 
papers, and for the literature produced by the citation search which was 
accepted, a review of all the references was conducted. In the event that 
the Web of Knowledge database did not include the paper, the 
references were reviewed manually.  
• All the literature from the “citation search” and the “references search” 
that passed the selection criteria for use with full text papers went 
through this citation and reference search process until no papers 
confirming the inclusion criteria appeared. 
• The texts that passed through all searches were subsequently assessed 
using the quality appraisal criteria as described in section 2.4.5. 
• The texts that passed the quality appraisal criteria were included in the 
review. This list is described in Appendix C. 
• Once a piece of literature was considered relevant based on the 
selection criteria and the quality assessment, it was loaded into the 
EndNote reference management software. 
This search process provided a total set of 26 texts to review and synthesise. 
An overview of the search results is illustrated in Table 2-9. 
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Search 
action 
Description Reviewed Selection 
based on 
title and 
abstract 
Final 
selection 
based on 
full text 
Selection 
rate 
1 AIB/Inform 195 9 4 2.1% 
2 EBSCOhost 18 2 2 11.1% 
3 Science Direct 75 6 2 2.7% 
4 Citation search 907 15 10 1.1% 
5 Reference search 1,761 16 8 0.5% 
Total  2,956 48 26 0.9% 
Table 2-9 Overall search results  
 
2.6 Results 
The 26 papers that came out of the search process can be broken down into 
the following categories:  
• Theory building literature: 6 papers 
• Literature review: 2 papers 
• Policy literature: 1 paper 
• Empirically-based literature: 17 papers 
o 12 based on quantitative empirical research 
o 4 based on qualitative empirical research 
o 1 based on mixed methods (a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative empirical research) 
Table 2-10 gives an overview of the 17 selected empirically-based research 
papers in terms of authors, title, publishing date, the industry as a unit of 
analysis, geography, and method of data collection. A full overview of all the 
selected papers is presented in Appendix C. 
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Table 2-10 Overview of the selected empirically-based research papers 
Although all the selected papers deal in some way with risk communication in 
organisations, it is remarkable to observe how the authors underpin their 
hypothesis and arguments with findings that stem from theory building literature 
or empirical research in the domain of risk communication with, and risk 
perception of, civilians. 
A second observation is that only four papers (Klein et al., 1995; Grote and 
Künzler, 2000; Harvey et al. 2001; Hambach et al., 2011) fully cover the 
research question, i.e., they deal with the impact of risk communication on risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. Although 
the remaining papers give answers to one or more review questions as well, 
Author(s) Title Publication Year Industry Geography Method of data collection
1 Klein et al Organizational culture in high reliability 
organizations: An extension
Human Relations 1995 Air traffic 
control center 
and a nuclear 
power plant
USA Combination of quantitative 
(survey) and qualitative 
(field observations) 
methods
2 Sitkin and 
Weingart
Determinants of risky decision-making 
behavior: A test of the mediating role of risk 
perceptions and propensity
Academy of 
Management 
Journal
1995 Not specified USA Quantitative - Study 1: MBA 
students  Study 2: 
Undergraduate students
3 Sauer Communicating risk in a cross-cultural 
context: A cross-cultural comparison of 
rhetorical and social understanding in US and 
British mine safety training programs
Journal of 
Business and 
Technical 
Communication
1996 Mining 
industry 
UK and USA Qualitative analysis of 
printed communication
4 Grote and 
Künzler
Diagnosis of safety culture in safety 
management audits
Safety Science 2000 Petrochemical 
industry
USA and UK Quantitative questionnaires
5 Houghton et 
al
No safety in numbers: Persistence of biases 
and their effects on team risk perception and 
team decision making
Group and 
Organization 
Management
2000 Not specified USA Quantitative questionnaires 
(MBA students)
6 Harvey et al The effectiveness of training to change safety 
culture and attitudes within a highly regulated 
environment
Personnel Review 2001 Nuclear 
processing 
plant
UK Quantitiative questionnaires
7 Harvey et al An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a 
highly regulated environment
Work and Stress 2002 Nuclear 
processing 
plant
UK Quantitiative questionnaires
8 Zacharatos et 
al
High-performance work systems and 
occupational safety
Journal of Applied 
Psychology
2005 Manufacturing
, telecom and 
petroleum 
industry
Canada Quantitiative questionnaires
9 Burns et al Explicit and implicit trust within safety culture Risk Analysis 2006 Gas plant UK Quantitative questionnaire 
and priming task
10 Conchie and 
Donald
The role of distrust in offshore safety 
performance
Risk Analysis 2006 Offshore gas 
plant
UK Quantitative servey
11 Michael et al Production supervisor impacts on 
subordinates' safety outcomes: An 
investigation of leader-member exchange and 
safety communication
Journal of Safety 
Research
2006 Wood products 
manufacturing 
USA Quantitative servey
12 Conchie and 
Burns
Trust and risk communication in high-risk 
organizations: A test of principles from social 
risk research
Risk Analysis 2008 Health UK Quantitative servey of 393 
student nurses
13 Dillon and 
Tinsley
How near-misses influence decision making 
under risk: A missed opportunity for learning
Management 
Science
2008 Aerospace USA Quantitative servey among 
students and NASA staff
14 Conchie and 
Burns
Improving occupational safety: using a 
trusted information source to communicate 
about risk
Journal of Risk 
Research
2009 Construction UK Quantitative servey
15 Lombardi, et 
al
Factors influencing worker use of personal 
protective eyewear
Accident Analysis 
and Prevention
2009 Manufacturing
, construction, 
and 
service/retail 
industry
USA Qualitative research based 
on 7 focus groups
16 Kath et al Safety climate dimensions, leader–member 
exchange, and organizational support as 
predictors of upward safety communication in 
a sample of rail industry workers
Safety Science 2010 Canadian 
Pacific Railway
Canada Quantitative servey based 
on a five level Likert-type 
questionnaire
17 Hambach et 
al
Workers’ perception of chemical risks: A focus 
group study
Risk Analysis 2011 Chemical 
industry
Belgium Qualitative research based 
on 7 focus groups with blue-
collar workers
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they are predominantly focused on other aspects of the domains under scrutiny, 
such as:  
• the role of risk perception in risky decision-making behaviour (Sitkin and 
Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and Weingart, 1995; Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; 
Ganzach et al., 2008),  
• communicating risk in a cross-cultural context (Sauer, 1996; Specht et 
al., 2006),  
• the role of trust in risk communication and in the construct of risk 
perception (Burns et al., 2006; Conchie and Donald, 2006; Conchie and 
Burns, 2008),  
• the role of training as a communication tool (Nævestad, 2008),  
• the importance of communication and leadership in creating a safety 
culture that has a positive impact on risk behaviour (Zacharatos et al., 
2005; Michael et al., 2006; Nævestad, 2009; Beus et al., 2010; Kath et 
al., 2010). 
In the next section I will present the initial answers to the review questions that 
derive from the search process.  
2.7 Initial findings of the review process 
A first analysis of all the 26 selected papers offered ample themes that fit the 
CIMO-logic (Denyer et al., 2008). Table 2-11 illustrates these findings.  
Contextual factors Interventions Mechanisms Outcome 
Specific (safety) 
culture and social 
influence 
The role of 
management and 
trade unions in safety 
culture 
Communicating and 
collaborating for 
safety through team 
working 
Reduced risk 
perception and 
involvement in safety 
Trust in hierarchy Leadership style Sensemaking and 
mindfulness 
Mutual respect and 
collaborating for 
safety through team 
working 
Lack of trust in 
hierarchy 
Hierarchical 
communication 
Heedful interrelating High impact of 
communication on 
risk perception 
Risk propensity and 
safety involvement 
Adding people to a 
decision process 
Individuals' 
information-
processing biases 
Employee's safety 
involvement 
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 affect risk perception 
and decision making 
Problem framing and 
problem domain 
familiarity 
Safety training Workers are 
operating collectively, 
developing collective 
rules of dealing with 
risk 
Lower accident rate 
due to adjustment of 
risk perception 
Age and experience Safety training and 
learning 
Awareness and 
sensemaking 
Reliable risk 
perception 
Linguistic, cultural 
and rhetorical 
misunderstanding 
Comprehensible 
content of 
communication 
Different cultural 
values imply different 
psychological 
contracts in relation 
to safety attitudes 
and behaviour 
Adjustment of risk 
perception 
Guilt, blame and 
power 
Management style Safety may be seen 
as a ‘top-down’ 
initiative 
Risk homeostasis 
 
Beliefs concerning 
level of perceived 
control and luck 
Introducing learning 
and evaluation 
mechanisms 
Avoidance of feelings 
of complacency and 
hubris 
Functional distrust, 
mindfulness in 
organisation 
Table 2-11 Findings of the review process based on the CIMO-logic 
A remarkable observation is that all the elements found in the literature on the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception perfectly fit the 
CIMO-logic. However, not all of the elements as presented in this CIMO-
framework were offered in the same logic. In other words, bits of data captured 
from different papers were linked to each other to fit the CIMO-logic. This might 
be illustrated by “age and experience -> safety training and learning -> 
awareness and sensemaking -> reliable risk perception”. Lombardi et al. (2009) 
indicated the contextual factor of age and experience as relevant for interpreting 
certain communications about risk in a positive or a negative way. Harvey et al. 
(2001) and Specht et al. (2006) offer the importance of safety training and 
safety learning as an intervention to counter or change this interpretation of risk 
communications. The mechanism that is triggered by this intervention in this 
specific context is more awareness of how risk might impact safety and a 
sensemaking process (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). The outcome of the 
intervention is a more balanced, reduced and reliable risk perception (Conchie 
and Donald, 2006).  
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2.8 Remark 
Many attributions that are linked to the context, interventions, mechanisms, or 
outcomes of the relationship between risk communication and risk perception 
do not stem from empirical research. Most of the components are based on the 
authors’ own conclusions, and are not supported by any data. Quite often the 
conclusions made by different authors are based on their own interpretations or 
insights of other scholars. Following the line of referencing, it appears that most 
of the claims are originally based on theoretical papers and not on findings from 
empirical research. 
2.9 Preliminary conclusions 
This systematic search process confirms the previous conclusions I made in the 
scoping study: little empirical research is done in the field of risk communication 
and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. 
That explains why the search process resulted in relatively few papers. 
Although the aim was to select highly rated academic journals, only 12 out of 
the 26 journal articles turned out to have “world-leading” (4 stars) or 
“internationally excellent” (3 stars) quality ratings based on the Cranfield School 
of Management Journal Rankings, Eighth Edition, April 2011. The other half of 
the articles stem from journals rated “internationally recognised” (4 papers), 
“national” (2 papers), or not rated at all (8 papers). 
Due to the absence of a systematic analysis about the relationship between risk 
perception and effective risk communication (Conchie and Donald, 2006), I 
decided to include these ‘low rated’ and ‘non rated’ journal articles in this 
systematic review. The rationale for inclusion is that they all meet both the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria (see: “2.4.4 Assessment criteria”) and the quality 
appraisal requirements (see: “2.4.5 Quality assessment”).  
In the next chapters I will elaborate on the findings concerning the review 
questions about the contextual factors, the interventions, the mechanisms and 
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the outcomes of the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. Key themes 
will be further explored and connected to other findings in the literature. The 
final chapter of part II of the doctoral thesis will synthesise the different findings 
concerning this relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations, its limitations, and 
recommendations for further research. 
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3 FINDINGS 
3.1 Contextual factors 
3.1.1 Introduction 
According to Denyer and his colleagues the surrounding factors, both external 
and internal, and the nature of the human actors that influence behavioural 
change form ‘context’ (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 397). Furthermore, Denyer et al. 
(2008) refer to Pawson and Tilley (1997) who stated that every action or 
intervention is always embedded in a social system, and thus affected by four 
contextual layers: the individual, the interpersonal, the institutional and the wider 
infrastructural system.  
In the light of this systematic review, context must be seen as the surrounding 
factors of the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. The nature of the human 
being(s) that influence that relationship is also an integral part of the context. 
These contextual factors have an impact on the way people communicate about 
risk, and how they perceive risk. Context does not only include certain features 
such as age, experience, language, or rhetoric in which communication has a 
specific position and role. Social systems, as well as other less tangible features 
such as the amount of trust among the members of the organisation and the 
figurative room for expressing this trust or distrust are part of the context as 
well. Linking back to the literature under review, safety culture, organisational 
culture, and cultural misunderstanding must be seen as factors that are rooted 
in a social system.  
Examining the literature that resulted from the systematic review process, 20 
out of 26 papers indicate contextual factors that might influence the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception. From these 20 papers, 16 are 
based on empirical research. However, only nine were executed in 
organisations with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems, such as 
nuclear power plants (Harvey et al., 2001; 2002), a UK offshore (Burns et al., 
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2006) and onshore gas plant (Conchie and Donald, 2006), an air traffic control 
centre (Klein et al., 1995), NASA (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008), or chemical 
companies (Grote and Künzler, 2000; Zacharatos et al., 2005; Hambach et al., 
2011). One research paper (Hambach et al., 2011) used a qualitative method 
involving different focus groups. Two other papers that shed light on how the 
contextual factors might impact the relationship between risk communication 
and risk perception claim to be based on qualitative research methodologies 
such as ethnographic observations and qualitative interviews (Specht et al, 
2006) or hermeneutic analysis of publications (Sauer, 1996). Although both 
studies offer valuable concepts and theoretical insights, they fail to uncover their 
methods of data gathering and analysis.  
In the next sections I will discuss the literature and the findings of this review 
concerning the context that influences the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception.  
3.1.2 Review of the literature 
The contextual factors that are found in the reviewed literature are presented in 
Table 3-1.  
Contextual factors References 
Safety culture Sitkin and Pablo (1992); Klein et al. (1995); 
Sauer (1996); Harvey et al. (2001); Harvey et 
al. (2002); Zacharatos et al. (2005); Michael et 
al. (2006); Burns et al. (2006); Specht et al. 
(2006); Conchie and Burns (2008); Dillon and 
Tinsley (2008); Conchie and Burns (2009); 
Kath et al (2010); Hambach et al. (2011) 
Trust  Conchie and Burns (2008); Conchie and 
Burns (2009); Hambach et al. (2011) 
Lack of trust  Zacharatos et al. (2005); Burns et al. (2006); 
Conchie and Burns (2008); Hambach et al. 
(2011) 
Safety involvement Sitkin and Weingart (1995); Beus et al. (2010) 
Problem framing and problem domain 
familiarity 
Sitkin & Pablo (1992); Sitkin & Weingart 
(1995) 
Age and experience Houghton et al. (2000); Harvey et al. (2001); 
Lombardi et al. (2009) 
Linguistic, cultural and rhetorical 
misunderstanding 
Klein et al. (1995); Beus et al. (2010) 
Guilt, blame and power Harvey et al. (2001); Nævestad (2008) 
Beliefs concerning level of perceived control 
and luck 
Grote and Künzler (2000); Dillon and Tinsley 
(2008) 
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Table 3-1 Contextual factors and their references 
A general observation when focusing on the context that influences the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations, is that the literature is heavily 
focused on technical risk management systems, while the literature on human 
risk management systems is rather scarce (Specht et al., 2006; p. 526). In the 
technical systems, risks are seen as mechanical causes of organisational 
disasters that can be prevented or not (Rijpma, 2003). The human systems, on 
the other hand, focus on the workers’ risk-mastering activities that are rooted in 
safety behaviours. This debate between the two systems is basically an 
ontological discussion between a positivist and a constructionist view on risk 
and organisational safety. In a theoretical paper on organisational safety in 
potential hazardous operations, Rochlin argues to take into account collective 
as well as individual agency in the construct of a safe operation environment as 
an interactive, dynamic and communicative act (Rochlin, 1999; p. 1549). This 
notion of individual as well as a collective construction of safety culture is further 
developed in the work by Specht et al. (2006). They argue that workers, who 
are confronted with risk, refer to their own risk perception to lead collective 
behaviour. In other words, although a previous risk experience can act on an 
individual level, when employees are working together, they develop shared risk 
perceptions as a group (Specht et al., 2006; p. 526), and thus, social influence 
is definitely a contextual factor. This link between individual and collective risk 
perception, and the activation of behaviour, is what Specht and his colleagues 
call ‘cultural process’. The model they present is called ‘Human Risk 
Management System’ (Specht et al., 2006; p. 537) and basically refers to the 
context that influences the relationship between risk communication, risk 
perception, and safety behaviour.  
The notion of Specht and his colleagues of a cultural process between 
individual and collective risk perception, and the activation of behaviour (Specht 
et al., 2006; p. 526), are partly in line with Pawson and Tilley’s ‘contextual 
layers’ as mentioned earlier (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Specht et al.’s (2006) 
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‘Human Risk Management System’ indicates a social context in which 
interventions and mechanisms are embedded and thus influence risk 
perception, human behaviour and workers’ risk mastering activities. Their 
review resulted in a classification of the cultural process in which risk 
communication could be driven by an organisation through information and 
training (Specht et al., 2006, p. 530), and contains four processes:  
- Social representations: refers to a human environment where people 
are linked to each other by various interactions such as language, 
history, regulations, etc. 
- Group interactions: refers to groups’ mutual and reciprocal influences 
(i.e., a combination of individual and collective mechanisms), such as 
values, practices, rules of behaviour. 
- Organisational learning: refers to the processes organisations 
implement to manage knowledge and savoir-faire. 
- Team working: refers to the social reality of work. In other words, even 
isolated, individuals depend on each other, and by doing so they 
develop collective rules. 
This classification of the cultural process, in which workers who are confronted 
with risk refer to their own risk perception to lead their behaviour (Specht et al., 
2006), supports my definition of risk. As stated in the introduction chapter, I 
define risk as socially constructed, and thus both an individual and a collective 
interpretation of a concept that is based on the chance of losing or gaining 
something, which can individually or collectively trigger associated perceptions 
that might have an impact on individual, group, institutional or societal level. 
A second observation is that almost all of the research papers focusing on risk 
communication and risk perceptions in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations denote safety culture as a key feature of context. According to 
Harvey and his colleagues safety culture involves perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours of individuals within an organisation (Harvey et al., 2002, p. 19). It 
could be argued that ‘attitude’ is the mechanism that is triggered by a certain 
intervention (which is ‘behaviour’), which results in a specific outcome 
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(perception). Therefore, in this context, safety culture might be seen as the 
breeding ground for interventions, mechanisms and outcome.  
Another component in the literature is the focus on safety culture in which 
communication is predominantly seen as a tool to convince the workforce 
(Harvey et al., 2002; Michael et al., 2006), an element in diagnosing the safety 
culture (Grote and Künzler, 2000; Beus et al., 2010), or as a key element in 
organisational learning or training programmes (Sauer, 1996; Harvey et al., 
2001). The exceptions here are empirical research by Kath et al. (2010) and 
Hambach et al. (2011) who focus on analysing the communication itself. Kath 
and her colleagues (2010) examined the upward safety communication rail 
industry workers in the USA apply and its positive impact on safety climate and 
the supervisor-employee relationship. Similar findings are presented by 
Hambach and her colleagues (2011) in a study that focuses on the perceptions 
of chemical risks among blue-collar workers in large and medium-sized 
chemical companies in Belgium.  
A final recurring theme in the literature referring to context that affects the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations is the notion of trust (Conchie and 
Burns, 2008; Conchie and Burns, 2009; Hambach et al., 2011). Although the 
different authors use a subtly different approach, trust could be analysed at a 
person’s level (i.e., the source of information) or at the level of information itself 
(i.e., the evaluation of trustworthy information). Quite often, the authors in this 
field of research refer to the integrative model of organisational trust (as 
presented by Mayer et al., 1995, and Schoorman et al., 2007), that defines trust 
as “… the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important 
to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” 
(Mayer et al., 1995, p. 712). The issue of ‘the willingness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party’ in this context refers to “the nature of the human actors 
that influence behavioural change” (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 397).  
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On the other hand, the notion of lack of trust is mentioned as well as a 
contextual factor that influences risk perceptions in general (Burns et al., 2006; 
Conchie and Burns, 2008) and the evaluation of the risk communicator in 
particular (Zacharatos et al., 2005; Hambach et al., 2011). Zacharatos and her 
colleagues (2005) indicate that lack of trust in management leads to job 
dissatisfaction and subsequent unsafe behaviour.  
Focusing on the role of trust as a contextual surrounding factor, Burns et al. 
(2006) argue that two forms of trust are at play; implicit and explicit trust. Implicit 
trust is rooted in the basic underlying assumptions that are the essences of 
safety culture, while explicit trust is part of the surface levels of safety culture 
(Burns et al., 2006, p. 1147). In other words, implicit trust is about the non-
tangible attributes of an organisation, such as values and beliefs, while explicit 
trust can be captured in figures and tables, such as the number of accidents or 
days absent. The way in which these implicit and explicit expressions of trust 
are communicated has an effect on the workers’ trust beliefs (Conchie and 
Burns, 2008). The language used by management also has an impact on the 
workers’ level of trust, and thus on their perception of a certain risk. Major 
incidents are quite often described by management as ‘operator error’, and in 
this way blame individuals (Harvey et al. 2002; Nævestad, 2008). In 
combination with information that is not user-friendly and difficult to understand 
for lower levels in the organisation (Beus et al., 2010; Hambach et al., 2011), 
this enforces the lack of trust in risk communication from higher hierarchical 
levels (Hambach et al., 2011). 
3.1.3 Conclusions 
Contextual factors that might influence the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception can be categorised into:  
- external and internal surrounding factors, 
- the nature of the human actors, 
- social systems. 
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Table 3-2 illustrates these three categories with findings from the literature 
concerning contextual factors.  
Context 
External and internal surrounding factors 
 - Complex interactive and tightly coupled systems 
 - The amount of trust among the organisational members 
The nature of the human actors 
 - Age, experience, language, rhetoric 
 - Beliefs concerning level of perceived control and luck 
 - Guilt, blame and power 
 - Problem framing and problem domain familiarity 
Social systems 
 - Safety culture, social influence, cultural misunderstanding 
 - Cultural processes 
Table 3-2 Contextual factors divided into three categories  
The next paragraph will explore the interventions that influence the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations.  
3.2 Interventions 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In the context of this systematic review, ‘interventions’ must be seen as the 
tools managers have at their disposal to influence the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations. They can be on an operational level, such as the implementation 
of safety trainings and courses, and on a behavioural level, such as leadership 
style. According to Denyer et al. (2008, p. 397) it is important to examine not 
just the nature of the intervention, but its implementation as well. Therefore, 
interventions have to be considered in a wider context than only the use of 
specific tools or forms of communication such as letters, mails, or 
conversations.  
Examining the literature that resulted from the systematic review process, only 
11 out of 26 papers indicate interventions that might influence the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception. From these 11 papers, nine 
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papers are based on empirical research. However, only four of them are 
focused on high-reliability organisations such as nuclear power plants (Harvey 
et al., 2001; Harvey et al., 2002), or chemical companies (Grote and Künzler, 
2000; Hambach et al., 2011). Two out of the nine research papers (Sauer, 
1996; Hambach et al., 2011) used a qualitative method involving seven focus 
groups each. The other seven research papers that offer insights on 
interventions are based on quantitative research methods. 
In the next section I will discuss the literature and the findings of this review 
concerning the interventions that influence the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception, and trigger specific mechanisms.  
3.2.2 Review of the literature 
The interventions that are found in the reviewed literature are presented in 
Table 3-3.  
Interventions References 
The role of management and trade unions in 
safety culture 
Grote and Künzler (2000); Specht et al. 
(2006); Kath et al. (2010) 
Leadership style / Management style Geller (2001); Harvey et al. (2001); Harvey et 
al. (2002); Michael et al. (2006); Nævestad 
(2008); Conchie and Burns (2009); Kath et al. 
(2010) 
Hierarchical communication Hambach et al. (2011) 
Adding people to a decision process Beus et al. (2010) 
Introducing safety training and learning 
mechanisms 
Grote and Künzler (2000); Harvey et al. 
(2001); Specht et al. (2006); Beus et al. 
(2010) 
Creating comprehensible content of 
communication 
Sauer (1996); Hambach et al. (2011) 
Human Risk Management System Specht et al. (2006) 
Table 3-3 Interventions and their references  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Harvey and his colleagues argue that 
safety culture involves perceptions, attitudes and behaviours of individuals 
within an organisation (Harvey et al., 2002, p. 19). In that perspective behaviour 
intervenes in the relationship between risk communication and risk perception. 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, communication is a process of 
establishing meaning (Scott and Marshall, 2005, p. 91), and process implicates 
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a series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular objective. I 
would therefore like to make a distinction between communication interventions 
on the sender’s and on the receiver ‘s level. On the sender’s level these 
interventions are clustered around management style and leadership actions. 
Michael et al. (2006) found sound evidence for employees’ higher perception of 
job satisfaction due to open and honest risk communication between leader and 
subordinate. Hambach and her colleagues also found a correlation between 
comprehensible risk communication and mutual respect between blue-collar 
workers and management (Hambach, 2011). Specht et al. (2006) also describe 
the role of leadership as a key intervention in the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception. They denote the influence management 
might have in supporting people in their sharing of a safety culture. Specht et al. 
call this ‘Human Risk Management System’ and claim that it is based on 
communication and confidence empowerment, and is driven by organisations 
through information and training (Specht et al., 2006, p. 530). Grote and Künzler 
(2000) agree that communication and training have a pivotal role in the 
adjustment of risk perceptions, but on the sole condition that they are applied in 
an appropriate way (Grote and Künzler, 2000, p. 148). Risk perceptions among 
workers in hazardous environments have been developed over years, and a 
few communication actions such as once-in-a-year safety trainings, or top-down 
safety programme initiatives are not sufficient to produce significant changes in 
workers’ risk-taking behaviours and safety attitudes (Harvey et al., 2001, p. 
631). Blue-collar workers generally perceive these training programmes as a 
waste of time and effort, as their sole purpose is to meet the requirements 
imposed by general management. Harvey et al. (2001) conclude that training 
programmes only seem to have an effect on attitudes for the higher grades of 
employees. However, although Harvey and her colleagues extensively studied 
the effects of a safety-training programme among staff at a nuclear processing 
plant itself, the communication process that supported the training programme 
itself was not taken into account.  
This leads to the second distinction: communication interventions on the 
receiver‘s level. The perceived attitudes of management, and the way they 
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communicate about and behave in respect to risk, have an impact on the 
employees’ ability to develop collective rules of how to deal with risk in day-to-
day operations (Specht et al., 2006, p. 533). Kath et al. (2010) offer a similar 
observation. They indicate that employees, who feel the freedom to 
communicate safety concerns with their supervisors, can have a direct effect on 
upward safety communication. This behaviour can only exist on the prerequisite 
that the organisation values the employee. The feeling of being valued is not 
only based on trust and individual perceptions, but also on good supervisor-
employee relationships and attitudes (Naevestad, 2008; Kath et al., 2010, p. 
648).  
Michael et al. (2006) also indicate this pivotal role of communication qualities at 
higher management level, and the importance of a good leader-member 
exchange (LMX) in enhancing workplace safety. The LMX theory, developed by 
Graen and his colleagues (Graen and Scandura, 1987; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 
1995), suggests that leaders tend to have different types of relations with 
different members of the same work group. The assumption is that high LMX 
relationships are beneficial for both leader and member, but also for the work 
group and even for the organisation (Phillips and Bedeian, 1994). In their study, 
Michael et al. (2006) found that the influence of LMX was greater than that of 
safety communication in predicting employee job satisfaction and safety-related 
issues. However, many scholars (such as Phillips and Bedeian, 1994; Brower et 
al., 2000; Becerra and Gupta, 2003; Uhl-Bien, 2006; Schoorman et al., 2007) 
suggest the critical role of frequent communication in creating trust in leader-
member exchange. Therefore, the question could be raised whether the focus 
of the method Michael and her colleagues used to research the impact of safety 
communication was not too narrow? In the research methodology part of their 
paper, Michael and her colleagues disclose, “Safety communication was 
measured by using six items of the Hofmann and Stetzer (1998) safety 
communication scale” (Michael et al., 2006, p. 472). Unfortunately, every item in 
this scale refers specifically to safety communication and its relationship to the 
supervisor. I would argue that the role of leadership in safety-critical operations 
is more than merely talking about safety issues. 
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3.2.3 Conclusions 
Table 3-4 illustrates the different interventions on the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations. 
Interventions 
Leadership style 
 - Adapted safety training and learning mechanisms  
 - Hierarchical communication 
 - Adding people to a decision process 
 - Creating comprehensible content of communication 
 - Human Risk Management System 
Table 3-4 Interventions linked to leadership style  
A remarkable observation concerning ‘interventions’ is that they all refer to 
leadership style and management actions. Apparently, when it comes to 
communication with the intention to have an impact on the relationship between 
risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations, the only plausible intervention is linked to a leadership 
capability. However, none of the selected papers in this systematic review 
explicitly disclose the kind of communication style these leaders should apply. 
Furthermore, a legitimate question that has to be raised is what kind of 
leadership do these organisations require?  
This link between risk communication and leadership, and the specific kind of 
leadership complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations call for, will be 
further discussed in the penultimate chapter of this part of the thesis (see Part 
II: “4.2 Discussion” on pages 159-161).  
In the next chapter I will explore the mechanisms that might be triggered by the 
interventions, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
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3.3 Mechanisms 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In this systematic review a mechanism must be interpreted as a phenomenon 
which, in the context of the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations, is triggered 
by certain interventions. Safety awareness, for example, is a mechanism that in 
the context of having a certain age and experience in the organisation can be 
triggered by the intervention of implementing training and learning sessions. A 
mechanism is thus a kind of effect from an intervention in a certain context, 
“offering the potential of long-term benefits to the employees and/or to their 
organisation” (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 397).  
The literature that resulted from the systematic review process offered seven 
papers (out of 26) that indicate mechanisms that are triggered by some 
interventions in the relationship between risk communication and risk 
perception. From these seven papers, five are based on empirical research. 
However, three research papers are based on empirical research in 
organisations with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems, such as 
nuclear power plants (Harvey et al., 2001), NASA (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008), 
and the petrochemical industry (Grote and Künzler, 2000). One exception is the 
work by Dillon and Tinsley (2008), as they mixed different sources of data in 
their research. Dillon and Tinsley (2008) researched the framing of near-misses 
on organisational learning, based on quantitative surveys among students (MBA 
students and undergraduates) and NASA managers. All of the five research 
papers that offer insights on ‘mechanisms’ are based on quantitative research 
methods. 
In the next section I will discuss the literature and the findings of this review 
concerning mechanisms that are triggered by some interventions in the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations. 
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3.3.2 Review of the literature 
The mechanisms that are found in the reviewed literature are presented in 
Table 3-5. 
Mechanisms References 
Communicating and collaborating for safety 
through team working 
Specht et al. (2006) 
Individuals' information-processing biases 
affect risk perception and decision making 
Houghton et al. (2000); Harvey et al. (2001); 
Dillon and Tinsley (2008) 
Workers are operating collectively, developing 
collective rules of dealing with risk 
Specht et al (2006) 
Awareness, sensemaking, mindfulness Specht et al. (2006); Nævestad (2008); 
Nævestad (2009) 
Different cultural values imply different 
psychological contracts in relation to safety 
attitudes and behaviour 
Harvey et al (2001)  
Safety trainings may be have seen as a "top-
down" initiative 
Harvey et al. (2001)  
Feelings of complacency and hubris Grote and Künzler (2000); Dillon and Tinsley 
(2008) 
Table 3-5 Mechanisms and their references 
According to Denyer and his colleagues, a logical prescription in terms of if you 
want to achieve outcome O in context C, then use intervention type I, raises the 
issue of causality (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 395, citing Pawson and Tilley, 1997). 
This issue of causality can be answered “by asking through which generative 
mechanism(s) the intervention produces the outcome in the given context” 
(Denyer et al., 2008, p. 395). As we saw in the previous chapter, all 
interventions that intervene in the relationship between risk communication and 
risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations are 
rooted in leadership actions. The generative mechanisms are hence linked to 
how these leadership actions are interpreted and processed.  
A helpful insight into that phenomenon is offered by Dillon and Tinsley (2008). 
They argue that individuals have two general information-processing systems: 
an associative one and a rule-based one (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, p. 1437). 
The associative system is based on emotions, feelings and interpretations, 
while the rule-based system operates according to formal rules of reasoning 
and evidence. Dillon and Tinsley claim “perceived risk is the product of the 
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associative system processing […] that influences behaviour” (Dillon and 
Tinsley, 2008, p. 1437). Interestingly, Dillon and Tinsley’s empirical research 
was focused on NASA employees, of whom might be presumed that they are 
trained to deal with risks based on a cognitive evaluation of evidence and 
calculated risk statistics, and not on emotions and feelings.  
If we link the findings of the literature on mechanisms, as presented in Table 3-
5, to both information-processing systems, we can create two distinct groups 
(see Table 3-6). 
Mechanisms 
Associative information-processing system 
 - Awareness 
 - Sensemaking 
 - Mindfulness 
 - Psychological contracts 
 - Feelings of complacency and hubris 
Rule-based information-processing system 
 - Team working 
 - Developing collective rules of dealing with risk 
 - Scepticism through safety trainings 
Table 3-6 Mechanisms linked to information-processing systems  
3.3.3 Associative systems 
Mechanisms, such as awareness, sensemaking, and mindfulness are all based 
on emotions, feelings and interpretations, which are the key qualifications of the 
associative information-processing system. In two separate research 
programmes that focus on the role and dynamics of risk awareness in relation 
to safe behaviour, Specht et al. (2006) found sound evidence that the use of 
communication in a training programme increases the level of risk awareness 
among the participants. However, Harvey et al. (2001, p. 628) argue that 
cultural differences might imply different psychological contracts in relation to 
safety attitudes. These ‘psychological contracts’ refer to frames of reference 
(Nævestad, 2008) organisational members adhere. Making organisational 
members aware of these frames of reference by aligning them is closely linked 
to the idea of mindfulness, which is the basis of the high-reliability theory. Weick 
and Sutcliffe define mindfulness as ‘a rich awareness of discriminatory detail. 
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[…] This is sometimes called situation awareness’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 
32). In other words, mindfulness is about awareness and attention, having the 
‘big picture’ in which details differ. A remark could be raised whether the 
principles of mindfulness may be hard to translate into action (Nævestad, 2009) 
because they are rooted in the associative information-processing system, 
which is based on emotions, feelings and interpretations (Dillon and Tinsley, 
2008). Therefore, safety trainings might not be the only solution to teach 
organisational members to become more aware or mindful. Communication in 
the sense of disclosing and disseminating information on the current ‘health’ of 
the system, including anomalies, errors, mistakes and incidents (Denyer et al., 
2008, p. 401) might ‘correct’ the associative system.  
In that sense, the concept of sensemaking might offer a valuable ad-on. The 
basic idea of sensemaking is that ‘reality is an ongoing accomplishment, which 
is derived from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what 
occurs’ (Weick, 1993, p. 635). In other words, sensemaking is a process of 
scanning the environment for valuable clues to make a retrospective 
interpretation of what happens. According to Nævestad (2008) we do this by 
employing frames of reference to make sense of the world. Those frames of 
reference ‘represent a way of focusing our attention as we are cognitively 
unable to interpret and examine everything’ (Nævestad, 2008, p. 158). Hence, 
when the information is too complex, the associative information-processing 
system takes it over from the rule-based system6.  
A final reference to the associative information-processing system is the 
phenomenon of complacency and hubris. Research by Grote and Künzler 
(2000) indicates a deficiency between results from a formal safety audit and the 
communicative validation of a deeper understanding of a safety culture in a 
company. They conclude that safety survey results are in fact indicators of more 
or less shared views of safety management, but not indicators of more or less 
safe behaviours and attitudes (Grote and Künzler, 2000, p. 147). In other words, 
                                            
6 This notion of associative information-processing system is based on Kahneman’s concept of 
System 1 and System 2 thinking (Kahneman, 2011) 
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successful safety evaluations can bias the risk perception of the organisational 
members, and lead to an attitude lacking self-criticism (Grote and Künzler, 
2000, p. 148) and feelings of complacency. Dillon and Tinsley (2008) support 
this claim by indicating how near-misses are perceived as successes, and how 
this information leads people to choose a riskier alternative because of a lower 
perceived risk following near-miss events (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, p. 1437). 
3.3.4 Rule-based systems 
Rule-based information-processing systems operate according to formal rules 
of reasoning and evidence (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, p. 1437). In a risk context, 
workers operate collectively and develop collective rules (Specht et al., 2006, p. 
533). Research by Specht et al. (2006) indicates that several processes such as 
informal negotiations, imitation and communication spur the development of 
these rules. Furthermore, these collective rules are most often based on 
existing cultural norms and team values.  
Another finding in this study by Specht et al. (2006) that can be linked to rule-
based information-processing systems is that risk communication might 
reinforce a communicative attitude among team members that eventually will 
lead to more safety through team working. A team of operators, which was 
supported by the management and had the trust of colleagues, demonstrated 
high collaboration and communication within the team. This allowed them to 
successfully resolve safety issues and thus contribute to the safety culture 
development in the workplace (Specht et al., 2006, p. 536).  
This communicating and collaborating, based on formal rules of reasoning and 
evidence, might lead to sceptical questioning of those rules as well. In an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of safety trainings in the nuclear industry, Harvey 
et al. (2001) found that safety programmes initiated by management are often 
perceived as a ‘top-down’ initiatives, and ‘thus are less likely to result in 
improved attitudes, particularly in relation to communications and personal 
responsibility’ (Harvey et al., 2001, p. 629). The lack of empowerment leads to 
the loss of agreement about the goals of the training. This questioning of goals 
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and formal rules in the organisation are also traits of a rule-based information-
processing system. 
3.3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter examined the mechanisms which in the context of the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations are triggered by the interventions. The literature 
offers two sets of generative mechanisms that are linked to the previously 
mentioned interventions (leadership actions) as to how these leadership actions 
are interpreted and processed. These mechanisms are an associative and a 
rule-based information-processing system. 
The next chapter will focus on the outcome of the interventions in the context of 
risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations. 
3.4 Outcome 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Outcome is the result of an intervention in its various aspects (Denyer et al., 
2008, p. 397). In this systematic review, ‘outcome’ can be a reduced or adjusted 
risk perception, a higher involvement in safety, as well as a lower accident rate 
among the employees. In other words, not all of the interventions that have an 
impact on the relationship between risk communication and risk perception in 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations automatically have an 
effect on either risk perception or risk communication.  
Examining the literature that resulted from the systematic review process, only 
five out of 26 papers indicate outcomes as results of interventions in the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception. From these five 
papers, four papers are based on empirical research. However, only one is 
focused on organisations with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems; 
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i.e., a UK gas plant (Conchie and Donald, 2006). All of the research papers that 
offer insights on ‘outcomes’ are based on quantitative research methods. 
In the next section I will discuss the literature and the findings of this review 
concerning outcome as a result of certain interventions in the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception. 
3.4.2 Review of the literature 
The different ‘outcomes’ that are found in the reviewed literature are presented 
in Table 3-7. 
Outcome References 
Reduced risk perception and involvement in 
safety 
Sitkin & Weingart (1995); Conchie & Donald 
(2006) 
Mutual respect  Specht et al. (2006) 
Employee's safety involvement Specht et al. (2006) 
Lower accident rate due to adjustment of risk 
perception 
Houghton et al. (2000); Conchie & Donald 
(2006) 
Reduced risk perception Conchie & Donald (2006) 
‘Risky shift phenomena’ Houghton et al. (2000) 
Functional distrust, mindful organisation Conchie & Donald (2006); Nævestad (2008) 
Table 3-7 Outcomes and their references 
An overall observation is that the results of the interventions in their various 
aspects can be divided into two categories: outcomes on an individual level, 
and outcomes on an organisational level. This is illustrated in Table 3-8. 
Outcome 
Individual 
 - Risky shift phenomena 
 - Reduced risk perception 
 - Employee's safety involvement 
Organisational 
 - Functional distrust 
 - Mutual respect 
Table 3-8 Outcome linked to individual and organisational level  
3.4.3 Outcome on individual level 
Sound leadership (Intervention) that involves people at all levels in a safety 
decision process (Beus et al., 2010) triggers (Mechanism) different 
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psychological contracts in relation to safety attitudes and behaviour (Harvey et 
al., 2001) that will lead to (Outcome) an employee’s higher safety involvement 
(Specht et al., 2006). Conchie and Donald, studying the attitudes of trust among 
UK offshore gas workers, confirm that open and trustworthy communication 
reduces individual risk perception (Conchie and Donald, 2006, p. 1151-1152). In 
this study as well, the authors emphasise good leadership (Intervention) that 
‘promotes shared values and commitment to an organization’s safety policies’ 
(Conchie and Donald, 2006, p. 1152), which is the basis for a safety culture 
(Context). 
Houghton and her colleagues studied the impact of cognitive biases on the risk 
perception process (Houghton et al., 2000). Although this study does not deal 
specifically with complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations, it 
uncovers that some biases, such as the illusion of control, decrease risk 
perceptions in a decision making process. This may lead to a so-called ‘risky 
shift phenomena’ (Houghton et al., 2000, p. 326); which is a situation where due 
to group discussions, individuals may agree to take more risks than a priori, and 
not to less extreme, moderate, or even risk aversive positions. Furthermore, 
Houghton et al. confirmed that risk perception is importantly related to risky 
choices at both the individual and the team level, as are cognitive biases 
(Houghton et al., 2000, p. 342).  
3.4.4 Outcome on organisational level 
Another outcome that emerges in the literature referring to outcome of the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations is the role of functional distrust in a 
way it can help to ensure a safe work environment (Conchie and Donald, 2006). 
Functional distrust can be described as an integral part of a mindful 
organisation, as mindfulness is about awareness and attention, having the ‘big 
picture’ in which details differ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Such an attitude 
requires a ‘healthy form’ of distrust that allows organisational members to check 
each other’s possible unsafe handlings. Conchie and Donald’s analysis 
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revealed attitudes of distrust as better predictors of safety performance 
compared to attitudes of trust (Conchie and Donald, 2006, p. 1158).  
However, as mentioned in ‘3.1 Contextual factors’, trust among organisational 
members is perceived as a beneficial context for the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception. The impact of communication on trust, and 
the subsequent impact on reduced or adjusted risk perception, is examined in 
depth by many scholars (see for example: Houghton et al., 2000; Burns et al., 
2006; Conchie and Donald, 2006; Conchie and Burns, 2008). Furthermore, we 
know that communication is one of the key components in creating trust 
(Zacharatos et al., 2005; Hambach et al., 2011). Therefore, speaking the same 
language refers to a shared and trusted social structure, which results in mutual 
respect (Specht et al., 2006, p. 535). 
In the next chapters, I will synthesise the different findings concerning the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations, indicate its limitations, and offer 
recommendations for further research. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This systematic review started by raising the question about the relationship 
between risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations. From both a researcher’s and a practitioner’s 
point of view I was anxious to know what the literature offers on this particular 
topic. As a consultant in the field of risk and crisis communication, I often meet 
managers in high hazardous organisations struggling to find the right ‘tone of 
voice’ to connect with their subordinate’s perception concerning the risk issue at 
hand, in order to make their workplace, the environment, and the entire industry 
much safer. From a researcher’s point of view I was keen to disclose the 
underlying mechanisms that intervene on this relationship between 
communication and perception. This double objective, a practical and an 
empirical one, was my driving force to embark on this DBA programme. It also 
explains why I aimed to combine knowledge with practice in this particular 
research project. The reason why I applied the so-called ‘CIMO-logic’ (Denyer 
et al., 2008) has to be seen in the light of this aim, as this logic is an attempt to 
synthesise previously published research in the form of more solution-oriented 
or prescriptive knowledge. The rationale for this CIMO-logic is the intention ‘to 
add to analysis and explanation, specifications for interventions to transform 
present practices and improve the effectiveness of organizations’ (Denyer et al., 
2008, p. 393-394).  
Looking at the literature on the relationship between risk communication and 
risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations, the 
findings as presented in accordance with the CIMO-logic look quite fragmented 
(see Table 4-1). We cannot follow the simple reasoning that in order to achieve 
a specific outcome, we have to do one intervention in a given setting. According 
to Denyer and his colleagues we have to include ‘a combination of interventions 
(I1 … In) that invoke particular generative mechanisms (M1 … Mn) to produce a 
particular outcome (O) in a specific context (C)’ (Denyer et al., 2008, p. 407). 
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Context Interventions Mechanisms Outcome 
External and 
internal 
surrounding factors 
 - Complex interactive 
and tightly coupled 
systems 
 - The amount of trust 
among the 
organisational 
members 
 
The nature of the 
human actors 
 - Age, experience, 
language, rhetoric 
 - Beliefs concerning 
level of perceived 
control and luck 
 - Guilt, blame and 
power 
 - Problem framing 
and problem domain 
familiarity 
 
Social systems 
 - Safety culture, 
social influence, 
cultural 
misunderstanding 
 - Cultural processes 
Leadership style 
 - Adapted safety 
training and learning 
mechanisms  
 - Hierarchical 
communication 
 - Adding people to a 
decision process 
 - Creating 
comprehensible 
content of 
communication 
 - Human Risk 
Management System 
Associative 
information-
processing system 
 - Awareness 
 - Sensemaking 
 - Mindfulness 
 - Psychological 
contracts 
 - Feelings of 
complacency and 
hubris 
 
 
 
Rule-based 
information-
processing system 
 - Team working 
 - Developing 
collective rules of 
dealing with risk 
 - Scepticism through 
safety trainings 
Individual 
 - Risky shift 
phenomena 
 - Reduced risk 
perception 
 - Employee's safety 
involvement 
 
 
 
Organisational 
 - Functional distrust 
 - Mutual respect 
 
Table 4-1 Overview of the findings presented in the CIMO-logic 
4.2 Discussion 
Going back to the practical problem behind the research question, about how 
managers have to communicate with their subordinates to have an impact on 
their risk perceptions, multiple interventions can be applied. These 
interventions, as revealed by systematically reviewing the literature are: 
I1 Put safety trainings and learning systems in place, adapt them to the 
different levels in the organisation (based on knowledge, experience, etc.), 
champion these trainings, and make sure these actions are not perceived as 
a ‘top-down’ initiative for the benefit of management to get high scores on 
safety audits, 
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I2  Install a hierarchical communication, based on comprehensible content 
that resonates with the employees’ problem domain familiarity and their 
beliefs concerning the perceived levels of control or luck, 
I3 Add people to the decision process. This requires a ‘no blame, no 
shame’ context where organisational members are respected and valued for 
their expertise and problem domain familiarity, 
I4  Introduce a ‘Human Risk Management System’ as it reveals the role 
social processes play when risks have to be communicated. The context in 
which employees in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations find 
themselves and how they perceive certain risks, differ substantially from risk 
perceptions among members of the general population.  
A remarkable observation concerning ‘interventions’ is that they all refer to 
leadership style and management actions. Apparently, when it comes to 
communication with the intention to have an impact on the relationship between 
risk communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations, the only plausible interventions are linked to the 
leadership capabilities. Unfortunately, none of the selected papers in this 
systematic review explicitly disclose what kind of leadership is required in these 
interventions. Conchie and Donald suggest ‘transformational leadership’ as 
‘Transformational leaders engage in actions that promote trust from workers, 
which workers reciprocate by increasing their commitment to goals set out by 
the leader’ (Conchie and Donald, 2006, p. 1153, citing Dirks and Ferrin, 2002). 
However, their research was focused on the role of trust and distrust attitudes 
toward workmates, supervisors, offshore managers, and contractor staff 
(Conchie and Donald, 2006, p. 1154), and did not examine the type of 
leadership that is required to maximise trust in the leader. Only Michael et al. 
(2006) explicitly mentioned LMX as an intervention that enhances workplace 
safety. But the question could be raised if Leader-Member Exchange is the 
most appropriate form, as it is based on dyadic relationships in which leaders 
tend to have different types of relations with different members of the same 
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work group (see for instance: Graen and Scandura, 1987; Phillips and Bedeian, 
1994; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995; Uhl-Bien, 2006).  
It is worth notifying that the different interventions that emerged from the 
literature in this systematic review are well in line with the basic principles of the 
High-Reliability Theory and its concept of creating a ‘mindful organisation’ 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). Three of the earlier described interventions (Safety 
trainings and learning mechanisms, adding people to the decision process, and 
creating comprehensible content of communication) refer to the basic principles 
of HRO. 
Regarding the ‘mechanisms’ triggered by particular communicative 
‘interventions’, Dillon and Tinsley (2008) claim that organisations fail to learn 
from near-misses as they perceive these events as successful risk-taking. Dillon 
and Tinsley argue that individuals’ risk perception is rooted in two general 
information-processing systems: an associative one and a rule-based one 
(Dillon and Tinsley, 2008). The latter operates according to formal rules of 
reasoning and evidence, while the former is based on emotions and 
interpretations. These two systems influence individuals’ decision-making 
processes and safety behaviour, but the associative system processes often 
prevail over rule-based system processes (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, p. 1437). In 
other words, people tend to process information based on emotions rather than 
relying on reason and evidence-based information. As a consequence, “people 
with near-miss information make riskier choices than those without this 
information, because the near-miss events lead them to perceive a lower level 
of risk regarding the decision situation” (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008, p. 1438).  
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5 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
5.1 Limitations  
It might be possible that other domains of the literature examined the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in a more 
balanced way. One example that was excluded from the systematic review, as it 
did not meet the inclusion criteria, was a theoretical paper by Vogus and his 
colleagues (2010). In this essay, they present an integrative framework of how 
patient safety is produced and sustained through safety culture. This framework 
is based on enabling, enacting and elaborating a safety culture, where “every 
step is rooted in mindful action and sensemaking” (Vogus et al., 2010, p. 70). It 
could be worthwhile to review the literature on the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in other, non-complex interactive and tightly 
coupled organisations, and by doing so examine their similarities and 
differences.  
The literature on how risk communication is executed in complex interactive and 
tightly coupled organisations can roughly be broken down into two categories: 
face-to-face (e.g., personal interaction, team meetings, town hall meeting, etc.) 
and by means of mediated communication (e.g., telecommunications, internet, 
e-mail, etc.). However, I could not find one piece of empirical research 
concerning the impact of social media (such as Facebook, Hyves, Twitter, etc.) 
on risk perception and risk communication among organisational members.  
And finally, it might be argued in hindsight that using the CIMO-logic was 
probably not the most optimal option for examining the literature. Although this 
CIMO-logic provided me with the structure to organise the literature, it is a very 
linear focused way of achieving defined answers to an organisational question. 
Therefore, it might not be the most suitable logic to examine the literature that 
refers to communication, as this field of social science is characterised as not 
linear, nor predictable, but more as emotional processes (Shotter, 1997; 
Damasio, 2006; Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; Shockley-Zalabak, 2009; Marynissen, 
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2011). In that perspective, it might be argued that the “outcome” is not only 
dependent on the interventions and subsequent mechanisms, but on many 
more dependent and independent variables such as power, politics, hidden 
agendas, and the like. Furthermore, in the CIMO-logic the context is defined as 
“the surrounding (external and internal environment) factors and the nature of 
the human actors that influence behavioural change” (Denyer et al., 2008; p. 
397). However, it might be argued, “context is not independent of human 
agency, and [therefore it] cannot be objectively assessed in a scientific form” 
(Grint, 2005; p. 1471).  
5.2 Recommendations for further research 
By systematically reviewing the literature on the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations, it becomes apparent that this specific domain of research has 
been neglected over the last two decades. Nevertheless, from a practitioner’s 
point of view, the need for more insights in this field is of utmost importance. 
Strict national and international safety regulations, severe pressure from 
environmental interest groups, and precautionary attitudes from investors and 
shareholders (Breakwell, 2007) force complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisations to steer their communication from a different intervention-
approach.  
Although the literature offers ample insights of how to communicate risks with 
civilians, almost none of these findings are used when it comes to communicate 
risk in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations. Theories such as 
affect heuristics (Slovic et al., 2002), the democratic view on risk communication 
(Gurabardhi and Gutteling, 2002), social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 
1988), or the psychometric model (Slovic, 2000) are neglected when it comes to 
empirically researching the effects of risk communication on risk perception in 
these specific type of hazardous organisations. Therefore, this offers multiple 
options for further research. 
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As this systematic review revealed, multiple leadership actions must be seen as 
the key interventions that evoke particular generative mechanisms, which 
produce a particular outcome in a specific context. However, the systematic 
review did not disclose what kind of leadership style is the most appropriate one 
for communicating risk in complex interactive and tightly coupled organisations7. 
Therefore it is recommended to empirically research different leadership 
interventions in relation to risk communication in these types of complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations, while taking into account the 
CIMO-logic and the dynamics between the different combinations (Denyer et 
al., 2008, p. 407). In other words, the context and outcome as indicated in this 
systematic review are determined, but the different interventions and 
mechanisms are the subject for further exploration.  
On the other hand, this systematic review also suggests how individuals 
perceive and interpret risk messages according to their information-processing 
system. Still, this conclusion was based on research that explored how both 
NASA employees and survey respondents interpret messages about near 
misses, and its impact on decision-making under risk (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008).  
5.3 Towards an empirical research project 
From an interpretivist point of view, I was not expecting to receive a clear-cut 
answer from the literature on how to communicate risks to have an impact on 
employees’ risk perceptions and risk aversive attitudes. However, I was 
surprised about the ease with which various authors use the word 
‘communication’ in the context of transferring information from point A to point 
B. None of the reviewed papers made a critical reflection on the interactive 
cognitive and social processes that might influence the interpretation of the 
received information (Rochlin, 1999). This might indicate that my assumption 
about how risk communication should work - namely not simply as an 
                                            
7 In a paper exploring safety leadership, Clarke (2013) indicates how active transactional 
leadership is important in ensuring compliance with rules and regulations, whereas 
transformational leadership is primarily associated with encouraging employee participation in 
safety. However, this paper was published two years after I submitted this systematic review of 
the literature. 
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information tool but as a means to create risk aversive perceptions - is wrong. 
On the other hand, it might suggest that all the reviewed literature simply takes 
for granted that transferring information is the most optimal way to adjust 
employees’ risk perceptions that ultimately will lead to safe behaviour. In an 
attempt to question this assumption and to acquire more insights on the effects 
of communication in these types of organisations, I undertook an empirical 
research project that focused on individual risk perceptions. This will be 
described in Part III of this doctoral thesis. 
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PART III: PROJECT 2 – EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
ABSTRACT 
Communication is often recognised as pivotal for organisations managing high-
risk technologies. Such communication is generally informed by industry and 
government regulations, which are then translated into procedures, guidelines, 
and the like. These are disseminated, discussed and instructed to the staff by 
executive team members, with the aim of reducing potential dangers. However, 
it is questionable as to whether all organisational members share the same 
perception, and therefore interpretation, of risk. Interview data evidence 
suggests that employees, other than the executive team, are not preoccupied 
with regulations, but rather with the question of how to keep themselves and 
their fellow workers safe. Based on this assumption, mere communication is 
perceived to be inadequate to create common awareness concerning safety 
and potential risks.  
This part of the doctoral thesis offers the results of empirical research, based on 
repertory grid, conducted with all employees of a natural gas terminal in 
Belgium about their perceptions of the risks faced by their organisation. It 
reveals that the people occupying different roles in the organisation do indeed 
have very different perceptions of workplace risks. These differences are 
affected by various factors such as the level of experience and tacit knowledge. 
However, previous real life threatening experiences seem to be a dominant 
predictor for a broader and more divergent view on the present risks. These 
findings might have a major impact on risk communication, safety courses, and 
trainings. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety culture is a major issue in organisations that face a constant threat of 
risks linked to their business (Grote and Künzler, 2000; Marynissen and Ladkin, 
2012). A sound safety climate, in which all employees are aware of the potential 
risks and dangers, might prevent businesses from the perils of potential 
disasters. But how to create an environment where the focus for safety is not 
solely based on procedures or hollow rhetoric from board members, but on 
responsible and risk-avoidance behaviour from all staff? What is the magic 
formula for a corporate culture that focuses on the avoidance of accidents?  
The following situation illustrates this discrepancy between intentions and 
behaviour quite well, between what is said about safety and what is executed. 
In an official brochure of an international gas production company, under the 
paragraph Corporate Governance it says that this company “will represent best 
practice in health, safety and the environment” (Gassco, 2011; p. 18). And in 
the foreword the President and CEO of that company clearly state that they “will 
not compromise on safety” (Gassco, 2011; p. 3). In this very same company, 
during a safety training, one of the operation supervisors was asked what he 
should do in case of a major gas leak in the receiving terminal on a Saturday 
night, when he and his colleague were the only two operators present in the 
control room. The man responded promptly: “I will call my boss. I’m sure he will 
solve it.” Giving him the scenario that his boss was not accessible by phone as 
he was on the plane to a holiday destination, the supervisor rubbed his chin, 
reflected for a couple of seconds, and finally answered: “Well … I honestly 
wouldn’t know!” This operation supervisor is not a fresh, inexperienced 
employee. He has a bachelor degree in mathematics and has been with this 
company for more than ten years.  
There is no doubt that safety is a top priority in this company. This can be 
illustrated by the President and CEO’s annual statements about the topic, the 
multiple safety trainings that every employee has to follow on a regular basis 
(minimum twice a year), the numerous safety procedures that are disseminated 
 168 
among all staff, and the millions of Euros that are invested in safety 
infrastructure and the improvement of a safer environment on a yearly basis. 
However, the question could be raised why after all these efforts and millions of 
Euros of investment, this operation supervisor still seems to be unaware of how 
to handle the risks of the business he is working in. This example indicates that 
he has not thought seriously about what he would do in the event of an 
emergency, despite all of the existing procedures and trainings. 
Now, it can be argued that this operation supervisor, as well as the majority of 
his colleagues, have a good brain and substantial work experience in the 
company. The safety trainings in this company, and the safety documents it 
disseminates among staff, are based on proven quality criteria (such as ISO-
certificates, DVK-accreditations, etc.). If it is not the individual, nor the company 
who are to blame for this lack of responsible behaviour towards safety, the 
hypothesis could be that a safety culture’s secret recipe must be found in the 
way in which safety information is presented and disseminated. This brings us 
to the issue of communication. In the traditional view of communication 
(Shockley-Zalabak, 2009) roughly speaking there are two parties, a sender and 
a receiver, a message, and one or more channels through which that message 
will be transferred. In this case, the message is about potential risks and how to 
avoid them. The channels are the safety trainings, the written procedures, and 
the CEO’s message about presenting the best practices in safety. The primal 
senders in this communicative process are the President, the CEO, and the 
entire executive team. They set out the safety standards that are linked to the 
company’s mission, vision and values. And besides the production controller, 
the receiver is every single employee in this company who deals with risk 
issues and safety. As argued before, the controller has all the required 
intellectual capabilities to execute his job, and communication professionals 
help the executive members of the company to produce the messages about 
risk and safety. It might be argued that these messages are not of poor quality. 
Despite all the efforts, we cannot speak of a sound safety culture in this 
company.  
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Therefore, another hypothesis could be raised; that different people in one 
organisation perceive the same type of risk differently. If that is the case, it 
means that each organisational member interprets the same piece of 
information in a different way, and consequently bases his or her actions on a 
personal interpretation of that information. In other words, it might be possible 
that although a very specific risk is well communicated and disseminated 
among staff, each of the staff members interpret it in a distinct way. If that is the 
case, it would be worthwhile to know what precisely affects this perception. This 
might be experience, education, age, or other factors. Following this rationale, 
the issue at hand does not have so much to do with the message itself, but 
more with the way a message is interpreted.  
To gain a deeper insight into this, two research questions will be raised: 
1. How do people within an organisation perceive the same type of risks?  
2. What factors affect the perception of these risks? 
These two questions derive from the previous systematic review of the literature 
(see Part II of this thesis) and will be empirically researched in an organisation 
that manages tightly coupled and complex interactive systems.  
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2 TOWARDS A RESEARCH QUESTION 
In an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between risk 
communication and risk perception in the domain of organisations managing 
complex interactive and tightly coupled systems, the existing literature on this 
topic was systematically reviewed in the previous research project (see Part II 
of this thesis). The rationale behind this systematic review was that by 
examining the literature on risk communication and risk perception in these very 
specific types of organisations, recommendations could be made to improve 
practices in risk communication that will ultimately lead to a better safety 
culture. In the following paragraphs I will explain how risk perceptions might 
have an impact on safety attitudes. In doing so, I will elaborate further on some 
findings of the systematic literature review. And finally, I will present the 
research questions derived from these findings which will form the basis for 
further examination in this part of the doctoral thesis.  
2.1 Information processing systems 
A finding that emerged from the systematic review of the literature on the 
relationship between risk communication and risk perception in complex 
interactive and tightly coupled organisations comes from Dillon and Tinsley 
(2008). They found that organisations and managers fail to learn from near-
misses as they perceive these events as successful risk-taking. Dillon and 
Tinsley argue that individuals’ risk perception is rooted in two general 
information-processing systems: an associative one and a rule-based one 
(Dillon and Tinsley, 2008). The latter operates according to formal rules of 
reasoning and evidence, while the associative system is based on emotions 
and interpretations. These two systems influence individuals’ decision-making 
processes and safety behaviour, but the associative system processes often 
prevail over rule-based system processes (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008). In other 
words, people tend to process information based on emotions rather than 
relying on reason or evidence-based information. As a consequence, “people 
with near-miss information make riskier choices than those without this 
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information, because the near-miss events lead them to perceive a lower level 
of risk regarding the decision situation” (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; p. 1438). As a 
result, they will show less safety behavioural attitudes.  
Dillon and Tinsley based their research on previous work by Nobel laureate 
Daniel Kahneman and his late colleague Amos Tversky. In their seminal paper 
on Prospect Theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest how a situation, 
once it is framed will determine individual risk behaviour. This happens as 
intuitive thinking uses simplifying shortcuts that will lead to biases and heuristics 
when it comes to making decisions in uncertain conditions. Heuristic may be 
seen as “a simple procedure that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, 
answers to difficult questions” (Kahneman, 2011; p. 98). People tend to make 
judgements of probability all the time. However, this is an almost impossible job, 
especially without knowing what exactly probability is. Thus, instead of judging 
the probability, most people actually judge something else that is easier to 
assess, but that will lead to systematic and predictable errors. When emotions 
are involved in this judging process, we call it an “affect heuristic”. Paul Slovic 
(2002) found that people determine their beliefs about risks based on their likes 
and dislikes. Once confronted with a risk, emotions will automatically evaluate 
the feelings regarding that risk based on the experiences with that particular of 
similar risks. Perceptions of risk are thus based on emotions, and consequently 
on judgements (Finucane et al., 2000), because “emotion is a quicker, easier 
and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain and sometimes 
dangerous world” (Slovic, 2000; p. xxxi). One’s emotional attitude towards 
things such as nuclear power, chemical hazards, or air pollution, drives a 
person’s beliefs about their risks and benefits. In other words, if a person 
dislikes chemical hazards, she or he most probably believes that its risks are 
high and its benefits negligible (Kahneman, 2011). The understanding of how 
affect influences risk perception and behaviour is called one of the ten most 
important accomplishments in risk analysis over the last 30 years (Greenberg et 
al., 2012). Even though, it was never demonstrated among employees in 
organisations managing high-risk technologies. 
 173 
Based on the principles of Prospect Theory, Kahneman (2011) elaborates on 
this topic in more recent work, by indicating two systems that drive the way we 
think, make choices, but also jump on errors. The first one, simply called 
“System 1 thinking”, is what Dillon and Tinsley (2008) indicate as associative 
information processing. Kahneman’s notion of “System 2 thinking” is the 
equivalent of Dillon and Tinsley’s rule-based information processing. The main 
function of System 1 is “to maintain and update a model of our personal world” 
(Kahneman, 2011; p. 71). Through associations we link bits of information that 
are in line with, or confirm, our mental models. This is a very fast and effortless 
process in the brain that is predominantly triggered by language (for more 
details see: Bechara and Damasio, 2005). The downside of this process is that 
System 1 has no self-controlling system, and thus often makes mistakes. Now if 
we link this to communication, and risk communication in particular, we have 
internal norms for a vast number of categories (Kahneman, 2011; p. 71). When 
the received information is not in line with these individual norms, we 
immediately reject that particular piece of information or we redirect it to make it 
fit into an existing norm. If this information is linked to a specific emotion, 
System 1 will immediately like or dislike the information, places it on an 
imaginary risk scale, and will jump to conclusions. This explains why so many 
people dread the risk of a nuclear power plant, while neglecting the risk of a 
deadly accident at home. 
System 2 has a controlling function. It restrains System 1 from making too many 
mistakes or wrong interpretations. We commonly call this cognitive reasoning. 
However, System 2 works at a much slower pace and demands lots of energy 
(especially glucoses and oxygen, for more details see: Lehrer, 2009). That is 
why wrong interpretations or false conclusions, as produced in System 1, are 
often not corrected by System 2. Dillon and Tinsley’s study indicates that in 
organisations dealing with risks, the associative information processing system 
(or System 1) prevails over the rule-based information processing system (or 
System 2) when it comes to evaluating potential risks. Their assumption is that 
“perceived risk is the product of the associative system processing […] that 
influences behaviour” (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008; p. 1437).  
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The question could be raised whether Dillon and Tinsley’s hypothesis is valid 
and applicable to all employees in every complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation, as their findings were based on quasi-experimental research with 
students and NASA employees. In an attempt to get more clarification on this 
issue, I will next elaborate on existing findings concerning how individuals 
perceive and act on information in general, and how they perceive risks in 
particular. 
2.2 Perception of risk 
Over the last decades, various scholars indicated how individuals perceive and 
interpret information in different ways. Weick’s theory of sensemaking (Weick, 
1979, 1993, 2001, 2005) is probably the most cited in this context. According to 
Weick, sensemaking is “a sprawling collection of ongoing interpretive actions” 
(Weick, 2005; p. 395). Weick refers to both a process of interpretation and a 
process of taking action. The interpretation part refers to how “individuals 
attempt to create order and make retrospective sense of the situations in which 
they find themselves” (Morgan et al., 1983, cited by Weick, 2005; p. 395). While 
the action part refers to individuals who are “creating and sustaining images of a 
wider reality, in part to rationalize what they are doing” (Morgan et al., 1983, 
cited by Weick, 2005; p. 395). These notions of interpretation and action are 
also described by Donnellon and her colleagues in the phenomenon of 
‘equifinal meanings’ (Donnellon et al., 1986). Their research indicates that, 
although organisational members collectively act in the same way, each of them 
has a different understanding of the conveyed information. These different 
interpretations of a single message indicate a divide between the dissemination 
of information and the individual perception of that particular information.  
 
Although this concept of equifinal meanings is based partly on Weick’s theory of 
sensemaking, it differs on the level of taking action. While Weick (2005) 
indicates a process in which individual action is taken based on retrospective 
sensemaking, Donnellon et al. (1986) emphasise individual sensemaking which 
results in collective action and similar behavioural implications. Weick and 
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Donnelon’s notion of interpretation of information is referring to ‘interpretation in 
action’, while the focus of this research is on ‘interpretation out of action’. I 
therefore prefer to refer to Julian Orr’s work on individual ‘out of action 
perceptions’ as he described in his ethnographic analysis of photocopier repair 
technicians (Orr, 1996). Although it was not Orr’s primal intention to study 
interpretations and perceptions of given messages on an individual level, he 
observed how repair people received official messages and guidelines from 
management, but perceived them in a different way than intended. According to 
Orr, it was through conversations with each other and with customers, and 
based on expertise that these technicians developed individual interpretations 
of the received information. 
When it comes to how individuals perceive risk, extensive research has been 
conducted in this domain. Paul Slovic (2000; 2010) and his colleagues 
(Kasperson et al., 1988; Leiss, 1995; Slovic et al., 2002, Fischhoff and 
Kadvany, 2011) indicated in multiple studies the difference between the experts’ 
view and the public’s view on risks, and demonstrated how among the latter, 
opinions about various risks may vary based on perceived benefits. When 
respondents were given arguments in favour of various risks that they earlier 
indicated as highly dangerous, they changed their beliefs about these risks. As 
described in the previous paragraph, this phenomenon in which people let their 
likes and dislikes determine their beliefs about the world (Kahneman, 2011) is 
called Affect Heuristics. It demonstrates how individuals might have various 
perceptions concerning risks, depending on the received message or 
information. However, a divergent perception is not necessary similar to an 
adapted risk aversive action. In that perspective, Weick and Sutcliffe argue, “it is 
easier to change someone’s beliefs than to change someone’s action” (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007; p.124).  
 
It is not only the case with lay people when it comes to interpreting risk; experts’ 
perceptions vary as well. In his doctoral thesis, Mike Lauder indicates seven 
different dimensions and eleven definitions of risk (Lauder, 2011). He argues 
that, for instance, a safety manager and a production manager each have a 
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distinctive view on the risks that might impact business performance. Therefore, 
depending on the role or the position in the organisation, “the concept of risk 
might be conceptualised during risk discourse” (Lauder, 2011; p. 31). Although 
Lauder focuses on the collective interpretation of risk, he indicates various 
interpretations of risks in one and the same organisation. Kaplan and Mikes 
(2012) support this view and present a framework for managing risk, in which 
they distinguish three risk types (preventable, strategy, and external risks) with 
distinct mitigation objectives and control mechanisms.  
Although these insights give answers to the question how people interpret the 
same information differently and how risks might be perceived in a varying way, 
none of the previously mentioned research was conducted in organisations with 
tightly coupled and complex interactive systems. Nor was it indicated whether 
these divergent perceptions have an impact on safety attitudes in these types of 
organisations. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the role of individual risk 
perceptions and its impact on safety attitudes in tightly coupled and complex 
interactive organisations is recommended. 
2.3 Conclusion 
In organisations that deal with complex interactive and tightly coupled systems, 
the executive team communicates with their staff about the organisation’s 
mission, vision, and values that aim to contain risks in daily operations. Safety 
guidelines, procedures, and various tools such as trainings, evacuation drills, 
emergency exercises, all underline the impact of the potential risks and how to 
contain them.  
On the other side, the external pressure that forces an executive team to 
contain risks becomes increasingly onerous. Various international and national 
regulations drive executives to operate according to strict safety directives. 
From a financial perspective, different interest groups such as boards, 
insurance companies, shareholders, and clients expect these companies to 
produce continuously, without being confronted with accidents. Besides these 
regulatory and financial obligations, these organisations have moral obligations 
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as well. Their neighbours, the community, their own staff, and the industry they 
operate in expect organisations to work under strict safety conditions. Multiple 
scholars (e.g. Leiss, 1995; Leiss, 1996; Perrow, 1999; Slovic, 2000; Gurabardhi 
and Gutteling, 2002; Gurabardhi et al., 2005; Breakwell, 2007) indicated the 
increasing regulations and the public pressure on these organisations as one of 
the main reasons why risk communication was invented. 
To get their safety messages across, and more precisely, to have their safety 
messages acted upon to heed the organisation from potential harm, the 
executive team will direct middle managers, HSEQ-staff (Health, Safety, 
Environment, and Quality), and internal or external experts (such as quality 
controllers, safety consultants, etc.) to support this communication about 
potential risks and the need for safety behaviour on the shop floor. However, 
the question could be raised whether everyone in the organisation perceives 
risk in the same way? 
In my daily practice as a consultant in the field of risk management I am 
confronted with the impression that every staff member has different 
perceptions of the risks that might endanger the organisation. Thus, it might be 
quite possible that it has nothing to do with how people communicate risk 
information, but with how organisational members (both ‘senders’ and 
‘receivers’ of information) absorb and perceive the risk that is the topic of the 
conversation. Therefore, the question could be raised what factors affect this 
risk perception?  
Therefore, this research project raises two questions to approach the described 
problem: 
1. Do people within a complex interactive and tightly coupled organisation 
perceive the same type of risks differently?  
2. If so, what factors affect the perception of these risks?  
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In the next chapters of Part III of this thesis, I will explain the method, the 
design, and the results of this research project. In the final chapter, I will discuss 
the limitations and offer recommendations for further research.  
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3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
In the previous chapter I indicated the rationale for gaining more insights in how 
different people within a complex interactive and tightly coupled organisation 
perceive the same type of risk, and what factors affect that perception of risk. In 
this section I will explain how these questions will be addressed in an empirical 
research project. The results of this research will be discussed in chapter 4.  
3.1 Research method 
If we assume that different people in the same organisation have divergent 
perceptions of the same type of risks in their organisation, there are two 
plausible options to address this issue in a research project: on an individual or 
on a collective level. As mentioned before, I will solely focus on the individual 
level, as this will offer the possibility to gain insights in the way risk perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviours of individuals within an organisation (Harvey et al., 
2002) are individually constructed. Furthermore, insights offered by Dillon and 
Tinsley (2008) on how individuals’ risk perception is rooted in an associative 
and a rule-based information-processing system, indicate that formal rules of 
reasoning as well as emotions and interpretations both influence individuals’ 
decision-making processes and safety behaviour (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008). To 
gain access to these information-processing systems and their impact on 
individual risk perceptions, a qualitative research method seems to be 
appropriate, as “good qualitative data are more likely to lead to serendipitous 
findings and to new integrations; they help researchers to get beyond initial 
conceptions and to generate or revise conceptual frameworks” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, 1). 
In an attempt to address the research questions, Repertory Grid seems to offer 
the possibility to uncover different constructs concerning risk as perceived by 
different individuals in an organisation. Repertory Grid stems from the Personal 
Construct Theory (PCT) as proposed by George Kelly (1955). Kelly believed 
that, in an effort to make sense of their world, human beings individually 
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develop constructions or theories of their world in relation to themselves. These 
constructions are not fixed, but change according to new experiences (Kelly, 
1955). If we translate this to this topic of research, i.e. how people within a 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisation perceive the same type of 
risk differently, it means that every time an individual receives some information 
about risk, he or she will implicitly evaluate this against a previously developed 
individual construct. This will lead to an interpretation of the risk and an 
evaluation of the potential danger in relation to himself or herself. By applying 
Repertory Grid as a research method, it offers the possibility to make 
unarticulated or implicit individual constructs of sensemaking explicit (Cassell 
and Walsh, 2004). The Repertory Grid technique is not only a powerful tool that 
helps respondents “articulate their views on complex issues without interviewer 
bias” (Goffin, 2002; p. 199), it is also a valuable qualitative method for 
organisational research in the field of risk analysis (Gammack and Stephens, 
1994; Cassell and Walsh, 2004) and management research in general (Goffin, 
2002). 
The rationales for applying the Repertory Grid technique to this research, rather 
than other methods, are multiple. First, my assumption is that various 
individuals in one and the same organisation perceive the same type of risks 
differently. It might be possible, for example, that the CEO’s view of certain risks 
within the organisation differs from those who maintain the technical installation. 
The only way to confirm or falsify that assumption is by checking every 
individual construct regarding risk, based on semi-structured interviews. 
Repertory Grid therefore offers a suitable approach. Secondly, examining these 
individual risk perceptions among staff might add an extra dimension to the 
different perceptions of risk among the organisational members. In other words, 
it might uncover new risk elements that are undervalued or simply unknown to 
the organisation. Thirdly, to get a deeper insight into the organisational 
members’ information-processing systems (Dillon and Tinsley, 2008) and how 
these systems influence the individuals’ risk perception, Repertory Grid might 
help the interviewees to articulate their comprehension of present risks in their 
own words. And finally, to get a fuller understanding of the risk avoidance 
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mechanisms at play in a complex interactive and tightly coupled organisation, 
Repertory Grid offers the possibility to tap into the individual’s tacit knowledge, 
and uncover how sense is made of risks in his or her organisation. 
Before deciding to apply the Repertory Grid technique as the most suitable 
method addressing the research question, I considered other qualitative 
methods such as ethnography and participant observations, discourse analysis, 
or focus group interviews. However, as I decided to focus on existing individual 
frameworks regarding organisational risks, and not collective interpretations of 
risks, these alternative methods were discounted. 
3.2 Unit of analysis 
To uncover how different people in a complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation perceive the same risks differently, it would be ideal to examine 
one hundred percent of the population in one organisation. Doing so might lead 
to a full and unbiased view of the different individual perceptions at play 
(Bohnsack, 2004) in that particular organisation. The Belgian receiving gas 
terminal of Norwegian gas transport company Gassco AS was selected for this 
research8. It is a representative complex interactive and tightly coupled 
organisation and has a small number of staff (29 in total). This offers the 
possibility to examine all employees’ risk perception individually. Gassco AS is 
a Norwegian state-owned gas transport company with headquarters and a 
central operation control room in Bygnes (Norway). Gassco has four EU-
continental receiving terminals in Germany (Dornum and Emden), Belgium 
(Zeebrugge), and France (Dunkirk), and two UK receiving terminals in St. 
Fergus, and Easington. In total, Gassco AS employs 353 staff. Over the last 
three years, multiple divisions of Gassco AS faced several critical incidents. 
Table 3-1 presents the number of incidents at group level in detail. 
 
 
                                            
8 This company is indicated in Part I of this thesis as ‘Gas Receiving Terminal’, or ‘GRT’. 
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Incidents at Gassco 2009  2010  2011 
Fires:      3   0  2 
Gas leaks:     1   2  2 
Critical incidents:    5   14  3 
Total personal injuries:    24   22  24 
Table 3-1 Incidents at Gassco AS on group level over the last three years 
(source: Annual Report 2010 and Annual Report 2011) 
The Belgian receiving terminal, which is located in the port of Zeebrugge, 
handles the total volume of gas that is transported through a 40” pipe (the so-
called ‘Zeepipe’), with a flow rate of 42 million Nm3 per day9. The gas contains 
91.2% methane (DNV Energy, 2010). This terminal remotely controls Gassco’s 
French receiving terminal in Dunkirk, which is responsible for all the Norwegian 
gas that arrives through the so-called ‘Franpipe’ (42” pipe), with a flow rate of 54 
million Nm3 per day. The Belgian and French receiving gas terminals jointly 
handle 26% of the Norwegian gas export (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2012). Gassco’s receiving 
terminal in Zeebrugge, the employees of which are the subject of my research, 
will be further referred to as ‘Zeepipe Terminal’ or ‘ZPT’. 
Since 2008, I have worked as a consultant for ZPT in the field of risk and crisis 
management. My company edited their emergency plans (both for Belgium and 
France), and we have run multiple safety trainings and crisis exercises over the 
last years. Due to these experiences I have a fairly good view of the 
organisation’s safety culture, strengths and weaknesses, and I have a trusted 
and respected position within Gassco’s executive management team as well. 
This unique position resulted in the full support of the Belgian CEO and his 
executive management team for this research project. Despite my good 
knowledge of this company and the industry they operate in, there were some 
                                            
9 Nm3 stands for ‘Normal cubic meter’ and is a common unit used in the industry to refer to gas 
emissions exchange. It is always dependent on the individual circumstances of each gas, 
pressure, and use. 
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issues to tackle before I could start this empirical project as a researcher and 
not as a consultant. Making a clear distinction between consultancy work and 
academic research was not easy and had multiple ethical issues. How could I 
not be biased by my previous knowledge and experience in this company? How 
could I distinguish academic research from consultancy work? And how would I 
deal with the results of the research in case they indicate flaws in my previous 
work as a consultant? All these topics were extensively discussed in advance 
with both my business partner and with ZPT’s CEO. Firstly, we decided to 
suspend my role as consultant at ZPT for the entire length of the research 
project. Secondly, we agreed on the fact that this research is free of charge for 
ZPT and that all expenses (such as transport, translation fees, etc.) linked to 
this research would be payable by me. Thirdly, all consultancy staff of my 
company would be excluded from the research process. And finally, ZPT’s 
executive management team agreed to accept my role as an independent 
researcher. We even discussed the possibility this research might offer 
recommendations contrary to my company’s previous advice. If that would be 
the case, we agreed to accept it as learning rather than shortcoming.  
In the following paragraphs (see: “3.4 Sampling”, and “3.5 Data collection”) I will 
elaborate on how we embodied these agreements in the research practice. 
3.3 Pilot 
Prior to this research at ZPT, pilot interviews based on the repertory grid 
methodology were held at a chemical production unit of Total Belgium. These 
interviews took place at the end of February 2012. Total’s production unit is a 
complex interactive and tightly coupled organisation as well, operating in the 
same industry as Gassco, i.e. the gas and oil business.  
At this stage I was examining a slightly different research question. As the 
outcome of P1, the systematic review, indicates various leadership actions in 
risk communication, I initially focused on ‘good’ and ‘poor’ risk communicators in 
an organisation and their impact on individual risk perception. Four different 
profiles participated in this pilot: the CEO, the safety manager, a middle 
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manager, and an operator. They all attended a brief information session about 
the aim of the pilot study, its place in the research process, and additional 
information about research confidentiality. The names of ‘good’ and ‘poor’ risk 
communicators were specific, clear, and offered by the interviewees. Value 
judgements were also avoided as the question was about good risk 
communicators, not about good managers or leaders. Although three out of four 
participants disclosed after the interview that it helped them to articulate their 
thinking and that somehow they gained new insights, the research results were 
not completely satisfying. Two out of four interviewees were struggling with the 
concept of “risk communication” as they mentioned day-to-day communication 
(formal as well as informal communication) as constructs. Some examples are: 
“having authority”, “pro-active communication”, “giving feedback”, or “the 
(mis)use of e-mail”. It became apparent that for the interviewees the terms “risk” 
and “communication” meant different things. This led to the insight that “good” 
or “poor communicators” are unfathomable concepts to evaluate by the 
interviewees. However, they were able to express their perceptions of 
communicative acts. After a discussion with my supervisory panel, we agreed to 
adapt the focus of the research project to an evaluation of individual risk 
perceptions rather than an evaluation of risk communicators. Moreover, this 
was also a major finding of the systematic review of the literature (see Part II, 
page 159). The research questions were subsequently adapted and relevant 
literature in the field of individual risk perception was examined (see: “2.2 
Perception of risk” on page 174).  
3.4 Sampling 
The total number of staff at the Belgian receiving terminal of Gassco in 
Zeebrugge (ZPT) is 29; 4 women and 25 men. Between 23 March and 9 May 
2012, 28 individual interviews were held at the premises of ZPT. One staff 
member was not included in the interviews as this person had been on 
permanent sick leave since the end of 2011. All face-to-face interviews were in 
Dutch, the employees’ native language. Each individual interview took 
approximately 50 minutes and was digitally recorded.  
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The table below (Table 3-2) gives an overview of the participants. 
Division n (men) n (women) Age Years with Gassco 
   (mean)  (mean) 
Management: 4 0 44.50 15.25 
Administration: 2 3 42.60 11.00 
Operation Supervisors: 14 0 41.85 12.89 
Maintenance: 5 0 49.40 15.00 
Table 3-2 Overview of interviewees at ZPT 
Concerning the level of education, the dominant group of employees holds a 
Graduate degree. Only two employees hold an Engineering degree, and no one 
a Masters’ degree (see Table 3-3). It must be indicated that 6 employees 
indicated they followed extra part-time courses on various topics such as 
management, prevention advisor, industrial maintenance, administration, or 
technical skills.  
Education level     n  
Engineer: 2 
Master: 0 
Graduate: 12 
Undergraduate: 11 
Secondary School: 3 
Table 3-3 Level of education at ZPT 
Prior to the interviews, ethical approval was asked of the Cranfield School of 
Management’s committee and granted. A Confidentiality Agreement between 
Cranfield School of Management, Gassco Zeebrugge, and myself was signed. 
This document was based on the school’s confidentiality form. 
3.5 Data collection 
All the 28 interviews were performed in 7 days spread over one and a half 
months (between 23 March and 9 May 2012). Prior to the interviews, the 
Gassco staff members who were participating that specific day in the interviews 
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were invited to a presentation on the research project. In this presentation, the 
aim, objectives, methodology, and the confidentiality of the interviews were 
explained. The CEO of ZPT required this briefing, as most of the employees just 
know me as a consultant, and only a few are aware of my engagement in the 
Cranfield DBA. These briefings also set the stage to differentiate my role as 
researcher and not as consultant.  
Every interview was digitally recorded and fully transcribed afterwards. All the 
interviews took place in ZPT’s so-called “Permit Room” in Zeebrugge. This is a 
private room, separated from the control room, where contractors receive their 
work permits before they start their activities on the plant. The interviews were 
held by one researcher and observed by a second researcher. Tim Van Achte, 
a researcher at PM who does not work as a consultant for ZPT, acted as an 
observer 8 times (on the first day and on the sixth day), Erik Snoeijers, a PhD-
student in the field of crisis communication at the University of Antwerp 
(Belgium), acted as the observer for all the other interviews (14 times) or as 
interviewer (6 times). I attended all the 28 interviews, 22 times as interviewer 
and 6 times as observer. The interviews I acted as an observer concerned ZPT 
staff I was too familiar with. I made this decision to avoid personal biases 
caused by my engagement as a consultant with this company.  
In the first part of the interview, approximately 10 minutes, the interviewee was 
asked to introduce him or herself, his/her educational background, age, the 
number of years with ZPT, previous work experiences, and if they ever 
experienced a crisis situation at work – be it at ZPT or elsewhere. Following 
Kelly’s (1955) triadic method, each interviewee was asked to name three risks 
at ZPT with high consequences, and three risks at ZPT with low consequences. 
The interviewee was asked to write each item on a separate pre-numbered 
card. The cards with ‘high consequences’ were numbered 5, 1, 6; the cards with 
‘low consequences’ were numbered 4, 3, and 2. Then, the interviewee was 
asked to explain the six elements and his or her personal interpretation of those 
risks. By doing so, the intention behind some of the elements became more 
apparent. ‘Fire’, for example was to some interviewees linked to gas fire on the 
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production plant, while others interpreted this as a fire in the building, such as a 
kitchen fire. The impact of each type is tremendously different. Another 
illustration is ‘sickness’; one interviewee referred to sickness in the sense of a 
pandemic outburst of flu that might have an impact on business continuity, while 
others referred to a single colleague who is ill and needs to be replaced.  
The interviewee was then given three cards, a so-called ‘triad’. Six elements 
offer the possibility to create twenty triads. Prior to the interview, these triads 
were indicated on the interviewer’s document and were consistent among all 
interviews. Appendix E shows an example of this document (taken from 
Interviewee # 14). Based on this triad, the interviewee was asked to look for a 
specific attribute that combines two risks and that makes those risks distinct 
from the third risk at the same time. Based on the interviewee’s observations, a 
construct was proposed by the interviewer. When, for instance, an interviewee 
divided a triad in ‘Gas leak – Gas Fire’ on the one hand, and ‘Loss of 
communication between the terminals in Zeebrugge and Dunkirk’ on the other, 
based on ‘material damage’, the construct ‘No material damage – Major 
material damage’ was proposed. The interviewee was then asked to grade each 
of the three elements that inspired him/her for this construct on a scale from 1 
(No material damage) to 5 (Major material damage). Subsequently the three 
other cards were offered and the interviewee was asked to grade them on the 
scale. The former example was taken from interview number 14. This process 
was repeated until the interviewee indicated that he or she had no more 
inspiration, or simply wanted to stop. The number of constructs each 
interviewee created varies between 5 and 13. No similar constructs were 
allowed, and constructs that were based on cause and effect were dismissed as 
well. 
At the end of the interview, the interviewer presented the risks with low 
consequences and the risks with high consequences once more to the 
interviewee. The question was raised whether the interviewee would change 
any of the initially chosen elements if he or she could. Only three interviewees 
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indicated that they would make minor adaptations, all the 25 other interviewees 
stated that they stick with their initial choices of chosen risks.  
3.6 Data analysis 
The process of data analysis evolved in multiple subsequent phases. In every 
phase the two observers assisted in the process of interpreting the data. After 
the first 21 interviews, preliminary interpretations were made. The data were 
analysed using the elements offered by the interviewees, the interviewees’ 
constructs, the observers’ notes and the full transcription of the tape recordings. 
This process is illustrated in figure 3-1 and will be explained in detail in the next 
paragraphs. 
 
Figure 3-1 Process of data analysis  
In Phase I, 126 risk elements (both with high consequences and with low 
consequences), offered in the first 21 interviews, were labelled into five distinct 
categories:  
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A. Risks related to operations (Gas related), 
B. Risks related to personal injuries and deaths, 
C. Risks related to possible emissions, 
D. Risks related to criminal acts, 
E. Various risks. 
The data was organised into responses that correspond to an already existing 
ZPT document: the Risk Alerting Matrix (Gassco, 2009). Categories A, B, C, 
and D refer to this Alerting Matrix; if something in one of these domains 
happens, the emergency plan will be activated immediately and the crisis team 
has to meet (Gassco Belgium, 2009). Category E (various risks) contains all the 
risk elements interviewees mentioned but that do not appear in ZPT’s official 
Alerting Matrix. Then, all the risks from the element groups were divided over 
the four divisions in the organisation, with respect for the interviewees’ 
interpretation of ‘low’ and ‘high consequences’:  
- Management, 
- Administration, 
- Operation supervisors, 
- Maintenance. 
The role of these four divisions, and how they interpret risk in their organisation 
will be extensively discussed in chapter 4 (on page 193). 
Based on an initial comparison between the data and the transcripts, and a first 
phase of open coding to assign a conceptual label to each element, the first 
preliminary interpretations were made. After this, the analysis moved to 
discovering relationships between the various constructs the interviewees 
offered in the interviews. These constructs, 178 in total, were labelled into 36 
construct codes, and were also assigned to the four groups in the organisation. 
A second preliminary interpretation based on this extra dimension was made.  
In Phase II, both the 30 elements and 47 constructs from 5 interviews were 
added to the existing data as described in Phase I. It is worthwhile mentioning 
that three new risk elements were found, and labelled. These elements are 
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‘bribery’ (Interviewee #22), ‘sound pollution’ (Interviewee #23), and 
‘electrocution’ (Interviewee #26). 
Then, Category E was subdivided into four types: 1) external risk factors that 
might impact ZPT, 2) risks linked to facilitating systems, 3) risks linked to ZPT’s 
specific process, and 4) risks linked to behavioural issues. This resulted in the 
clustering of 42 risk elements groups into eight element types. The 42 risk 
element groups and eight risk element types are illustrated in Table 3-4. A full 
overview of all the elements, mentioned by the interviewees and how they are 
attributed to the various element groups, is presented in Appendix F.  
 
Table 3-4 Risk elements attributed to element groups and types 
Then, the list of 225 constructs was clustered into 36 construct groups. These 
construct groups were clustered into seven construct types. They are:  
- Human factors, 
- Organisational relation structures, 
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- Risk and crisis containment, 
- Tangible and non-tangible damage, 
- Outcome probability, 
- Plant and process related, 
- Non-human related root causes.  
These ‘construct groups’ and ‘construct types’ are presented in Table 3-5. A full 
overview of all the constructs, mentioned by the interviewees and how they are 
attributed to the various construct groups, is presented in Appendix G. 
 
Table 3-5 Risk constructs attributed to groups and types 
The process of integrating the ‘risk elements’ and the ‘constructs’ into ‘element 
groups’ and ‘construct groups’, and ‘element types’ and ‘construct types’ was 
the basis for a third preliminary interpretation of the data. 
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Every step in the process of evaluating the data was made after individual and 
collective interpretation and complete agreement on the decisions made. The 
first two preliminary interpretations were made over a six hour session between 
the researcher and the two observers. All the elements were attributed to a 
particular category after final checks of the transcripts and personal notes. 
When for example an interviewee mentioned ‘fire’ as one of the risks 
threatening ZPT, a distinction had to be made between a ‘non-gas related fire’ 
and a ‘gas fire’. The third interpretation, when the elements and constructs were 
clustered into groups and types, took more than six hours. Firstly, there was an 
individual categorisation where no discussion was allowed and each 
researcher/observer recorded their coding. Then, the individual categorisations 
were compared and discussed until final agreement was found. 
In Phase III, the data of the final two interviews (12 elements and 16 constructs) 
was coded according to the labels that were attributed in Phase II. Still, one 
more new element was offered by the very last interviewee (‘damage to the 
pipeline outside the ZPT plant’). After 28 interviews, data saturation was 
attained as the entire active population of Gassco’s receiving terminal in 
Zeebrugge was interviewed. Then, the process of integration of the three 
previous preliminary interpretations, and refining the analysis of the data was 
performed. These findings will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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4 FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this empirical research is to evaluate the staff’s individual risk 
perception in an organisation with complex interactive and tightly coupled 
systems. To do this, the design of this research was set up in a way to access 
the staff’s perception in comparison to the company’s official risk matrix.  
The Zeepipe Terminal (ZPT), like all of Gassco’s installations, has various 
safety and recovery plans. They are not only required by the government, but 
are also an integral part of the company’s overall safety values. Prior to the 
research, I examined various safety and business continuity plans for ZPT 
(Gassco, 2009; DNV Energy, 2010; Gassco, 2011; Gassco, 2012). These 
documents contain lists of external and internal risks to the operations at ZPT. 
Each of the risks has been evaluated in terms of potential fatal victims, damage 
to the installation, and impact on production and environment. Based on 
interpretations of probability and potential outcome, Gassco’s management 
installed and communicated an alerting matrix. This matrix contains four large 
domains of potential risks at ZPT: 1) fire and gas leaks, 2) injuries and sickness, 
3) emissions, and 4) criminal acts (as presented in Figure 4-1). Each of these 
domains is covered by multiple Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and 
Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) that aim to control, mitigate or avoid 
potential harm10. In all, there are 247 SOPs and 300 SOGs in use at Gassco. All 
these procedures and guidelines are accessible through the intranet, and the 
majority are about the safe use of tools on the plant. Table 4-1 presents the 
number of procedures and guidelines linked to each of the four risks in the ZPT 
Risk Matrix. ‘Level 1’ has to do with corporate governance processes, such as 
audits, reviews, and business plans. ‘Level 2’ are directives that are initiated by 
Headquarters (HQ) in Norway and deal with working environment, 
management, and performance. The ‘Level 3’ directives are installed by HQ and 
                                            
10 Not all the SOGs and SOPs are directly linked to operational risks. Many of them are job 
descriptions and guidelines to secure the supply of office stationery or even toilet paper, for 
instance. 
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apply to all Gassco staff and gas receiving terminals. They are more focused on 
safety operations, asset management, and emergency responses. The final 
group of SOPs and SOGs are local directives linked to authority relations, 
security management, and fiscal processes. Although Gassco indicates four 
large domains of risks for their ‘Risk Alerting Matrix’, all of the four levels of 
directives are equally important. It might be clear that ‘injuries’ outscores the 
other four risk domains when it comes to the number of procedures and 
guidelines ZPT has in place to prevent staff from being injured. In contrast, 
‘criminal acts’ has the lowest score regarding procedures and guidelines.  
 Fires Injuries Emissions Criminal acts 
Level 1 – 
Corporate 
Governance 
4 4 6 1 
Level 2 – HQ 
directives 
8 9 16 6 
Level 3 – 
Gassco all & All 
terminals 
5 9 4 3 
Local Directives 
(ZPT) 
26 32 22 12 
Sub total 43 54 48 22 
Guidelines 7 28 16 6 
TOTAL 50 82 64 28 
Table 4-1 Number of procedures and guidelines linked to Risk Matrix 
The procedures and guidelines linked to these four risk domains, as presented 
in Table 4-1, are the subject of formal trainings that each employee (including 
administrative staff) receives once a year at the so-called HES days (Health, 
Environment, Safety). The HSEQ manager or external consultants in various 
fields of risk and crisis containment conduct these trainings. Besides these 
formal trainings, my experience with ZPT indicates that a lot of informal 
conversations about safety and potential risks are discussed among staff 
members on a daily basis. As this is a rather small organisation, everyone 
seems to talk to everyone. On several days I witnessed how maintenance 
workers were sitting at a large round table over lunch, having a chat with the 
CEO and other colleagues about various topics (i.e., about the new safety fence 
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that was under construction, or about a minor incident at one of the other gas 
receiving terminals).  
All staff is expected to know these risks and the affiliated procedures, and to 
anticipate them in case of an emergency. In trainings, exercises, and safety 
meetings, every staff member learns how to detect, interpret, and alert the on-
call duty manager. It is each person’s task to evaluate the situation, and -if 
required- activate the crisis team (Gassco Belgium, 2009).  
To evaluate the individual risk perception of ZPT staff, the four domains 
described in this risk matrix (presented in Figure 4-1) were used as the 
company’s own risk standards.  
 
Figure 4-1 Risk domains covered in the ZPT Risk Matrix 
As described in chapter 3 of this part of the thesis, each individual at ZPT was 
asked to name three risks in their organisation with high consequences, and 
three with low consequences. Figure 4-2 illustrates the staff’s overall perception 
concerning risks with high consequences and both risks with high and low 
consequences at ZPT.  
 
Figure 4-2 Overall risk perceptions at ZPT 
The numbers on the bar graphs indicate the actual number of mentions. As 28 
individuals were interviewed, the perceptions of risks with high consequences 
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are based on 84 elements (3 x 28) and the perceptions of risks with low and 
high consequences are based on 168 elements (6 x 28).  
A first observation is that all the four risks from the alerting matrix (see Figure 4-
1) appear in the overall risk perception diagram, be it not in the same 
proportion. Secondly, the bar chart with low and high consequences has a less 
extreme distribution of the risk elements than the diagram with solely high 
consequences. However, in the former, risks linked to the domains ‘fires & 
leaks’, ‘injuries & illness’, ‘facilitating systems’, and ‘Gassco specific process’ 
are dominant. Thirdly, I would argue that only the diagram with risks with high 
consequences might be compared to the official alerting matrix as this matrix is 
only suitable for risks with high consequences and not for minor injuries or 
damages. In that case, ‘fires & leaks’ completely outscores the other risk 
elements. And finally, we must point out that the group of Operation Supervisors 
has a dominant voice in this overall picture, as they comprise 50% of the total 
population at ZPT. 
Based on the various risk elements, every individual was asked to reflect on 
constructs that differ or combine some of the mentioned risk elements. This 
leads to seven construct types, based on 36 construct groups or 241 constructs. 
Figure 4-3 gives an overview of these construct types distributed over the entire 
ZPT population. 
An overall observation is that ‘Human factors’, ‘Crisis and risk containment’, and 
‘Tangible and non-tangible damage’ are the dominant construct types.  
 
Figure 4-3 Construct types linked to general ZPT population  
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The aim of this research is to uncover individual perceptions regarding risks in 
the organisation. In an attempt to present the data comprehensibly, individual 
perceptions are clustered and presented by the teams. Hence, the following 
sections will explore the commonalities and differences in risk perceptions 
among four distinct groups at ZPT: management, administration, maintenance, 
and operation supervisors. These four groups and their places in the 
organisation’s structure are presented in Figure 4-4.  
 
Figure 4-4 ZPT’s organisational structure  
While being vigilant not to interpret the data as the organisation’s vision on risk, 
nor its attitude towards safety behaviour, the objective of the following 
subsections is to present the data in a clear and comprehensible format, and 
indicate significant similarities and differences between the interpretations of 
various risks in the organisation. An in-depth discussion about the interpretation 
of these findings and the contribution of this research will be presented in 
Chapter 5 of this part of the doctoral thesis. 
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4.2 Management 
The management team comprises four people: the CEO, the Operations 
Manager, the Maintenance Manager, and the HSEQ Manager (Health, Safety, 
Environment, and Quality). They are all male, between 34 and 56 years of age, 
and have been with the company between 7 and 20 years. The average 
number of years of experience in tightly coupled and complex interactive 
organisations (ZPT included) is 21 years. Two of the management team 
members hold an engineering degree. 
 
Figure 4-5 Repertory grid results on Management level 
A first observation is that the management team members’ view on ‘risks with 
high consequences’ predominantly refers to their main activity: gas (see Figure 
4-5). More than fifty percent of the elements (7 out of 12) mentioned by the 
management team as risks with high consequences are in the domain of ‘Fires 
& leaks’. This is not really a surprise as gas is the core business of this 
company, and without doubt one that potentially contains multiple risks. 
However, it is not proportional to the number of procedures and guidelines 
concerning the prevention of fires and gas leaks. 
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A second observation is that only one interviewee mentioned “a deadly 
accident” as a risk with a high consequence, while ‘Emissions’ was not 
mentioned at all. Although ‘Injuries & illness’ and ‘Emissions’ both appear in the 
Alerting Matrix which was approved and disseminated by themselves in the 
2009 Emergency Plan (Gassco, 2009), it is not reflected in the interviews. 
However, looking at the constructs, it provides a slightly different perspective. 
Multiple constructs were based on ‘Human factors’, such as “safe situation for 
our staff”, “impact on personal and social life”, “level of stress”, “emotional 
vulnerability”, or “an accident with physical consequences”, just to mention a 
few. This compensates for the low score in the elements diagram on ‘Injuries & 
illness’. The same applies for ‘Emissions’. Concerning the constructs, almost all 
management team members mention ‘impact on the environment’, which is 
absorbed into the construct group ‘environment’ and is part of the ‘Tangible & 
non-tangible damage’ construct type.  
And finally, one interviewee called “serious personal accident” a risk with low 
consequence, while another member of this group was unable even to come up 
with risks with low consequence. Instead, he mentioned a couple of banalities 
such as “a broken coffee machine”, or “a broken chair in the conference room”. 
Concerning the constructs, this group is the only one that did not mention 
outcome probabilities. 
4.3 Administration  
The administration team comprises five persons; two administrative assistants, 
a management assistant, a project and documentation engineer, and an 
accountant and controlling officer. The three female and two male members of 
this team are between 28 and 53 years of age, and have been with the 
company between 5 and 20 years. The average number of years of experience 
in tightly coupled and complex interactive organisations (ZPT included) is 13 
years. Two of the administration team members hold a graduate degree, the 
three others hold undergraduate degrees but acquired task specific knowledge 
through various certificated courses. 
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Closer inspection of the diagrams in Figure 4-6 shows that in ‘risks with high 
consequences’ and ‘risks with high and low consequences’ the proportion of 
elements linked to ‘Criminal acts’ is considerably high.  
 
Figure 4-6 Repertory grid results on Administration level 
In comparison to other groups at ZPT, the administrative team is remarkably 
more concerned about criminal acts than any other team. This high number of 
references to ‘Criminal acts’ could be ascribed to the fact that the majority of 
this team followed a one-day anti-terrorism course at the end of 2011 (a couple 
of months prior to this research). A UK expert on explosives and anti-terrorism 
gave this training, and it was set up very realistically. The participants were first 
told that a real bomb had been hidden on the premises. Then, they were 
instructed how to recognise strange objects, and how to deal with threatening 
situations. They were subsequently asked to go out and search for an explosive 
package. It is worth noting that one group, including four administration team 
members, followed this course the day after a deadly attack took place in 
Belgium. At a Christmas market in Liège, a man shot at the crowd enjoying their 
Christmas shopping. Six people, among them two teenagers and a baby, were 
instantly killed. Maybe the timing of this anti-terrorism course, in combination 
with the very realistic approach of the trainer, might explain why the members of 
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this team mentioned ‘Criminal acts’ so often, both as risks with low and high 
consequences. 
A second observation is that the administration team members do not mention 
‘Emissions’ as a high risk, and only one interviewee mentioned it as a risk with 
low consequences, more specifically ‘noise pollution’. This might be surprising 
as ZPT is a very silent plant in a quiet area of the port of Zeebrugge. The 
motivation for offering ‘noise pollution’ as a risk with low consequences, 
however, was a personal one:  
“When the diesel generator starts up, in case of an electricity outage for 
instance, it makes a lot of noise. And I sit close-by it. In fact, all noise 
bothers me.” (Interviewee #23) 
A third observation is that this team mentioned all the elements in the category 
‘Fires & leaks’, except ‘Minor gas leak. However, none of the administration 
people will be physically exposed to these risks in case of a possible 
emergency because they are all relatively safe inside a heat resistant building.  
A fourth observation is linked to the risks concerning ‘Injuries & illness’. Here, 
the risks with low consequences are predominantly linked to minor injuries as a 
direct result of not wearing personal protection equipment (“using your 
equipment in a wrong way”, Interviewee #12; “a contractor who’s not wearing 
his protective clothes”, Interviewee #11), or to general health issues (“health of 
staff”, Interviewee #4; “illness”, Interviewee #12). It is worth mentioning that one 
of the colleagues of this team, a young woman, was suddenly diagnosed with 
an aggressive cancer late 2011. This was a shock for the entire company, but 
more specifically for her colleagues at the admin department. Therefore, the 
large proportion of constructs under ‘Human factors’ is not surprising. The 
following quotes illustrate this: 
“If something were to happen to one of my colleagues, it would have a 
big impact on me - more on an emotional level - than if something were 
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to happen to a contractor. My colleagues are closer to me, you see.” 
(Interviewee #4)  
“We all have a good insurance policy, and a regular check up with a GP, 
but still … serious things can happen to your health. It gives me a hard 
time when people struggle with their health. People do get older, or 
something unexpected might happen. It can happen to all of us…” 
(Interviewee #4)  
“When someone feels sick, this normally has no major impact. In most 
cases, people who are on sick leave will be replaced or the situation will 
be dealt with.” (Interviewee #12) 
“Stress might impact you; you get a sudden call when someone falls sick, 
when there is a strike or a fire. How do you deal with emotions? How 
much stress can you handle, I mean, to be productive.” (Interviewee #21) 
4.4 Maintenance 
The maintenance team comprises five persons; three blue-collar workers, one 
person who is responsible for maintaining the IT and electronic systems, and 
one person responsible for all electronic tools and measurement. They are all 
male, between 46 and 53 years of age, and have been with the company 
between 7 and 20 years. The average number of years of experience in tightly 
coupled and complex interactive organisations (ZPT included) is 20.2 years. 
Two of the maintenance team members hold a graduate degree, two an 
undergraduate degree, and one a secondary school degree. One blue-collar 
worker in this team declared that he experienced a life-threatening crisis 
situation in his previous job.  
Closer inspection of the diagrams in Figure 4-7, remarkably show that the 
maintenance team members do not denote ‘Emissions’ nor ‘Criminal acts’ as 
‘risks with high consequences’. It is, however, one of their dedicated tasks to 
check the plant for anomalies in the production process, at the installation, or on 
the premises. Nor did any of the maintenance team members mention ‘Minor 
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gas leak’ as a risk. A minor gas leak is extremely difficult to detect in a control 
room, as it has no measurable impact on the production process. Therefore, 
maintenance staff particularly have to be extremely vigilant for minor leaks.  
 
Figure 4-7 Repertory grid results on Maintenance level 
Another remarkable observation is that only one of the maintenance staff 
members mentioned an element that fits the ‘Injuries and illness’ element type 
as a risk with high consequences. This is at odds considering that, of all ZPT 
staff, the maintenance people are predominantly exposed to injuries caused by 
tools, leaks, or the perils linked to a gas plant. This interviewee (#20), who 
mentioned an element that fits ‘Injuries and illness’, referred to possible harm to 
third parties, not maintenance staff. Furthermore, he unequivocally suggests 
that the cause of a specific personal injury lies in other people’s unsafe 
precautionary actions. 
Interviewee #20: “When we have to open a specific part of the installation 
for maintenance, and it is not free of gas it’s a major risk to us. For those 
who have to open this.”  
Q: “And what is it you have to open? Can you be more specific?” 
Interviewee #20: “A part of the gas installation. And when it needs an 
inspection or a specific intervention and they (note of the researcher: he 
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nods his head towards the control room, which is where the operation 
supervisors work) haven’t vented the pipeline well, or it’s not properly 
rinsed, … or someone forgot to check for gas residues…” 
Q: “So you are talking about a part that needs a maintenance check, but 
is not free of gas?” 
Interviewee #20: “That’s right.” 
Q: “And what might happen then?” 
Interviewee #20: “It happened once. A contractor was here on the plant 
to open a flange of one of the process trains. He had all the necessary 
work permits. They started to unscrew the flange and there was still … I 
am not saying there was huge pressure, but still enough gas pressure in 
that pipeline.”  
Q: “What happened?”  
Interviewee #20: “It was a large flange, 24 inches. Those things don’t 
loosen at once. You have to unscrew them slowly. At a certain moment 
the flange opens and gas pours out. You stop all activities immediately. 
But this could be prevented. What happened? I don’t know. And I’m not 
going to blame anyone, but someone should have checked the pipe 
before the maintenance work. That’s the job of … (note of the 
researcher: he nods his head again towards the control room).” 
One might interpret that maintenance staff suffer severely from hubris as they 
completely neglect two out of four risk groups that are denoted by Gassco’s 
official risk alerting matrix. This attitude might be attributed to a typical male 
attitude among blue-collar workers, where “boys don’t cry” (Interviewee #19), 
and where comparing wounds seems to be an indication of being tough and 
skilled. Or as one interviewee expressed it:  
“A cut or a small eye injury, that’s not too bad. I once got a drop of nitric 
acid in my left eye. It’s no fun, but it is not the end of the world! A good 
rinse and it was better.” (Interviewee #20) 
Although the members of the maintenance team neglect elements that refer to 
the ‘Injuries & illness’ type, the constructs they offered indicate multiple facets of 
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human factors that suggest a severe awareness of possible injuries. A few 
examples are “impact on staff members’ ergonomics” (Interviewee #15), 
“consequences for human beings” (Interviewee #16), “potential victims” 
(Interviewee #20), and “creating human suffering” (Interviewee #28). 
Finally, it is not surprising that this group of maintenance people indicate many 
risks that are categorised under the ‘Facilitating systems’ element type, such as 
technical problems with IT systems, problems with non-operating systems such 
as air-conditioning, or issues with technical equipment and tools. These are all 
typical issues maintenance staff has to deal with.  
4.5 Operation supervisors 
The operation supervisor’s team comprises fourteen people; seven operation 
supervisors, and 7 deputy operation supervisors. They are all male, between 29 
and 55 years of age, and have been with the company between 1 and 20 years. 
The average number of years of experience in tightly coupled and complex 
interactive organisations (ZPT included) is 19.6 years. Five of the operation 
supervisors hold a graduate degree, seven an undergraduate degree, and two a 
secondary school degree. Five people in this team declared they experienced a 
life-threatening crisis situation in their previous job.  
The operation supervisors’ habitat is the control room. This room is located 
centrally in the ZPT-building. It has no windows, but a large video wall that 
shows all the processes and images of the multiple control cameras on the 
premises, both in Zeebrugge and Dunkirk.  
The operation supervisory team is the only group at ZPT that works in shifts, as 
the control room operates 24/7. The main role of the operation supervisors is 
controlling the gas flow in both receiving terminals (Belgium and France). Or to 
say it in an interviewee’s words:  
“Our only job is to follow the process, and notify alerts! But, the issue 
here is that alerts are not always 100% clear.” (Interviewee #5) 
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When they discover an anomaly in the production process, they can rely on 
their colleagues from the maintenance team to go on the plant, check the 
problem, and fix it. However, in case something happens at night or over the 
weekend, the operation supervisors or their deputies have to leave the control 
room and go outside to check and fix the problem themselves.  
Due to this technical and practical knowledge of the gas-receiving terminal, the 
operation supervisors have a fairly good view of all the existing risks. This is 
reflected in the diagrams as presented in Figure 4-8.  
 
Figure 4-8 Repertory grid results on Operation Supervisors level 
A first observation is that operation supervisors have the broadest distribution of 
risk elements and constructs compared to the other three groups at ZPT 
(management, administration, and maintenance). This might be accredited to 
the fact that the operation supervisors represent 50% of the total population of 
staff at ZPT, and therefore simply attribute more risk elements. On the other 
hand, it might be attributed to the fact that the operation supervisors have an 
overall view in every sense (with CCTV images and real-time data) on each and 
every detail that happens at ZPT. This notion of having a ‘broad picture’ of the 
plant, in combination with many years of experience, might also explain why this 
group of operation supervisors has the broadest view on existing risks at ZPT. 
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A second observation is that the share of element types in ‘Injuries & illness’ is 
considerably higher than in any of the other three teams. In combination with a 
large number of constructs in the domain of ‘Human factors’, this indicates their 
concern with personal injuries among co-workers.  
A third insight is that this is the only team that mentions emissions as a risk with 
high consequences: ‘Water-glycol’ and ‘To inert with nitrogen’ are both chemical 
risks linked to the production process that were mentioned by Interviewee #9. 
Among the risks with low consequences, other operation supervisors mentioned 
a “leak at the water-glycol system” (Interviewees #10, 26, 27), as well as 
“working with chemicals” (Interviewee #10). 
In contradiction to management and maintenance, which talked about 
procedures, it is remarkable to observe how operation supervisors 
predominantly talked about control. This issue of control was linked to 
contractors “who are difficult to control” (Interviewees #3, #4, #5) “as they easily 
neglect safety rules” (Interviewees #6, #8), or “who neglect to return their work 
permits after finishing their intervention” (Interviewees #3, #8). The issue of 
control was also used in the context of “monitoring access to the premises”:  
“Quite often it happens that someone is in the building, for a meeting with 
management for instance, and we are not aware of this. It’s not the end 
of the world, but … When we see someone walking on the plant, in 
between the installations, and we don’t know who it is and what he’s 
doing, you have an issue of not having control over access to the plant.” 
(Interviewee #5) 
“The remote access to the plant in Dunkirk often does not work 
adequately, but apparently no one worries about it.” (Interviewee #8) 
Similar to some of the maintenance staff, some of the operation supervisors 
also point the finger to others when it comes to neglecting safety rules. The 
following interview excerpt illustrates this:  
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“Recently there was an adjunct supervisor who responded to an alarm as 
follows ‘Oh, it’s only air, nothing to worry about.’ I replied: ‘No, it is not! 
This is important!’ Not informing your colleague about the smallest 
anomaly might bring you in danger. It’s a pity this didn’t happen in 
another shift; they could have seen the consequences of neglecting an 
alarm.”  
Q: Am I correct in thinking that not everyone takes alerts as seriously as 
you? 
A: “Yes, it depends on the person. Something can happen any minute. I 
can’t stand it when I arrive at my shift, and I see alerts from three days 
ago no one responded to. That has happened too often.” (Interviewee 
#5) 
A deputy operation supervisor’s answer to the request to come up with three 
risks at ZPT with high consequences, reinforced Interviewee #5 by saying: 
“A risk, somehow, is something that isn’t easily going to happen, I guess. 
Normally…” (Interviewee #6) 
4.6 Conclusions 
As mentioned earlier, we have to be vigilant not to interpret these data as the 
organisation’s vision on risk or its attitude towards safety behaviour. The 
research aim was to uncover individual perceptions regarding risks in the 
organisation, not to evaluate individuals’ or teams’ behaviour. Uncovering 
perceptions does not reveal whether someone is knowledgeable or sensitive to 
detect actual risks when they emerge. 
Although there is a remarkable feeling of connectedness among staff (in terms 
of belonging to a group you know very well and fully trust), quite a number of 
employees indicate a low feeling of ownership regarding their responsibility in 
the organisation. Often, employees look towards management or headquarters 
(systematically indicated as ‘Norway’) to fix a problem when it arises.  
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“If there is a fire, management will be alerted immediately. They will 
decide what actions need to be taken.” (Interviewee #11) 
“We have to report every issue to Norway. However, and now I’m 
walking on very thin ice, there is a difference between what we have to 
do and what we actually do. In practice we don’t always alert Norway.” 
(Interviewee #13) 
“We depend on Norway. We execute what they say. If we observe minor 
issues, such as a broken computer screen, we’ll fix it and just notify 
Norway. When it concerns major issues, the server for example, we have 
to rely on Norway.” (Interviewee #15)  
Therefore, the question could be raised if this attitude reflects a schism between 
what these employees experience as risks, and what Gassco advocates as 
risks. Or in other words: it is not clear whether employees with a fairly good 
knowledge of existing risks at ZPT also have the practical skills to intervene in 
the event of an emergency.  
Examining all the constructs, it shows that those who are directly involved in 
managing risks (management, operation supervisors, and maintenance staff) 
neglect or minimise ‘Outcome probability’ as a construct. While among the 
members of the administration team, who have no direct impact on the 
processes, ‘Outcome probability’ is the second highest mentioned construct. 
According to Kahneman, the concept of probability has been developed by 
logicians and statisticians, while for “laypeople […] probability is a synonym of 
likelihood in everyday language” and thus “a vague notion, related to 
uncertainty, propensity, plausibility, and surprise” (Kahneman, 2011; p. 150). 
Therefore, this different perception concerning ‘Outcome probability’ between 
the administration team and the rest of the organisation might suggest that 
those who manage risks predominantly perceive them in terms of impact on 
production and safety, while those who are dependent on others to handle risks 
look at it in terms of the chance that something might happen. 
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And if we consider all the risk elements, it becomes apparent that firstly there 
are different perceptions of risk among all organisational members, which vary 
among the four groups at ZPT. And, secondly, only one group – the operation 
supervisors- mentioned all the risk elements that are part of Gassco’s official 
risk alerting matrix. 
In the next chapter I will elaborate on the nature of these findings, and uncover 
the factors at play that create this broad view on risks. This will be linked to the 
existing literature and claims to new contributions to knowledge will be made. 
Finally, limitations to this research will be discussed, and viable 
recommendations for practice and further research will be indicated. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
Although several risk communication theorists (Kasperson et al., 1988; Klein et 
al., 1995; Slovic, 2000, 2010; Coan, 2002; Hambach et al., 2011) have 
proposed that communicating risk issues might have an impact on risk 
perceptions, relatively little empirical work has been done to demonstrate the 
extent to which this risk communication has an impact on individual risk 
perception among staff in organisations managing high-risk technologies. This 
research attempts to fill this gap. Through repertory grid analysis I examined 
each staff member’s individual perception of the existing risks and how this 
differs from the company’s official risk matrix, as communicated in the 
organisation. Next, these individuals were grouped according to the role they 
play in the organisation, and the data was analysed and interpreted in terms of 
‘work groups’ rather than just the individuals. This led to the finding that there 
was a certain consistency within these groups, and how these groups perceive 
risks differently. 
In the next paragraphs I will interpret the findings and link them to the existing 
literature. By doing so, I will provide a contribution to the literature on risk 
perception. 
5.2 Interpretation of findings 
This research indicates that all staff members have a different perception of the 
actual risks in their organisation. It is remarkable to denote that not two 
employees mentioned an identical set of risks, and none of the staff members 
indicated the company’s official risk matrix. These observations lead to the 
following questions: 
- How is it possible that, despite all organisational members having a 
different perception of the risks, this organisation operates in a safe 
way? 
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- What are the factors that influence the organisational members’ 
individual risk perception? 
- Is communication the best tool to adjust risk perceptions and 
encourage staff to be aware of safety and potential risks? 
These questions will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
5.2.1 Equifinal meanings 
ZPT has never experienced a severe crisis situation since its inauguration in 
1992. They had a couple of unexpected shut downs over the last years, and 
nothing more severe than bruises and minor personal injuries. It might be 
argued that this plant could not operate for 20 years without any crisis situation 
while all the employees have various interpretations of the actual risks. As we 
know, the average amount of years staff is with this company is 13.5 years, and 
43 percent of staff has been with this company since the very beginning back in 
1992, we can argue that it is not pure luck that has prevented ZPT from having 
a severe accident. As a team, despite the different individual perceptions of the 
actual risks at ZPT, the organisational members seem to operate in a safe and 
risk aversive way.  
This might be linked to the concept of ‘equifinal meanings’ (Donnellon et al., 
1986) for different interpretations of a message, but similar behavioural 
implications. Donnellon’s research indicated that, although organisational 
members collectively act in the same way, each of them has a different 
understanding of the conveyed information. This concept of equifinal meanings 
is partly based on Weick’s theory of sensemaking (Weick, 1979; 2005) in which 
employees basically have two alternative sets of organising mental tools at their 
disposal: (1) shared meanings and (2) shared communication mechanisms. 
Based on the data, Donnellon et al. suggest that “meaning and action are 
related in a complex iterative process in which meanings are continually 
constructed and destroyed as more sense-making communication occurs and 
new actions are taken” (Donnellon et al., 1986; p. 53). Although I was not 
researching individual perceptions regarding risks in action, my research 
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indicates that despite the fact all organisational members have a different 
interpretation of the actual risks, they operate in the same safe way.  
This leads us to the following two questions, one about the factors that influence 
the organisational members’ individual risk perceptions, and one about 
alternative tools to adjust risk perceptions and encourage staff to be aware of 
safety and potential risks. 
5.2.2 Crisis experience as dominant predictor  
In this research, various parameters were checked to identify plausible factors 
that influence risk perceptions. From the literature we know that trust in the 
communicator (Conchie and Burns, 2008; Schoorman et al., 2007), social group 
relationships (Kasperson et al., 1988), domain familiarity (Gutteling, 1993), and 
heuristics and biases (Kasperson et al., 1988; Kahneman, 2011) all have an 
impact on how individuals perceive risk. However, all of these findings are 
based on research among civilians, and not with staff in organisations 
managing high-risk technologies.  
It can be argued that trust between the communicator and the receiver of risk 
information at ZPT is relatively high. It is a small group of colleagues (29 in 
total) that have known each other for a long time: 13.5 years on average, and 
almost 50 percent of them for 20 years. None of the 28 interviewees mentioned 
an element that indicates bad intentions or a lack of confidence in the words 
and actions of their colleagues. In a few cases operation supervisors and 
maintenance staff were finger-pointing each other with regard to neglecting 
safety rules. It is my interpretation that this was not an expression of distrust, 
but rather an effort to underline how good they know the risks and safety rules 
themselves in comparison to others. On the other hand, the question could be 
raised whether this high level of trust at ZPT is weakening the organisation from 
a safety perspective. Based on earlier findings by Conchie and Donald (2006) 
who studied the role of trust and distrust in a similar type of organisation, i.e. an 
offshore gas installation operating on the UK Continental Shelf (Conchie and 
Donald, 2006). They revealed how attitudes of distrust “such as checking and 
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scepticism have a functional role of ensuring a safe work environment” 
(Conchie and Donald, 2006; p. 1158).  
Concerning social group relationships and domain familiarity it can be argued 
that the majority of staff at ZPT has a similar educational background (12 
undergraduates, 11 with a graduate degree, only two engineers, and no one 
with a Master’s degree), and a large group shares common work experience, as 
12 out of 28 were among the first employees who started working at this 
terminal back in 1992.  
When it comes to heuristics, however, there is a significant dissimilarity 
between the employees who had witnessed a life-threatening crisis situation at 
their previous job, and those who had not. Almost a quarter of all employees (6 
in total) indicated they once experienced a severe crisis situation, such as a fire 
on board of a ship, an explosion at a chemical plant that killed three blue-collar 
workers, an emission of a highly toxic product (H2S), or the safety operations at 
the Herald of Free Enterprise (a ship that capsized on the night of 6 March 
1987, moments after leaving the Belgian port of Zeebrugge, killing 193 
passengers and crew).  
Five of them are operation supervisors, and one is a member of the 
maintenance team. Together, they mentioned 36 risk elements, whereas 15 
risks are directly linked to their experienced life-threatening situation. Figure 5-1 
gives an overview of the differences between the different ZPT-employees who 
experienced a crisis situation and those who did not. 
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Figure 5-1 Differences in risk perception between employees who 
experienced a crisis situation and those who did not 
We see that those who experienced a crisis situation are sensitive to ‘Fires & 
leaks’ as well as the other employees, but they are much more concerned about 
‘Injuries & illness’, ‘Behavioural issues’, and problems with ‘Facilitating 
systems’. There might be a twofold explanation for this. Firstly, due to their 
crisis experience they have some kind of knowledge on how systems might 
break down, quite often by wrong manipulation and how this has an impact on 
personal injuries (4 out of 6 interviewees who witnessed a severe crisis situation 
at a previous job attributed these incidents to behavioural issues when dealing 
with systems that eventually lead to personal injuries). Secondly, it might be 
argued that these persons have a fairly good knowledge of the company’s 
procedures. As earlier indicated, these procedures predominantly focus on how 
to prevent systems’ failures and personal injuries, and thus give clear guidelines 
on safety behaviour. 
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Comparing the constructs that were offered by all the interviewees and those 
who experienced a crisis situation, the differences are less explicit. As Figure 5-
2 indicates, the employees who experienced a life-threatening crisis situation 
predominantly talk about ‘Human factors’ and ‘Plant & process related issues’, 
and less about ‘Tangible & non-tangible damage’ and ‘Organisational relation 
structures’. 
 
Figure 5-2 Differences in constructs between employees who experienced 
a crisis situation and those who did not 
This indicates that the employees who experienced a life-threatening crisis 
situation at a previous job have a different view of the actual risks in the 
organisation. Furthermore, these employees also acknowledge the importance 
of crisis experiences in their attitude versus risk at work. 
“That’s the big disadvantage here; we don’t face problems. Because 
nothing serious is happening here, no one has a sound knowledge of all 
the possible dangers on this plant. You do learn from your mistakes. But 
here, we don’t learn anything at all.” (Interviewee #26) 
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There is evidence in the field of fire-fighters’ trainings that by increasing the 
reality level of the exercises, for instance by experiencing a real ‘flashover’ (this 
is when the majority of an exposed surface in a space is heated to its auto-
ignition temperature and emits flammable gases. Flashovers normally occur at 
500 °C) in a simulator, fire-fighters’ practical knowledge and risk awareness will 
increase massively (Daniels, 2006; Baumann et al., 2011). Therefore it could be 
argued that heuristics of real life-threatening situations do indeed have an 
impact on employees’ risk perception.  
5.2.3 Different kind of communication 
To answer the question whether communication is the best tool to influence risk 
perceptions and encourage staff to be aware of safety and potential risks, we 
have to go back to the ‘research method and design’ section and the findings of 
the research. We know that the ZPT management team spends a lot of effort to 
disseminate the risk-alerting matrix among the staff. Safety meetings are 
regularly organised, and post-incident briefing sessions are part of daily routines 
(Gassco, 2009). But still, the data as presented in the findings, indicates that: 1) 
basically every individual in this organisation has his or her personal list of risks 
with high consequences, and 2) within each of the four ‘work groups’ at ZPT 
there is a high level of homogeneousness concerning the risk perceptions (in 
group), while the focus of risk perceptions within each group significantly differs.  
Concluding that communication has no effect at all on the individual risk 
perceptions is a bridge too far. Of course, all the ZPT-staff mentioned different 
risks, but the dominant risk was still in the domain of ‘Gas & leaks’, which is no 
surprise as this is directly linked to ZPT’s core business. However, it might be 
argued that the kind of communication that is used is not the most appropriate. 
Given the high degree of discrepancy between what the interviewees say and 
what ZPT disseminates, the question could be raised whether this 
organisation’s safety communication is merely based on distributing procedures 
and guidelines rather than engaging staff in a safety dialogue. In the high 
reliability theory (HRT), for instance, the focus is clearly on how organisations 
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can create mindful infrastructures that diminish or even postpone damage 
produced by unexpected events and impair reliable performance (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007). This concept of mindful infrastructures is based on employees’ 
behaviour and engagement in an organisation-wide safety debate. The five 
basic principles of HRT (early tracking of small failures, reluctance to 
oversimplification, remaining sensitive to operations, maintaining capabilities for 
resilience, and deference to expertise) are all rooted in an open dialogue on 
safety, where all staff can make sense of and give meaning to potential risks 
(Weick, 2005) and by doing so help the organisation to avoid failures.  
Therefore it could be argued that the more traditional the form of 
communication, i.e. the mere top-down transfer of risk information through 
procedures and guidelines, is not the most beneficial. To enforce risk 
perceptions among employees, with the aim of creating a safer work 
environment and protect the organisation against potential perils, it would be 
better to focus on an organisation-wide dialogue instead of relying on traditional 
communication tools.  
5.3 Contribution 
This research offers two significant contributions to theoretical knowledge. 
Firstly, it supports the concept of ‘equifinal meanings’ (Donnellon et al., 1986). 
My research indicates how all employees in one organisation have different 
interpretations of risks, but behave in ways that result in the desired safety 
record. Donnellon and her colleagues’ research design was based on discourse 
analysis of the interpretation of a single message and the respondents’ reported 
intention for action. Moreover, their study was based on students who acted as 
organisational members in a class setting. Therefore it might be argued that 
these findings were not generalizable beyond the student sample. According to 
Web of Knowledge, Donnellon et al.’s paper was cited 107 times, but none of 
these papers empirically tested or confirmed the concept of ‘equifinal 
meanings’. Furthermore, the concept of ‘equifinal meanings’ describes a 
phenomenon, but it gives no explanation why everyone in the organisation has 
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a different view while the outcome in behaviour is similar. My work indicates 
how every single individual in one organisation has a divergent perception of 
the actual risks, while the organisation itself operates in a safe way. 
A second contribution concerns support for the high reliability theory that argues 
for deference to expertise. Many empirical studies (Covello et al., 1987; Covello, 
1991; McCallum and Covello, 1989; Renn and Levine, 1991; Peters et al., 1997; 
Terpstra et al., 2009) indicate a fundamental divide between the perception of 
risk among lay people, on the one hand, and the way in which risk experts 
present risk information, on the other hand. These initial studies explored the 
role of the psychological decision processes at play in improving societal risk 
taking (Slovic et al., 2000). The Psychometric Model, a theoretical framework 
that aims to measure risk perception with traditional attitude questions and non-
traditional word association and scenario generation methods (Slovic, 2000) is 
still the dominant model to quantitatively analyse similarities and differences 
between lay and expert evaluations of risks (Slovic et al, 2002). However, this 
has not been tested in a tightly coupled and complex interactive organisation 
yet. My research findings, however, indicate that management (which might be 
seen as ‘the experts’ as this is the only team that has two engineers) indeed 
has a different perception of the present risks, but not one that is as broad as 
those of the operation supervisors. Hence, it supports an earlier remark linked 
to HRT (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) that expertise is situated on various levels in 
the organisation and not exclusively among ‘experts’. 
5.4 Recommendations for practice 
Based on the findings of this empirical research, it might be argued that the 
management team of ZPT undervalues the rich knowledge concerning risk that 
already exists in the organisation. By focusing on the ‘official’ risk domains, and 
by labelling them in four broad categories (Fires & leaks, Injuries & illness, 
Emissions, and Criminal acts), Gassco neglects a whole range of risks that are 
known among ZPT-staff. The possibility of acting that way, by neglecting these 
risks (25 element groups in total!), is that the employees will slowly but steadily 
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lose this knowledge and eventually might not pay attention to signals that warn 
them for certain risks. According to Weick, people fail “because they remember 
the name but not the substance of the originating experience. This means that 
whenever events occur that are beyond the reach of the labels that people do 
share, they will be the last to know about those events” (Weick, 2005: 401). 
Weick refers to past incidents at NASA due to a disconnection between the 
labels that were placed on certain risks, and the wrong interpretation and 
comprehension of those labels. In other words, neglecting employees’ risk 
perceptions might move them further away from their own impressions and 
experiences regarding actual risks in their organisation. 
Secondly, it is recommended to bring more expertise to the risk analysis 
process. The group of operation supervisors at ZPT has a more diverse view on 
the existing risks than any other group in the organisation. However, they were 
never consulted when the management team discussed the risk-alerting matrix 
(Gassco, 2009). In their seminal work on High Reliability Organisations, Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2007) advocate to be “sensitive to operations [as they] are 
attentive to the front line, where the real work gets done” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; p. 12). They also argue to give deference to expertise, as “decisions are 
made on the front line, and authority migrates to people with the most expertise, 
regardless of their rank” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 16). Therefore, it would 
be recommendable to ZPT’s management team to bring in the operation 
supervisory team’s knowledge and experience on preparing, designing and 
testing a revised risk-alerting matrix.  
Thirdly, it would be recommendable to promote attitudes of ‘healthy distrust’ in 
this organisation. In line with earlier findings in a similar organisation (Conchie 
and Donald, 2006), it could be argued that a system of checking and scepticism 
concerning actions among operation supervisors might be beneficial for a safer 
work environment. This type of ‘healthy distrust’ can also be found among air 
traffic controllers, and has proven to be pivotal for safe operations (Helmreich et 
al., 1999).  
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Finally, the impact of life-threatening crisis experiences on risk perceptions 
might advocate a different approach for crisis simulation exercises. Actual crisis 
exercises at ZPT take place only once a year, and are finished after two to three 
hours. Previous to the simulated crisis exercise, the operation supervisors’ team 
gets a half-day briefing about the scenario, the aim of the exercise and its 
pitfalls. This in no way resembles real incidents. But the general assumption is 
that ‘doing is learning’, and by going through a certain crisis scenario it helps 
the participants to prepare for the worst. However, the interviewees who 
experienced a real crisis situation explicitly indicated the difference between a 
simulated crisis and a real one: 
“Crisis exercises are fine, however, the reality is completely different. It’s 
so weird to see people react without applying what they learned in a 
training.” (Interviewee #13) 
Therefore it would be highly recommended to review the current crisis trainings 
and exercises, and turn them into more realistic experiences that help to 
increase risk and crisis awareness among all employees. Unannounced 
exercises, field trainings, and combined trainings with security services and first 
responders that last for at least 12 hours might be some areas for further 
improvement. 
5.5 Limitations  
Although this research, based on all the ZPT-staff’s individual risk perception, 
offers various findings and recommendations for further development, one has 
to take into account that it only reflects the current risk perceptions among ZPT 
staff. Depending on future events, be they in the company or on an individual 
level, these research findings might vary. Moreover, this research was focused 
on individual perceptions of risk, to evaluate perceptions and attitudes of 
individuals within an organisation (Harvey et al., 2002). However, by doing so, 
plausible collective perceptions were deliberately neglected.  
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Another way to approach this research could have been by looking at the data 
in aggregate form and group individuals according to their similarities. However, 
as no two individuals in this company mentioned identical risk elements nor the 
same constructs, I decided to analyse and interpret the data in terms of ‘work 
groups’ rather than just the individuals. 
This study was based on one single receiving terminal of Gassco: ZPT. 
Therefore, it might be argued that these findings are not generalizable beyond 
this single terminal, nor to the wider gas transport industry, nor to other tightly 
coupled and complex interactive organisations. However, I would suggest that 
there are aspects of what I have found which could sensitise other tightly 
coupled and complex interactive organisations in similar situations to the kinds 
of things that are important, such as giving deference to expertise, intensifying 
trainings, and valuing knowledge concerning risk that already exists in the 
organisation. 
5.6 Recommendations for further research 
This research indicates how different people in one organisation perceive 
various risks differently. By doing so, I have offered new insights to the concept 
of ‘equifinal meanings’, as described by Donnellon and her colleagues (1986), 
and supported a key insight of the HRO theory (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) 
concerning the deference to expertise at various levels in the organisation. 
Linking back to the literature on information processing systems (Dillon and 
Tinsley, 2008) the answer to the question why individuals’ view on risks differ, 
might be found in the way people process information in their System 1 and 2 
(Kahneman, 2011), based on biases and heuristics. However, answering the 
why question was not the aim of this research.  
Although we know that everyone in an organisation has a divergent view on 
risks, we do not have an answer to the question why the outcome in collective 
behaviour is similar either? In other words, how do individuals with various 
perceptions on organisational risks collectively achieve coordination of safety 
attitudes? Donnellon et al. (1986) did not answer this question as they just 
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described the phenomenon, but not the underlying process. In this organisation, 
which was the subject of this research, like in many other organisations 
managing high-risk processes, the management team aims to create and 
sustain safety by standardising processes, procedures and guidelines, and 
supervision. According to Gosling and Mintzberg, the dominant view on 
management is Cartesian, in which “action results from deliberate strategies, 
carefully planned, that unfold as systematically managed sequences of 
decisions” (Gosling and Mintzberg, 2003, p. 61). My research actually suggests 
that this coordination of safety management is created more through shared 
norms, values, and beliefs, which is at complete odds with the dominant view on 
organisational coordination. Moreover, the fact that similar findings come out of 
similar groups seems to indicate some collective effects. 
Therefore, the next research project (Part IV of this doctoral thesis) explores 
how these organisational members, while individually holding divergent 
perceptions on organisational risks, collectively achieve a coordination of safety. 
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PART IV: PROJECT 3 – EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
ABSTRACT 
The dissemination of safety procedures and guidelines is perceived as pivotal to 
keep organisations managing high-risk technologies incident free. The role of 
clear communication is seen as essential in transferring these procedures and 
guidelines. However, the previous empirical research project in a gas-receiving 
terminal indicates how every single individual in that organisation holds 
divergent perceptions of the present risks. This suggests that transmitting 
information through various forms of communication fails to create a uniform 
perceived interpretation of the potential risks in an organisation. Hence, these 
variable risk perceptions might actually endanger safe operations. 
On the other hand, the gas terminal that was the subject of this empirical 
research has been operating accident-free for more than twenty years. This is 
at odds with the average number of fatal accident rates in onshore gas 
companies. Therefore it might be argued that this gas-receiving terminal 
achieves some form of coordinated safety behaviour, based on a differing way 
of relating within the organisation. In an attempt to uncover these safety 
attitudes, this research project explores the interactive processes between all 
staff. Based on Social Network Analysis and qualitative interviews it indicates 
how the ongoing conversations about safety and risk avoidant behaviour 
constitute a safety culture in this gas-receiving terminal. Furthermore, it adds 
fundamental new insights to the existing knowledge in the field of 
‘communication constitutes organisation’ research (CCO), and more specifically 
to the use of CCO in organisations managing high-risk technologies. Finally, 
recommendations for practice and viable directions for further research have 
been indicated.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Individuals perceive risks differently 
The premise for my previous research project (see Part III) was that 
communication by the top management team creates risk awareness and safety 
behaviour in an organisation managing high-risk technologies. By 
communicating standard operating procedures, guidelines, and standardised 
processes, a management team aims to supervise behaviour. One of the main 
findings of that research is that despite the clear communication of potential 
risks and required risk aversive measures, each individual in that specific gas-
receiving terminal has a divergent perception of the present risks in their 
organisation. No two individuals in that organisation share exactly the same risk 
perceptions. There might be two interpretations for this finding. The first, a 
rather negative one, is that this gas receiving terminal is a very dangerous place 
to be as all the employees (including management) have divergent 
interpretations of the potential risks linked to their operations. A second, more 
balanced one, is that the combination of various risk perceptions is exactly what 
makes this plant a safer place to be, as the reasoning goes that two or more 
individuals when working together see more potential danger than one 
individual. Still, it also indicates that the communication of safety procedures 
and guidelines apparently does not result in consistent risk perceptions among 
all employees. 
Before jumping to preliminary conclusions concerning the safety level of this 
gas-receiving terminal, we have to take into account that this plant has never 
faced a crisis situation over the last 20 years. It might be argued that one can 
be lucky for a couple of years, but maintaining incident-free operations for over 
20 years is not a question of luck. It indicates some kind of well-coordinated 
safe operations.  
Therefore, the question for this research is: how do people in an organisation 
managing high-risk processes maintain safe operations? 
 227 
1.2 Mutual adjustment 
Thus, the question that could be raised is how these safe operations are 
achieved? If it is not the communication of procedures and guidelines that 
shapes consistent risk perceptions, what is it that keeps this organisation safe? 
This question implies a form of collective behaviour and awareness regarding 
risks and risk aversive behaviour, rather than an individual appreciation of 
potential risks.  
According to Mintzberg (1993), collective behaviour can be achieved through 
five coordinating mechanisms in organisations:  
1. Mutual adjustment, 
2. Direct supervision, 
3. Standardisation of work processes, 
4. Standardisation of outputs, 
5. Standardisation of input skills. 
This list seems a bit odd as three coordinating mechanisms are based on 
standardisations and one key component is about one person giving orders or 
instructions to several others, while the mutual adjustment mechanism is about 
achieving coordination through the simple process of informal communication. 
The latter is almost contradictory to the direct supervision mechanisms as an 
informal communication between two or more employees is intrinsically not 
verifiable behaviour that can be adjusted by direct supervision. Mintzberg 
argues that it has nothing to do with control, but is “merely an indication of the 
need to maintain a small face-to-face work group to encourage mutual 
adjustment when the work is complex and interdependent” (Mintzberg, 1993; p. 
69). 
According to Denyer and his colleagues, ‘mutual adjustment’ is achieved when 
two or more parties talk in real time and by doing so change the situation 
through communication (Denyer et al., 2011). In that perspective 
communication has to be seen as an interactive process that adjusts 
organisational behaviour, rather than a top-down tool for transferring guidelines 
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and standardised procedures. In other words, we have to make a distinction 
between communication as “instances of talk and message exchange that 
happen in certain contexts” (Koschmann, 2010; p. 432) and communication as 
a distinct mode of explanation (Deetz, 2009) for coordinated behaviour. 
In an attempt to combine the views of Mintzberg (1993) and Denyer et al. 
(2011), it might be argued that in order to have a real time conversation in a 
complex work environment that changes the situation, the work process itself 
has to be designed in a way to ensure the required skills and knowledge to 
mutually adjust are present, as well as the structure in which this interactive 
coordinated process can happen. Although Mintzburg contends, “the work 
processes themselves […] can be designed to meet predetermined standards” 
(Mintzburg, 1993; p. 5), still, the act of adjusting work processes itself requires 
some sort of communication. 
1.3 High Reliability Organisations as theoretical source 
The theory of High Reliability Organisations (HRO) emerged in the 1980s when 
scholars from the Berkeley campus of the University of California (the so-called 
‘Berkeley group’) studied how organisations operating with ‘high hazard’ 
technologies manage to remain accident-free for impressive lengths of time 
while meeting high production goals (Denyer et al., 2008; Shrivastava et al., 
2009). HRO focuses on how organisations can create “mindful infrastructures 
that diminish or even postpone damage produced by unexpected events and 
impair reliable performance” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 2). Supporters of 
HRO argue that organisations can avoid failure by the early tracking of small 
failures, reluctance to oversimplification, remaining sensitive to operations, 
maintaining capabilities for resilience, and by deference to expertise. High-
reliability theorists emphasise the human errors school of thought (Reason, 
1997), which suggest that failures can be attributed to people.  
For this research, the work on high reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007) has been taken as the main theoretical source. HROs rely on five basic 
principles, whereas the first three have to do with anticipation (preoccupation 
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with failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations), while the latter 
two look at containment (commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise). 
The principles of anticipation “focus on the prevention of disruptive unexpected 
events” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 64). It is all about capturing early signals 
of unexpected or unwanted events, having the right diagnosis of these signals, 
and transforming that diagnosis into meaningful actions in a specific context. In 
other words, anticipation aims to prevent an organisation from unwanted 
events. The two principles of containment on the other hand “aim to prevent 
unwanted outcomes after an unexpected event has occurred rather than to 
prevent the unexpected event itself” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 65). It helps 
HROs to react in a way that reduces unwanted outcomes after an unexpected 
event occurred. In that perspective, resilience is all about “large and varied 
response repertoires, competence in reassembling existing practices into new 
combinations, intense sharing of information, and a well-developed ability to 
maintain emotional control in the face of chaos” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
81). Responding to unexpected events also requires decision making that is 
based on expertise rather than organisational ranks. Therefore, Weick and 
Sutcliffe recommend decoupling authority and expertise, as the latter “resides 
as much in relationships as in individuals, meaning that interrelationships, 
interactions, conversations, and networks embody it” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; p. 82). 
However, simply applying the various principles that support these two 
dimensions are no guarantee for high reliable operations. According to Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2007) there is an overarching prerequisite for achieving high 
reliable organising, which is ‘mindful organising’. Mindful organising supports a 
different mindset about the things that can bring an organisation into jeopardy. It 
is about a set of attitudes and conceptions, such as “human alertness, 
experience, skill, deference, communication, paradoxical action, boldness, and 
caution” (Weick et al., 1999; p. 102) that aim to foresee the unforeseeable. In an 
attempt to do so, Weick and Sutcliffe’s advice is to reinvent the wheel every 
chance you get, as “you’re a slightly different person from the last time you 
reinvented the wheel” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 149). This attitude of 
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mindful organising encourages organisational members to detect flaws or minor 
mistakes that they may have missed before, and by doing so it prevents an 
organisation from unwanted events. Hence, it describes a corporate culture in 
which safety values and expectations about risk aversive behaviour and early 
(mindful) detections of flaws is encouraged. In an attempt to install and maintain 
this corporate culture, Weick and Sutcliffe denote five elements that have to be 
put in place as a prerequisite for producing a culture of mindful organising. 
These elements are: thinking differently about 1) success, 2) simplification, 3) 
strategy, 4) plans, and 5) authority (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 148). 
Following from these theoretical conjectures, I will examine how safety 
behaviour is achieved in a high reliability organisation, whether the work 
process or its structure is designed in a specific way, and the distinct role of 
mutual adjustment in this context. In the next chapter I will explore some of the 
literature that focuses on the communicative role in this adjusting work process.  
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2 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the question could be raised whether it is 
the communicative transfer of risk information that is keeping an organisation 
safe, or something else that has little to do with this type of safety 
communication. The aforementioned form of an informational view of 
communication is rooted in a view of communication that expresses 
organisational realities (Ashcraft et al., 2009), one that perceives 
communication as a mere tool to support management practices in 
organisations. Axley (1984) describes this type of communication as a 
transmission model, a linear transmission process from sender to receiver and 
from receiver to sender in a cycle of message production, transfer, and 
reception. In this view communication does not create reality, it is a question of 
transferring information of already formed realities to one another (Ashcraft et 
al., 2009).  
Although scholars have approached organisations as social phenomena using 
language, interactions, symbols and sensemaking (Putnam and Nicotera, 
2009), and thus a phenomenon in which communication is crucial for 
organising, the research on how communication generates organisational 
realities (Ashcraft et al., 2009) is a more recent endeavour (Putnam and 
Nicotera, 2009). In the last decade, multiple scholars (for an overview see 
Blaschke et al., 2012; p. 880-881) aim to address “how complex communication 
processes constitute both organising and organisation and how these 
processes and outcomes reflexively shape communication” (Putnam and 
Nicotera, 2010; p. 159).  
This divide between a transmission view and a constitutive view of 
communication is rooted in the distinctive attributed roles of communication in 
the ontology of an organisation. On the one hand, the constitutive view 
perceives ‘organisation-as-verb’ (process/doing), while the transmission view 
distinguishes ‘organisation-as-noun’ (entity/being) (Putnam and Nicotera, 2010; 
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p. 159). This divide between verb and noun, between process and entity, is 
linked to the ontological perspective of organisations, where the latter has a 
realistic perspective and the former an interpretivist view of organisations.  
As the process view focuses on how organisations are doing things and how it 
“creates elements and communicative processes that produce organising and 
organisation” (Putnam and Nicotera, 2010; p. 160), I will approach my topic of 
maintaining safe operations from a process ontological point of view, more 
specifically in the following two domains: 1) the way it looks at organisation-as-
verb, and 2) the way it looks at communication-as-verb. 
Therefore, over the next sections I will summarise some of the main 
perspectives in the existing literature on Process Organisation Studies, and the 
concept of Communication Constitutes Organisations, and link each to the 
aforementioned domains.  
2.2 Process ontology and organisations 
Process Organisation Studies are rooted in an interpretivist thinking of 
organising and organisations as being in flux, in a continual process of 
becoming, where organisations are viewed as processes “in the making” 
(Hernes, 2007). In other words, Process Organisation Studies are exploring 
evolving phenomena in organisations, rooted in an array of processes and not 
in abstract structures (Putnam et al., 2010). It does not deny the existence of 
events or states, but it insists on how activities and interactions in an event 
contribute to the constitution of further processes. Therefore, Process 
Organisation Studies prefer to focus on inter-actions to analyse self-standing 
actions (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010).  
These Process Organisation Studies are in contrast with the substance view of 
organising and organisations, whereas organisations are perceived as “things 
made” (Hernes, 2007). This division into two non-overlapping visions, 
(substance versus process) might be best summarised as follows: 
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- The substance view: an organisation exists by the grace of structures, 
guidelines, and basic functions, and although it implements processes 
these do not change the substance of the organisation,  
- The process view: an organisation is created by people and thus the 
unique product of interpretations, consultations, and the interaction 
process among its members. 
Both views are in line with Putnam and Nicotera’s (2010) interpretation of 
‘organisation-as-verb’ (process view), and ‘organisation-as-noun’ (substance 
view). This dichotomy between substance and process is also reflected in the 
literature on organisational communication, whereas the substance view 
perceives communication as “the flow of information from one person to 
another” (Dainton and Zelly, 2011; p. 2), the process view defines 
communication as “the process by which people interactively create, sustain, 
and manage meaning” (Conrad and Poole, 1998; p. iv). 
2.3 Process ontology and communication 
In the field of Process Organisation Studies there is an emphasis on “narrative 
forms of knowing” which incorporates linkages between experienced events 
over time and gives meaning to particular new organisational events (Langley 
and Tsoukas, 2010). This notion of incorporating linkages and giving meaning is 
achieved when two or more people’s interactions involve existing metaphors-in-
use (Axley, 1984) to set up organisation-wide dialogues on new and future 
events. By doing so, they create, sustain and manage meaning (Conrad and 
Poole, 1998) through some kind of mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1993).  
This communicative approach in Process Organisation Studies focuses on how 
‘communication constitutes organisations’ or ‘CCO’ (for an overview on the 
CCO perspective in organisation studies, see: Blaschke et al, 2012). CCO 
draws on the view of organisations as “networks of conversations” (Ford, 1999; 
p. 485), where through “telephone calls, meetings, planning sessions, sales 
talks, and corridor conversations […] people inform, amuse, update, gossip, 
review, reassess, reason, instruct, revise, argue, debate, contest, and actually 
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constitute the moments, myths and, through time, the very structuring of the 
organization” (Boden, 1994, p.6). In other words, communication is perceived 
as central to the social construction of the organisation’s reality (Hübner, 2007) 
as it takes an active stance in that mutual interactive process.  
CCO differs from the ‘informational view of communication’, the focus is on 
expression and the process is a straightforward transfer of information 
(Koschmann, 2013). It perceives organisations “as” communication, opposed to 
communication that happens “within” organisations. Instead of viewing 
communication as merely the transfer of information, this approach sees 
communication as the fundamental process that shapes our social reality, a 
rather complex process of continually creating and negotiating the meanings 
and interpretations that shape our lives (Koschmann, 2012). Therefore, this 
approach is more a ‘constitutive view of communication’ as it creates our social 
world.  
This constitutive view of communication might provide an answer to how 
organisational members obtain collective coordinated behaviour. Although 
getting the right information to everyone in a high-risk organisation is absolutely 
critical, it still does not mean that all those people interpret that information in 
the same way. Therefore, studying the informative communication process in an 
organisation, such as transmitting data between senders and receivers, merely 
discloses part of a complex mutual interactive process of creating, sustaining, 
and managing meaning (Conrad and Poole, 1998) among organisational 
members.  
To conclude, based on the interpretation of the literature, it might be argued that 
through mutual adjustment, organisational members create and transform their 
organisation in order to solve exceptions and problems, and through these 
communicative, and thus social, interactions they obtain coordinated behaviour 
Following from this my research sets out to examine how maintaining safe 
operations is achieved in an organisation managing high-risk processes, and 
the distinct role of mutual adjustments in this context.  
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3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
In the previous chapter I indicated the theoretical rationale for gaining more 
insights how communication constitutes organisations. In this section I will 
explain the research methodology and the design I used for uncovering how 
CCO is represented in an organisation managing high risks. The findings of this 
empirical research will be discussed in chapter 4 of this Part IV.  
3.1 Introduction 
According to many scholars who have adopted the CCO perspective, 
organisations are networks of communication episodes, conversations, or texts 
(Blaschke et al., 2012). To uncover these networks, the research has to be 
designed in a way that uncovers how these interactions play in an organisation, 
who interacts with whom, and how it unfolds. One potentially suitable method 
for uncovering these collective interactive processes in a particular organisation 
is social network analysis (SNA). A ‘social network’ refers to “the set of actors 
and the ties among them” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; p. 9). The theoretical 
basis for SNA lies in the social cognitive view on organisations, whereas 
“organisations and environments are reconceptualised as cognitions in the 
minds of participants” (Ibarra et al., 2005; p. 365). In other words, organisations 
are perceived as complex relational systems where individuals’ positions within 
that network may affect both perceptions and their sensemaking of nodes and 
relationships (Ibarra et al., 2005). These ties or relationships among various 
actors depict the structure of a group. The analysis of such a structure might 
uncover “the functioning of the group and/or the influence of this structure on 
individuals within the group” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; p. 9).  
In an attempt to describe SNA, Kadushin used the metaphor of a traffic 
helicopter: “It is like being stuck in a traffic jam surrounded by cars and trucks. 
The traffic helicopter can see beyond our immediate surroundings and suggest 
routes that might extricate us […] It allows us to see beyond our immediate 
circle” (Kadushin, 2012; p. 4). 
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According to Wasserman and Faust (1994) SNA is not only about dyads, triads, 
or subgroups, it is also about “the ability to model the relationships among 
systems of actors” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; p. 19). Whereas a system has 
to be seen as the ties among members of some group, and a group as “a finite 
set of actors who for conceptual, theoretical, or empirical reasons are treated as 
a finite set of individuals on which network measurements are made” 
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994; p. 19). Although SNA seeks to understand the 
relationships and dynamics between individuals in organisations, it is essential 
to bring in the role of individuals in social network analysis as they “account for 
micro-foundations of structural research” (Kilduff and Krackhardt, 1994; p. 88). 
By doing so, I avoid looking at organisations as the sum of its individual parts, 
but look more at the interrelating intensions and perceptions that lead to 
collectively maintaining safe operations.  
Therefore, the questions in the research process aim for the relations between 
individuals, and the individual and collective perceptions. The result will be more 
than collective constructs on risk and safety perceptions, but rather how people 
in an organisation interrelate with regard to safety and risk awareness. The 
objective is to identify the patterns of interrelating and collective mindful 
organising (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and by doing 
so bring the questions to an individual level, to see how they actually have an 
effect on safety attitudes. The questions that will be asked focus partly on the 
social networks on the one hand, and at what they do and how they contribute 
to mindful organising on the other hand.  
3.2 Subject of research 
The Belgian receiving gas terminal of Norwegian gas transport company 
Gassco AS was selected for this research. It was also the unit of analysis in my 
previous empirical research project (P2). Therefore, I will briefly describe the 
characteristics of this Belgian Gassco branch. More details on organisational 
structures, production process, etc., can be found in the previous section of this 
doctoral thesis (see Part III, pages 181-183). Gassco AS is a Norwegian state-
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owned gas transport company with headquarters and a central operation control 
room in Bygnes (Norway). Gassco has four EU receiving terminals in Germany 
(Dornum and Emden), Belgium (Zeebrugge), and France (Dunkirk), and two UK 
receiving terminals in St. Fergus, and Easington. In total, Gassco AS employs 
353 staff. The Belgian receiving terminal, which is located in the port of 
Zeebrugge, handles the total volume of gas that is transported through a 40” 
pipe (the so-called ‘Zeepipe’), with a flow rate of 42 million Nm3 per day11. This 
terminal remotely controls Gassco’s French receiving terminal in Dunkirk, which 
is responsible for all the Norwegian gas that arrives through the so-called 
‘Franpipe’ (42” pipe), with a flow rate of 54 million Nm3 per day. The Belgian 
and French receiving gas terminals jointly handle 26% of the Norwegian gas 
export (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, 2012). All staff of Gassco’s receiving terminal in Zeebrugge, 
referred to as ‘Zeepipe Terminal’ or ‘ZPT’, are the subject of my research. 
Since 2008, I have worked as a consultant for ZPT in the field of risk and crisis 
management. My company contributed to their emergency plans (both for 
Belgium and France), and we have run multiple safety trainings and crisis 
exercises. These experiences offer me a good view of the organisation’s safety 
culture, strengths and weaknesses, which according to Roberts and Rousseau 
(1989) is a prerequisite for conducting research in organisations managing high 
risk processes. “Frequent and often long-term interactions among researchers, 
designers, operators, and managers are important if any real understanding of 
high-reliability organizations is to be obtained […] A well specified research 
project can emerge only after the researcher has sufficient training in the ways 
of the organization” (Roberts and Rousseau, 1989; p. 134).  
3.3 Sample 
The total number of staff at the Belgian receiving terminal of Gassco in 
Zeebrugge (ZPT) is 30; 4 women and 26 men. This is one full time staff 
                                            
11 Nm3 stands for ‘Normal cubic meter’ and is a common unit used in the industry to refer to gas 
emissions exchange. It always depends on the individual circumstances of each gas, pressure, 
and use. 
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member extra compared to early 2012 (when the previous research, as 
described in Part III of this document, was executed). Between 31 January 2013 
and 13 March 2013, 28 individual interviews were held at the premises of ZPT. 
Two staff members were not included in the interviews as they were on long-
term sick leave. All face-to-face interviews were executed in Dutch, the 
employees’ native language. Each individual interview took approximately 20 
minutes and was digitally recorded. Every interview was attended by Eline 
Claerhout, a master-after-master student in Organisational Communication at 
the University of Leuven (Belgium). Eline was doing an internship at my 
company. She took notes, observed the interviewees, and took part in the 
internal discussions concerning the interpretation of the data.  
The table below (Table 3-1) gives an overview of the basic characteristics of the 
interviewees as on 31 March 2013. 
Division n (men) n (women) Age Years with Gassco 
   (mean)  (mean) 
Management: 4 0 45.50 16.25 
Administration: 2 2 41.00 13.00 
Operation Supervisors: 15 0 41.86 13.03 
Maintenance: 5 0 50.40 16.00 
Table 3-1 Overview of interviewees at ZPT 
 
3.4 Research design 
According to Blaschke and his colleagues (2012), the range of methodologies to 
analyse the relationship between communication and organisation is rather 
limited. Although the CCO perspective has been well theorised over the last two 
decades, it still faces methodological challenges in the empirical study of these 
processes (Putnam and Nicotera, 2010).  
Based on a review of the CCO literature, Blaschke, Schoeneborn and Seidl 
(2012) extracted three main requirements that need to be met to research “the 
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connectivity between interactions that constitute organisations as ongoing 
processes of communication” (Blaschke et al., 2012; p. 884):  
1. the constitutive character of communication is fundamental to CCO 
thinking, therefore network analysis is suitable for the CCO perspective 
only if it treats communication as constitutive of organisation,  
2. communication processes cannot be completely and intentionally 
determined by individual actors, therefore network analysis needs to 
account for the emergent and not fully determinable character of 
communication and thus of organisation,  
3. to underline the fundamentally processual character of communication, 
organisations have to ensure that they perpetuate their communication, if 
they are not to disappear altogether. In other words, every 
communication event calls forth and is linked to further communication 
events, which form and reform the organisation over time.  
These arguments substantiate my decision to use network analysis to examine 
the communicative processes that constitute safe operations at ZPT. 
Besides the data I acquired through social network analysis, I made use of 
three other sets of data to analyse the underlying processes: 
- qualitative data from the semi-structured interviews during the SNA-
process and in six interviews that were executed after the analysis of the 
SNA-data. This allowed me to place the indicated links between the 
interviewee and his or her colleague in a broader context, 
- ethnographical data from attending management and safety meetings, in 
order to examine the coordinated behaviour in action, 
- archival data from brochures, DVDs, and ZPT’s internal documents, in 
order to have a broader understanding of the past courses and trainings, 
and to understand the roots of some current procedures and guidelines. 
3.4.1 Questionnaire 
As explained in the first chapter of this part of the doctoral thesis (see: Part IV, 
“1.3 High Reliability Organisations as theoretical source”), the work on high 
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reliability organisations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) was used as the main 
theoretical source for this research project. Therefore, the questionnaire that 
was used for the network analysis was based on the five principles of high 
reliability organisations as described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), 
supplemented by questions based on findings from my previous empirical 
research projects (P1 and P2). This questionnaire, as presented in table 3.2, 
has been submitted and approved by the supervisory panel prior to the 
interviews at ZPT.  
#Q Question Rationale Reference 
1 
 
Who would you be willing to report 
a mistake to? 
Who would report a mistake to 
you? 
A. What is the nature of their 
relationship with you?  
HRO Principle 1: 
Preoccupation with failure 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
9-10 
2 Who more clearly articulates the 
dangers/risks in this organisation? 
A. How do they do that? 
HRO Principle 2: 
Reluctance to simplify 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
10-12 
3 Who in a hierarchical position 
spends time with individuals down 
in operations? 
HRO Principle 3: 
Sensitivity to operations 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
12-14 
4 Who in this organisation works 
hardest to maintain normal 
operations? 
A. How do they do that? 
HRO Principle 4: 
Commitment to resilience 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
14-15 
5 Who would you turn to for support if 
faced with a work problem?  
Who would turn to you for support 
when facing a work problem 
A. Why? 
HRO Principle 5: 
Deference to expertise 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 
15-17 
6 Who would you turn to for a 
personal problem? 
Who don’t you go to?  
A. Why? 
Probing for trust in the 
relationships 
P2. 
7 Who do you talk to about safety 
generally? 
Who don’t you talk to about safety? 
A. Why? 
B. Are there particular 
groupings in this 
organisation?  
C. Which ones? 
Probing for shared values 
and norms concerning 
safety in the same group 
P2. 
8 Who shares the same safety 
attitudes/behaviour in this 
organisation? 
A. What are these attitudes? 
B. Are there different attitudes 
for different groupings? 
Probing for equifinal 
meanings concerning 
safety 
P2 + Donnellon et al., 
1986 
9 In the case of a crisis situation, who Probing for expertise in P2 + Daniels, 2006; 
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has the experience to take the 
actions that need to be taken? 
real-life crisis situations Baumann et al., 2011 
10 Who do you talk to when you have 
a safety issue or when you see an 
unsafe situation? 
Who talks to you when they have a 
safety issue or when they see an 
unsafe situation? 
A. Does it vary with the nature 
of the situation? 
Probing for broad risk 
perceptions beyond the 
official risk matrix 
P2 + Weick, 2005; p. 401 
11 Who do you need to manage when 
it comes to execute safe operations 
at work? 
Who would manage you when it 
comes to execute safe operations 
at work? 
A. Why? 
B. What is their formal / 
informal relationship to 
you? 
Probing for “healthy 
distrust” 
P2 + Conchie and 
Donald, 2006 
12 Who do you socialise with outside 
of work? 
Probing for trust in the 
relationships 
P2. 
13 Who listens to you when it comes 
to accepting orders concerning 
safety measures? 
Who do you listen to when it comes 
to accepting orders concerning 
safety measures? 
A. Does it vary? 
B. Why? 
Probing for leadership 
through expertise 
P1 + Weick & Sutcliffe, 
2007 
Table 3-2 Questionnaire for SNA interviews at ZPT 
The additional questions, indicated in italic as “A”, “B”, or “C” have been treated 
as open-ended qualitative questions to achieve a better understanding of the 
relationships indicated by the interviewees and their attitude towards mindful 
organising.  
3.4.2 Pilot 
Prior to this SNA-research project at ZPT, pilot interviews were held with 
colleagues at my own company. These interviews took place on January 2013. 
The objective of this pilot was twofold: 1) a simple check whether the SNA-
questions made sense and were well understood by the interviewees, and 2) to 
get a feel of the usefulness of answers on the quantitative questions. Based on 
the outcome of this pilot, one question was eliminated from the initial 
questionnaire (question number 8) and several questions were slightly adapted. 
Table 3.3 shows the updated questionnaire after the pilot interviews. 
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#Q Question 
1.1 Imagine you made a mistake (with little or no impact on the organisation), who would 
you report that mistake to? 
1.2 Imagine someone made a mistake (with little or no impact on the organisation), who 
would report that mistake to you? 
2 Who in this organisation is most likely to initiate discussions about safety and risks? 
3 Who in the management team spends frequent time with staff on the shop floor? 
4 Who in this organisation works hardest to maintain normal operations? 
5.1 Who would you turn to when faced with a work problem? 
5.2 Who would turn to you when faced with a work problem? 
6.1 Who would you turn to for a personal problem? 
6.2 Who don’t you go to? 
7.1 Who do you talk to about safety? 
7.2 Who don’t you talk to about safety? 
9 In case of a crisis situation, who has the experience to take the actions that need to be 
taken? 
10.1 Who do you inform when you have a safety issue or when you see an unsafe 
situation? 
10.2 Who informs you when they have a safety issue or when they see an unsafe situation? 
11.1 Who do you need to check when it comes to executing safe operations at work? 
11.2 Who would check you when it comes to executing safe operations at work? 
12 Who do you socialise with outside of work? 
13.1 Who deserves your respect when it comes to safety measures?  
13.2 Who does not deserve your respect when it comes to safety measures?  
Table 3-3 Adapted questionnaire for SNA interviews after pilot 
All of these questions were asked to each ZPT-employee, and all the data was 
captured and analysed. In the next chapter (see: “4 Findings”) I will separately 
discuss both HRO dimensions (anticipation and containment), the elements of 
mindful organising, and the questions relating to trusted social relationships, 
based on the maps and tables that emerged from all the data analysis. 
3.4.3 Additional interviews and observations 
In a second wave, at the end of April 2013 and the beginning of May 2013, I 
interviewed 6 employees for a second time. These individual interviews were 
more a kind of triangulation process where I showed every participant the 
various maps and subsequently checked for their experiences and 
interpretation of the data. This approach is in line with O’Donoghue and Punch’s 
interpretation of triangulation as a “method of cross-checking data from multiple 
sources to search for regularities in the research data” (O’Donoghue and 
Punch, 2003; p. 78). It was also a subtle approach to sense whether my initial 
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interpretation of the data was in line with their day-to-day experiences. The 
selection criteria for the six interviewees were based on the following rationale: 
From the results of P2, I selected two groups: 1) the (6) employees who 
experienced a crisis situation in a previous workplace, and 2) the (8) employees 
who have worked less than 9 years at ZPT. I selected the latter group, as they 
did not participate in a Safe Behaviour Programme in Norway in 2004. In the 
introduction section of the following chapter (‘4.1 Introduction’) I will explain in 
detail the objectives and content of this Safe Behaviour Programme.  
I then selected the most and the least dominant person from each group as 
represented in the various maps (2 with a crisis experience, and two with less 
than 9 years of work experience at ZPT). I then made sure I had various 
positions in this second round of interviews (maintenance, operation 
supervisors, and adjunct operation supervisors). Complementary to these four 
interviewees I interviewed the CEO and the HSEQ manager, with the same 
purpose: to check their interpretation of the data, and to sense whether my 
interpretation of the data was in line with their experiences. 
Finally, I attended a Morning Safety Briefing and a Management Meeting at 
ZPT. The Morning Safety Briefing is partly a formal hand-over of the night shift 
operations to the day shift. On the other hand, all maintenance and operations 
staff, operations manager and safety manager review all operational issues, 
minor deficiencies, and other points of interest of the past 24 hours. The 
Management Meeting is a daily formal encounter of all members of the 
management team and the head of accounting. Every morning, it starts with a 
quote from Steven Covey’s Inspiration Calendar, the CEO’s personal reflection 
of this quote and his appeal to those present to reflect on company issues that 
relate to Covey’s quote. They then systematically discuss various topics, 
divided over 10 themes (such as: ongoing works today, notifications, finance, 
inspections, etc.). Both meetings last about 45 minutes each. 
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3.4.4 Analysis of the results 
The SNA data was analysed with UCINET 6, a software package designed for 
the analysis of social network data. Intermediate results were discussed with my 
supervisor and the panel chair (on 13 March 2013) to evaluate the appropriate 
method for analysis and the initial findings. These results will be offered in the 
next chapter (see: “4 Findings”).  
The qualitative data, captured through the open-ended questions and in the 
second round of interviews with a number of individuals at ZPT, as well as the 
observation notes of the various meetings I attended, have been transcribed 
and then analysed with Dedoose-software. In that process, two distinct sets of 
codes were used: the elements for producing a culture of mindful organising as 
described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007, p. 148), and a set of attitudes that aim 
to foresee the unforeseeable (Weick et al., 1999; p. 105-106). These elements 
and the results of the analysis will be explained and discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter (see: “4.7 Mindful organising”). It is worth mentioning that 
Dedoose-software was used in multiple publications (see for instance: Hay et 
al., 2008; Lieber et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2010; Tshuma et al., 2012), and was 
indicated in the Journal of Ethnographic and Qualitative Research as valuable 
for mixing qualitative and quantitative methods (Lieber, 2009). 
3.4.5 Ethical approval 
An ethical approval was asked and approved by the committee at Cranfield 
University, School of Management. Each interviewee was fully informed about 
the objectives of the research, their freedom of participation, and the 
confidential character of the interviews. 
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4 FINDINGS 
In this chapter I will present the findings that came out of the Social Network 
Analysis at ZPT and the qualitative interviews and observations. Social 
networks connote complex sets of relationships between members of social 
systems, and in this research it indicates the extent to which different nodes 
(indicating ZPT employees) form ties with similar versus dissimilar others 
concerning HRO issues. More specifically, it indicates who is linked, in a formal 
or informal way, to whom when it comes to various safety related issues at ZPT. 
The ties between two or more actors indicate a link concerning a specific topic 
that was raised in a question. Sometimes these ties can be reciprocal (when 
two actors refer to each other), transitive (when A refers to B, B to C, and C to 
D, such as in an hierarchical situation for instance), or simply referable (when 
one actor is referring to one or more actors). 
In the various maps presented in this chapter, the centrality of the nodes on the 
map refers to a group of metrics that aim to quantify the ‘importance’ or 
‘influence’ of particular actors within the network. The more central, the more 
‘degree centrality’, which is defined as the number of ties a node has. Also 
presented in the next sections are ‘In Degree’ and ‘Out Degree-ties. ‘In Degree’ 
stands for the number of times a person is referred to by others, while the ‘Out 
Degree’ indicates the number of times one person refers to others. These in 
and out degrees will be presented in those cases where it might be insightful to 
have a clearer view on how many times a specific person points to his/her 
colleague, or is indicated by his/her colleagues. 
In referring to my data in the next sections, the following abbreviations are used: 
- ADM: member of the administration team 
- AOS: member of the adjunct operations supervising team 
- C: contractor (not specified, thus every none-Gassco employee) 
- MNG: member of the management team 
- MT: member of the maintenance team 
- OS: member of the operations supervising team 
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The numbers behind the abbreviations indicate a person in that specific team. 
For confidentiality reasons, the names have been masked. 
Throughout this chapter I have used italics for a specific purpose. This is to 
signify that interviewees have expressed quotes or words that I have italicised.  
First of all, I will indicate how the various questions that were raised in the social 
network analysis were probing for more clarification concerning the two HRO 
dimensions (anticipation and containment) and trusted social relationships. I will 
then elaborate on how the elements of mindful organising were captured 
through the qualitative interviews and observations. 
4.1 Structuring of the data 
All ZPT employees were asked the 12 questions (as presented in Table 3-3 on 
page 242). The first five questions are all linked to the HRO principles (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007), whereas the other seven questions are linked to findings 
and/or assumptions that were made in the previous research projects (P1 and 
P2). However, most of these findings or assumptions are linked to one of the 
five HRO principles as well. According to Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), the five 
HRO principles have to be broken down into principles that refer to anticipation 
of harmful events and principles that refer to containment of harmful events (see 
also: “1.3 High Reliability Organisations as theoretical source” on page 228).  
Therefore, the various questions were attributed to the two dominant groups – 
anticipation and containment – and its findings will be discussed according to 
these two distinctions, not according to the individual principles. Two questions 
that probe for trusted social relationships (questions 6 and 12) relate to the 
findings of the previous research project (P2), and its findings will be discussed 
separately as well. An overview of the various questions, linked to the two 
dimensions of HRO and the social relationships are illustrated in the table below 
(Table 4-1). 
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Table 4-1 Questions linking the two HRO dimensions and P2 
Over the next sections I will separately discuss both HRO dimensions 
(anticipation and containment), and the questions relating to social 
relationships, based on the maps and tables that emerged from the social 
network analysis data. In an attempt to evaluate the elements of mindful 
organising at ZPT, I will discuss the collected qualitative data in a final separate 
section (see: “4.7 Mindful organising”). The qualitative data was collected on 
three occasions: 1) during the social network analysis: I raised various open-
ended questions for more clarification concerning the interviewees’ answers, 2) 
multiple meetings (such as: Morning Safety Briefings, and a Management 
Meeting), and 3) after I finished all the social network analysis interviews, I went 
back to a number of interviewees (including two members of the management 
team) to probe their interpretation of the data and their appreciation of initial 
observations concerning the elements of mindful organising without, however, 
using the term ‘mindful organising’. 
The interpretations of these findings and the link to the earlier presented 
literature will be discussed in the next chapters (see: “5. Interpretation of the 
findings” and “6. Discussion”). A full detailed overview of the metrical data for 
each of the questions can be found in Appendix H. 
 Weick, K. E, Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing the Unexpected – Resilient 
Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, J Wiley & Sons, San Francisco, 
CA. 
P2 
Preoccupa-
tion with 
failure 
Reluctance 
to simplify 
Sensitivity 
to 
operations  
Commitment 
to resilience 
Deference to 
expertise 
Trusted social relationships 
Questions relating to anticipation Questions relating to containment Questions relating to P2 
Q1: Reporting a minor mistake  
Q2: Initiating discussions about safety 
and risks  
Q3: Spending time on the shop floor  
Q7: Talking to someone about safety 
[also relating to P2] 
Q10: Alerting safety issues or unsafe 
situations [also relating to P2] 
Q11: Focusing on the safe execution of 
operations [also relating to P2] 
Q4: Working hard to maintain 
normal operations  
Q5: Turning to someone when 
facing a work related problem  
Q9: Taking actions in case of a 
crisis situation [also relating to 
P2] 
Q13: Deserving respect for 
taking safety measures [also 
relating to P1] 
Q6: Turning to someone with 
a personal problem 
Q12: Socialise with someone 
outside of work  
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4.2 Introduction 
It is essential to note that in 2004 all ZPT staff followed a ‘Safety Behaviour 
Programme’, organised by Statoil. In those days, the Zeepipe Terminal was part 
of Norwegian company Statoil, and it became part of Gassco in 2007. Multiple 
ZPT employees referred to this Safety Behaviour Programme as “a mind 
blowing experience” (OS2). According to the former company’s brochure 
(Statoil, 2002), the intention was to embrace over 25,000 employees over more 
than 100 two-day workshops in Norway. The programme paid particular 
attention to five of what they call ‘soft barriers’ that play an important part in 
safety thinking. These are: correct prioritisation, compliance, open dialogue, 
continuous risk assessment, and caring about each other. All of these 
workshops were delivered by members of Statoil’s top executive team, by the 
relatives of somebody killed during an anchor handling operation, and a 
presentation by a severely burned safety instructor who almost died when 
fighting a methanol fire. Although none of the presenters at these workshops 
were scholars in the field of high-reliability organising, the five aforementioned 
‘soft barriers’ resemble a mixture of the HRO principles with Behaviour Based 
Safety (BBS) principles (for more insights on BBS, see for instance Geller, 
2001; Roughton and Mercurio, 2002). It is known that in the first years of the 
21st century, Statoil dabbled in BBS concepts and added a 
European/Norwegian flavour (Antonsen, 2009). 
In the next chapter (see “5. Interpretation of the findings”) I will link these ‘soft 
barriers’ and HRO principles back to the overall findings in an attempt to 
evaluate ZPT’s current level of congruence, and to indicate the significance of 
these findings to the company’s level of mindful organising.  
4.3 Overall findings 
Before diving into detailed findings and insights, I would like to provide a 
general picture of the findings upfront. This might help the reader to interpret 
each partial insight or finding in the broader context of this research.  
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The social network analysis uncovers the following broad insights: 
- Everyone at ZPT talks to everyone about safety. These safety 
conversations are rooted in the safety procedures and guidelines, which 
in turn are the result as well of active conversations about how to 
improve safety related issues by refining existing procedures and 
guidelines.  
- This collective safety attitude, which is inspired by Statoil’s Safety 
Behaviour Programme, apparently extends to new employees. The 
various employees who joined ZPT after 2004, and thus never 
participated in Statoil’s safety workshop, absorbed this ‘safety walk the 
talk’ as they are frequently indicated as initiators of conversations about 
safety. 
- The management team has a specific steering role in the mindful 
organising processes. While they have been creating a mental space to 
have these type of conversations, the management team has a leading 
role in feeding, conducting and leading these conversations by example. 
In the next sections, I will offer more details that support these insights. 
4.4 Anticipation 
In this section, the data retrieved from six questions of the social network 
interviews will be analysed and discussed. These questions are based on the 
first three HRO principles (questions 1, 2, and 3), as presented by Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2007), and three questions that relate to findings of the previous 
research project (questions 7, 10, and 11). All questions refer to the three 
anticipation principles, as presented by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007). They look at 
how employees are preoccupied with failure, their reluctance to simplify, and 
their sensitivity to operations. According to Weick and Sutcliffe, the principles of 
anticipation “focus on the prevention of disruptive unexpected events” (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 64). It is all about capturing early signals of unexpected 
or unwanted events, having the right diagnosis of these signals, and 
transforming that diagnosis into meaningful actions in a specific context. 
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Therefore, the questions that were asked probed for this anticipatory attitude:  
- Question 1 checked whether employees have an attitude to report minor 
mistakes, even if they do not harm operations. The rationale for raising 
this question was to gauge the employees’ preoccupation with failure.  
- Question 2 encouraged the interviewees to indicate people in the 
organisation that initiate discussions about safety issues and risk. The 
rationale for raising this question was to uncover the employees who 
show an attitude of reluctance for simplifying safety and risks. 
- Question 3 aimed to identify those members of the management team 
who spend considerable time on the shop floor in an attempt to get a 
good feel of the issues and concerns that reside in the organisation. The 
rationale for raising this question was to check the management’s 
sensitivity to operations. 
- Question 7 checked the interactions among employees about shared 
values and norms concerning safety, as at the end of the previous 
empirical research project (P2) the assumption was made that everyone 
in this organisation has conversations about safety with colleagues in 
their own division. Therefore, the rationale for raising this question was 
twofold: to verify this assumption and to check the employees’ 
preoccupation with failure. 
- Question 10 probed for broad risk perception beyond the official ZPT risk 
matrix. P2 observed a clear tendency among the majority of ZPT-
employees to have a broader view on risks. Therefore, the rationale for 
raising this question was to check the employees’ anticipation attitudes. 
- Question 11 probed for some kind of ‘healthy distrust’ (Conchie and 
Donald, 2006) among staff. One of the assumptions that was made at 
the end of P2 was that all employees are too familiar with each other, 
and therefore, not critical enough when it comes to controlling their 
peers. Therefore, the rationale for raising this question was to check the 
employees’ sensitivity to operations.  
Over the next sections I will highlight the main findings concerning these 
anticipatory attitudes. 
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4.4.1 Hierarchical lines and procedures 
A recurring pattern in the answers to questions relating to reporting mistakes or 
potential safety issues is the formal hierarchical reporting as provided in the 
standard operating procedures (SOPs). These SOPs stipulate that all mistakes 
or near mistakes have to be reported to the operations supervisor or his 
adjunct. In turn, they have to report this to the hierarchy and at the Morning 
Safety Briefings where it is discussed by all maintenance and operations staff. 
Figure 4-1 illustrates this formal hierarchical reporting based on the first 
questions (Who would you report a mistake to?): maintenance people (MT) 
refer to each other, or to their line manager, and so do the Adjunct Operation 
Supervisors (AOS) as they report to their Operation Supervisor (OS), and the 
Administration staff (ADM) reports to their colleagues or to their line manager. 
 
Figure 4-1 Q1: Who would you report a mistake to? 
The data retrieved from Question 10 (alerting safety issues) offers a different 
but remarkable insight in the employees’ attitude towards reporting safety 
issues. More than 82 percent (that is 23 out of 28 employees) gave exactly the 
same answer to the question: “Who do you inform when you have a safety 
issue or when you see an unsafe situation?” They all said: “I would immediately 
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address the person who is creating this unsafe situation!” To my subsequent 
question, “Imagine if this person is your CEO, would you do the same?”, they all 
answered affirmatively. I reversed this question to the CEO by asking: Imagine 
one day you would act in an unsafe way. What is the reaction you hope to get 
from your subordinates? Without hesitation he replied: “I would be very 
embarrassed the day this happens, but I do expect everyone in this company to 
correct me immediately.” This mental mindset of approaching everyone who 
does not show the right safety behaviour, and thus might create a potentially 
dangerous situation, is “ingrained in all ZPT staff’s DNA” (interview OS4) and a 
clear example of anticipating unwanted events.  
The second part of the employees’ answer to this question reconfirmed the 
formal reporting of an unsafe situation or incident. ZPT’s safety procedures 
indicate these types of situations as ‘incident’ that has to be reported in writing. 
Figure 4-2 nicely illustrates how this official reporting happens: according to the 
procedure in a hierarchical way. Some of the interviewees (predominantly 
maintenance people and adjunct operators) report an incident to an operation 
supervisor. These operation supervisors intervene when necessary, and 
subsequently log the event in a digital register. These logs are subject to formal 
discussion in the daily Morning Safety Briefing with operations, maintenance 
and the management team. Most of the Operation Supervisors directly report an 
incident both to their manager and/or to the HSEQ manager. The latter, in turn, 
immediately reports to the other members of the management team. 
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Figure 4-2 Q10: Who do you report safety issues or unsafe situations to?  
Although there is a very direct way of approaching anyone who shows unsafe 
behaviour, the formal way of reporting such an incident happens in a 
standardised hierarchical way. According to AOS4 “you don’t go tell everyone 
when you see a safety issue. You immediately address the person himself, and 
report it to the HSEQ manager. When I see an unsafe situation, I’ll try to fix it 
first before I officially report it in the incident log.”  
4.4.2 Collective conversations 
Safety is a vivid topic of discussion and mutual alignment in ZPT. This is 
illustrated in the network analysis graph of the question concerning who initiates 
discussions about safety and risks (see Figure 4-3), and is similar in the results 
of question number seven (talking to someone about safety). Figure 4-3 offers 
an almost unique illustration of how the entire organisation has an ongoing 
constitutive conversation about safety and potential risks. Everyone refers to 
others as the initiator of conversations about safety, and at the same time 
everyone is also indicated as an initiator of these types of conversations. 
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Figure 4-3 Q2: Who is most likely to initiate discussions about safety and 
risks? 
Figure 4-4 (presenting the ‘In Degrees’, i.e. the number of times every individual 
is indicated by others) indicates how all employees are indicated by at least 
seven colleagues as initiators of discussions about safety and risk.  
 
Figure 4-4 Q2: In Degree representation  
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A final observation concerning these collective conversations is that several 
employees who joined ZPT over the last few years are among the people who 
refer to all of their colleagues as instigators of safety conversations. Although 
they never attended Statoil’s Safety Behaviour Programme, these “new entrees” 
absorbed this “safety dialogue” as they are frequently indicated as initiators of 
safety conversations. 
4.4.3 Role of management team 
In all data, the very particular role of the management team emerges as key to 
anticipate hazardous events, and by doing so, their contribution to the long-
standing organisation’s safety record. Besides a very clear hierarchical line of 
reporting, the management team previously installed and continuously supports 
a ‘no blame no shame culture’ in which all safety related issues are open for 
collective discussion and improvement. This involves all employees in an “open 
safety dialogue” (MNG2) in which every individual is responsible for reporting 
safety issues. According to the CEO, “no individual in this company has to take 
all the responsibility, but they are all responsible for reporting mishaps or risks 
and for taking appropriate action.” One member of the maintenance team (MT3) 
reframed the CEO’s expression as follows: “making mistakes is not the end of 
the world, as long as you report them immediately and learn from your 
mistakes” (MT3). And “if a mistake is based on the wrong interpretation of a 
procedure, than we need to reinterpret and change the procedure” (MNG2). 
A second basic pillar of this safety culture is framed in the catchphrase “time 
and money are no excuse for executing a safe job”. One of the ZPT employees 
recalled a story in which the executive team decided to interrupt construction 
work that involved more than 80 external contractors. As the safety conditions 
were not fully guaranteed, they were all sent home. “Can you imagine the cost 
of temporarily interrupting such a major project? But still, it was a fraction of the 
real cost in case something really nasty had happened!” (MT5).  
And finally, the management team strongly promotes a “no one is infallible” 
(MNG3) attitude, starting with them. Meaning everyone is allowed to approach 
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them to point out flaws or mishaps. This is based on the management team’s 
belief that every individual is fallible and thus will make a mistake one day. “We 
are not gods, nor untouchables! As management team our responsibility is to 
keep this place safe by engaging every single individual in an open safety 
dialogue. The day we rely on past successes, things will go badly wrong” 
(CEO). 
4.4.4 Reporting minor mistakes 
When evaluating the results of the data, captured by the two questions 
concerning the reporting of minor mistakes, in light of the anticipation principles, 
we might conclude that ZPT has created a system in which all employees are 
open to discuss and report minor mistakes to the hierarchical lines, which 
indicates their preoccupation with failure (HRO principle #1). Weick and Sutcliffe 
state “to avoid failure, you’ve first got to embrace it” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; 
p. 46). Given the fact all employees indicate that they report minor mistakes, 
independently of social bonds or hierarchical positions, this suggests ZPT’s 
sensitivity to operations (HRO principle #3). According to Weick and Sutcliffe it 
is “about detecting small discrepancies anywhere […] seeing what we are 
actually doing regardless of what we were supposed to do based on intentions, 
designs and plans” [emphasis in original text] (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 59). 
This refers to reporting minor mistakes, even when this is not foreseen in the 
company’s procedures, and indicates ZPT’s conformity to being sensitive to 
operations. 
In the penultimate paragraph of this chapter (4.7 Mindful organising) I will 
elaborate on the management team’s attitude to anticipate hazardous events, 
and its impact on organisational safety in more detail. 
4.5 Containment 
In this section, the data retrieved from four questions of the social network 
interviews will be analysed and discussed. These questions (questions 4 and 5) 
are based on the last two HRO principles, as presented by Weick and Sutcliffe 
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(2007), and two questions that relate to findings of the previous research 
projects (question 13 is related to P1, the systematic literature review, and 
question 9 is based on findings from the previous empirical research project). 
All the questions refer to the two containment principles, as presented by Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2007). They “aim to prevent unwanted outcomes after an 
unexpected event has occurred rather than to prevent the unexpected event 
itself” [emphasis in original text] (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 65). In this 
perspective containment is all about “large and varied response repertoires, 
competence in reassembling existing practices into new combinations, intense 
sharing of information, and a well-developed ability to maintain emotional 
control in the face of chaos” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 81). In other words, 
the principles of containment look at how employees are committed to resilience 
once an incident occurs, and how the organisation gives deference to expertise 
rather than to experts to contain critical situations.  
Therefore, the questions that were asked probed for this attitude to prevent 
unwanted outcomes after an unexpected event occurred: 
- Question 4 encouraged the interviewees to indicate the people in the 
organisation who go that extra mile to maintain normal operations. The 
rationale for raising this question was to gauge the employees’ 
commitment to resilience.  
- Question 5 checked who in the organisation turns to whom for support 
when facing a work related problem. The rationale for raising this 
question was to uncover the employees who are perceived as people 
with a lot of expertise. 
- Question 9 probed for expertise in real-life crisis situations. One of the 
major findings in P2 was that employees who experienced a life-
threatening crisis situation in a previous job had a more divergent view 
on the actual risks in the organisation. Therefore, the rationale for raising 
this question was to identify employees who are seen by their colleagues 
as capable to contain unexpected events. 
- Question 13 aimed to identify employees who deserve respect for taking 
safety measures. This question was based on findings of the systematic 
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literature review (P1), indicating the importance of a leadership style that 
is based on expertise. Therefore, the rationale for raising this question 
was to identify the employees who are respected by their colleagues as 
safety experts, and capable to contain unexpected events. 
As mentioned earlier, ZPT has operated for more than twenty years without 
experiencing any critical incident. “The worst things we have encountered here 
are a couple of bruises and a dislocated ankle,” admitted one of the veterans in 
the company (OS7). Therefore, the questions that were raised to gauge ZPT’s 
containment attitudes were based predominantly on minor incidents and what if 
scenarios. All interviewees were encouraged to refer to colleagues, who clearly 
demonstrate these containment capabilities, such as maintaining normal 
operations, solving problems, or taking the right actions in case of a possible 
crisis situation. The rationale for asking these referring questions was dual; first 
of all to identify individuals or groups in the organisation who are perceived as 
people who are committed to resilience, and secondly to check to what extent 
ZPT-staff strictly stick to hierarchical lines, or rather consult colleagues with the 
appropriate knowledge to solve a specific work related issue. The latter 
orientation refers to the fifth HRO principle, which is ‘Deference to expertise’ 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007).  
The majority of the employees stick to the hierarchical line when searching for 
help in case something happens. Figure 4-5 (data retrieved from question 
number 5 - “Who would you turn to when facing a work related problem?”) 
illustrates this by indicating transitive ties. An Adjunct Operation Supervisor will 
turn to the Operation Supervisor, who in turn goes to the COO, and the COO in 
turn goes to the CEO. The same pattern emerges for the Maintenance Team 
members who turn to the CTO, while the Administration people turn to the 
HSEQ Manager who is responsible for the administrative department as well.  
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Figure 4-5 Q5: Who would you turn to with a work related problem? 
Looking at the reciprocity set of ties (Figure 4-6), this supports the earlier 
interpretation concerning the hierarchical reporting, as there are only four 
mutual ties. This indicates almost everyone is reporting to his or her superior 
instead of a peer or friend. In the case of the reciprocal ties between MT5 and 
MT6, and OS5 and MT2 they all indicated that for specific work related issues 
they would most probably consult each other’s expertise first before addressing 
their manager. For OS1 and AOS3 it seems to be logical to address each other 
as they always work together in the same dyadic team. They also say they 
address the line manager, but only if they cannot find a satisfying solution for 
the problem themselves. When it comes to the management team, one would 
expect they all address each other with a work related problem. The data (see 
Appendix H.6) indicates only MNG3 and MNG4 turn to their peers in the 
management team. The CEO (MNG2) declares he will “turn to my superior in 
Norway”; while the CTO (MNG1) says “it depends on the problem. I’d rather 
expect my subordinates to approach me with a work related problem.” 
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Figure 4-6 Q5: Reciprocity between actors 
The CTO’s quote, however, is at odds with the answers the maintenance staff 
gave on the second part of question five (“Who would turn to you with a work 
related problem?”). Here, various people in the maintenance department and 
the operations department indicated the CTO (MNG1) as a person who looks 
for help with a work related problem, while none of the other executive 
members are perceived that way. This supports my previous interpretation of a 
flat horizontal organisational structure when it comes to solving problems and 
work related issues (see: “4.4.1 Hierarchical lines and procedures”). 
The aim of these questions concerning whom to approach when facing a work 
related problem was to probe for ZPT’s attitude for deference to expertise (HRO 
principle #5). The results indicate that a dominant majority of ZPT staff feel 
comfortable when his or her colleagues consult him or her for work related 
problems, even when this happens outside official hierarchical lines. 
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Furthermore, it also illustrates how all staff makes an effort to articulate work 
issues with their colleagues, and by doing so transcends the divisional barriers. 
4.6 Trusted social relationships 
In this section, the data retrieved from two questions of the social network 
interviews will be analysed and discussed. These questions (questions 6 and 
12) are related to findings of the previous research project (P2) and probed for 
trusted social relationships among ZPT employees. As the average years of 
employment at ZPT is 15, my assumption was that the majority of the staff has 
close social relationships both inside and outside work.  
Therefore, the questions probed for these trusted social relationships among 
staff:  
- Question 6 encouraged the interviewees to indicate the people in the 
organisation they go to with personal, and thus not work related, 
problems.  
- Question 12 aimed to identify the employees who socialise outside of 
work. 
For the first question (who do you turn to with a personal problem?), a large 
group indicated they keep work and private life separated, and thus do not 
discuss personal issues with their colleagues (see Figure 4-7). Only a handful 
refer to their direct colleague they share the office with. Most of them have 
worked together for several years, often during weekends or night shifts. These 
respondents indicate: “You get to know each other so well after a while, you 
can’t hide personal problems. You become buddies, and sometimes share more 
with each other than with your spouse” (AOS3).  
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Figure 4-7 Q6: Who would you turn to with a personal problem? 
Others refer to members of the management team, and especially to the CEO 
and the COO. Both worked as Operation Supervisors in the control room for 
years, and they continued to have good relationships with their former 
colleagues. One Operation Supervisor admitted: “Our CEO has this precious 
gift to ‘read’ your mind. You can try as hard as you can to hide your personal 
sorrows, but he will approach you with a compassionate question for sure. The 
nice thing is you know your personal trouble is safe with him. It will not be used 
against you, on the contrary!” (OS2).  
When it comes to socialising outside of work, another picture appears (see 
Figure 4-8). A small group linked to the COO (MNG4) does connect outside of 
work. “Together with our spouses, we make a three to four day city trip once a 
year. And the golden rule is: no conversations about work!” (MNG4). Others 
occasionally meet outside of work for various reasons; they live close to each 
other (ADM2 and MNG1), they follow the same photography course (MT2 and 
MT4), they refer to a dinner they have once or twice a year, together with their 
partners (OS8 and AOS5), or to an occasional drink after work “on a Friday 
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afternoon, when the weather is fine, and we fancy a cold beer or two” (AOS1 
and OS4).  
 
Figure 4-8 Q12: Who do you socialise with outside work? 
Although ZPT organises a couple of off-site events for all employees every 
year, some complain about the lack of social coherence, while others prefer to 
keep work and private life strictly separated. The latter indicated they seldom 
join these off-site events.  
A final remark is the position of the CEO. He indicates the three members of his 
management team as colleagues he sometimes socialises with outside of work, 
while none of them refer to the CEO. There might be several explanations for 
this, but the most probable one is that none of the management team members 
perceive off-site meetings as a form of socialising, but rather as “informal 
discussions about work related issues” (according to one of the managers). 
In an attempt to gauge the impact of social relationships on the willingness to 
report minor mistakes, the data retrieved from Question 12 (Who do you 
socialise with outside of work?) was combined with the data of questions that 
probed for reporting mistakes. As a result, Figure 4-9 illustrates the ties 
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between staff that socialise outside of work and would report minor mistakes to 
each other (Question 1). It might be argued that these personal ties have no 
impact on the reporting process, as all respondents refer to more colleagues 
than just their close friends. In other words, Figure 4-9 only shows a fraction of 
the reporting ties.  
 
Figure 4-9 Q1 combined with Q12: Influence of social relationships on 
reporting minor mistakes  
The evaluation of the possible impact of social relationships on reporting safety 
issues (Question 10) does not indicate a significant correlation. The connections 
as presented in Figure 4-10 represent a small part of all the relations that were 
indicated by the various employees. Therefore, it might be argued that there is 
no difference in reporting safety issues when it comes to social relationships.  
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Figure 4-10 Q10 combined with Q12: Influence of social relationships on 
reporting safety issues  
4.7 Mindful organising 
To achieve high reliability, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) indicate ‘mindful 
organising’ as an overarching prerequisite. Mindful organising supports a 
different mindset about the things that can bring an organisation into jeopardy. It 
is about a set of attitudes, such as “human alertness, experience, skill, 
deference, communication, paradoxical action, boldness, and caution” (Weick et 
al., 1999; p. 105-106), that aim to foresee the unforeseeable. This attitude of 
mindful organising encourages organisational members to detect flaws or minor 
mistakes that they may have missed before, and by doing so it prevents an 
organisation from unwanted events. Hence, it describes a corporate culture in 
which safety values and expectations about risk aversive behaviour and early 
(mindful) detections of flows are encouraged. In an attempt to install and 
maintain such a corporate culture, Weick and Sutcliffe denote five elements that 
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have to be put in place as a prerequisite to produce a culture of mindful 
organising. These elements are: thinking differently about 1) success, 2) 
simplification, 3) strategy, 4) plans, and 5) authority (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; 
p. 148).  
In an attempt to gauge ZPT’s ability for mindful organising, all the interviews 
and ethnographical data were analysed and encoded according to two sets of 
elements: the prerequisites for creating a culture of mindful organising (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007), and attitudes to foresee the unforeseeable (Weick et al., 
1999). Every interview was transcribed and encoded with Dedoose software. 
When there was an overlap in two sets of interviews, for instance when an 
interviewee discussed a specific topic or example twice in two separate 
interviews, solely the section of the first interview was encoded. Although the 
aim of encoding the data was not to achieve numerical representative data, the 
rationale for excluding double identical sets of data was to obtain a more 
balanced view. Table 4-2 shows the results of this encoding process. Every 
number indicates the overall frequency interviewees referred to a specific 
element. 
  
Table 4-2 Encoding results of the qualitative data  
In the next sections I will discuss each set of elements separately.  
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4.7.1 Attitudes 
It might be argued that foreseeing something unforeseeable (Weick et al., 1999) 
is an almost impossible task, as the latter is intrinsically linked to something that 
is not possible to anticipate or predict. Therefore, Weick and his colleagues 
indicate a set of attitudes (human alertness, experience, skill, deference, 
communication, paradoxical action, boldness, and caution) which, when they 
are present among staff, might provide warning signs of possible flaws or 
danger (Weick et al., 1999).  
The interview data of this research project indicates how all these attitudes are 
present among staff, predominantly in combined sets. An example of this is 
when someone recalls how he or she interacted with a colleague concerning 
something that involves deference to the other person’s expertise, based on a 
concept of being cautious in operations, and alertness. The following example 
illustrates how an Adjunct Operation Supervisor mentions communication, 
deference, alertness and caution in one single quote: “In fact, I do talk to 
everyone about safety. When I see someone from maintenance who might be 
involved in my project, I will definitely approach him about certain issues that 
might pop up. These guys know all the ins and outs of our plant, better than 
anyone else. Recently, a couple of contractors had to do a repair job on the 
metering installation. It was a rainy day, and I was worried about how to avoid 
water in the installation. I discussed this with my colleague and warned the on-
call maintenance guy.” (AOS6) 
The most frequently mentioned elements are communication and experience. 
As already indicated in the findings of the social network analysis, the threshold 
level among employees for approaching each other to indicate potential 
dangerous behaviour of risks is very low. One member of the maintenance staff 
articulated it in this way: “When I see someone doing something stupid, I will 
immediately say ‘you’re not doing a good job, pal!’ This will be reported anyway. 
And if it concerns serious misconduct, I will immediately inform our HSEQ 
manager; to say ‘that guy over there is definitely not doing it right’. In my view, 
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that’s what needs to be done. Irrespective of who’s doing something stupid” 
(MT3).  
Formal communication in terms of alignment concerning the safe execution of 
jobs is also mentioned quite often. It illustrates how standardised processes are 
constantly discussed, aligned, and evaluated prior to the start of a job, and thus 
indicates a mindful attitude. “Every morning, the COO passes by, just to check if 
we are expecting anything special that day. The same story with our CTO. And 
our morning meeting of course where we discuss various issues” (AOS5). One 
operation supervisor added: “A recurring topic at the morning meetings is the 
question how we might improve safety. Quite often Jan, our HSEQ manager, 
starts this conversation by introducing a randomly chosen issue. It also happens 
that a minor incident becomes the theme for an in-depth discussion on how to 
improve things” (OS3). 
The element of ‘experience’ is predominantly linked to know-how of the job, 
such as “I will explain to them what I experienced, and how I solved it, more in 
the sense of making sure they will not fall into the same trap as I once did” 
(OS6). Still, experience is also often linked to insights and knowledge acquired 
in trainings and subsequently applied to the job: “Trainings and exercises 
clearly indicate the [safety] direction we’re aiming for” (MT5), and “We all have 
more or less the same level of knowledge, based on the trainings we all 
followed here in the company. But luckily, everyone has different skills. Both, 
skills and knowledge, give us all the required experiences to manage this plant 
safely” (MT6). 
4.7.2 Culture 
When it comes to thinking differently about success, simplification, strategy, 
plans, and authority (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), it is remarkable how many 
employees at ZPT mention authority (21 out of 28) and strategy (18 out of 28). 
In almost all the interviews, both aforementioned elements are linked to 
management actions, initiatives or vision. The following quotes support this: 
“there is no blaming culture in this company” (MNG3), “We don’t have a ‘normal’ 
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hierarchy in this organisation; new entrees can learn as much from employees 
who have been working here for more than fifteen years, and vice versa. You 
will find that attitude in our management team as well” (OS2), and “Our 
management team made it very clear that safety is everyone’s responsibility” 
(MT6). This last quote is confirmed by “We are all safety officers in this 
organisation” (AOS1).  
It might be argued that the elements for producing a culture of mindful 
organising, as described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), are predominantly 
linked to management actions. Envisioning success, simplifying processes, 
adapting and implementing a strategy, making organisational plans, and 
exerting authority, are all typical leadership or management tasks. That might 
explain why predominantly members of the management team referred to these 
elements to produce a culture of mindful organising (see Table 4-2). 
A concluding consideration is linked to Antonsen’s (2009) connotation of “a 
‘good’ safety climate” (p. 17). Antonsen argues that a common mindset about 
safety can only flourish in a “‘good’ safety climate […] where managers at all 
levels are highly committed to safety; where the workforces express satisfaction 
with and adherence to the organisation’s safety system; where everyone is risk 
averse; where there is no pressure towards maximising profits at the expense of 
safety and where operators as well as managers are highly qualified and 
competent” (Antonsen, 2009; p. 17). In various interviews, both in P2 and P3, 
several employees quoted the company’s unofficial catchphrase “time and 
money are no excuses for executing a safe job”, while underlining the 
management team’s dedication to safety no matter what. That supports 
Antonsen’s description of a safety climate.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The findings of this research indicate how all ZPT-staff interrelate when it 
comes to constituting a shared understanding of risks and safety issues. 
Although there is a formal hierarchical structure of reporting and managing the 
day-to-day activities, and every work related action is based on agreed 
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procedures or guidelines, every individual takes part in a horizontal-like 
discussion on safety. By doing so they achieve a form of collective coordination 
that is based on the five principles of HRO. However, these HRO principles, as 
such, are unknown by ZPT’s management team. Given the fact that ZPT has 
operated accident-free for more than twenty years, they have the benefit of the 
doubt that these high-reliability attitudes keep the plant and its operations safe.  
The role and position of the Management Team is also noteworthy. Depending 
on the topic, they all have a more or less subtle presence in the middle of each 
map that is linked to conversations about safety and work related issues. This 
indicates their key-supporting role in maintaining safe operations. The 
management team facilitates the conversation, but they are not perceived as 
the key people that own the conversation. 
A final overall observation is the position on the various maps of employees that 
experienced a real life threatening crisis situation at a previous job, and those of 
the employees that joined ZPT after 2004. They are all well mixed on the 
various graphs, and nobody is outlined as an ‘expert’, or as ‘outsider’. 
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5 INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will link the findings of this research back to the earlier 
described ‘soft barriers’ (Statoil, 2002) and the HRO principles (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007) (see Chapter “4: Findings”) in an attempt to evaluate ZPT’s 
current level of congruence, and to indicate the significance of these findings. 
Furthermore, I will interpret ZPT’s capability to maintain safe operations from a 
process ontological point of view.  
5.2 Alignment to HRO principles 
This research is aimed at uncovering how maintaining safe operations is 
achieved in an organisation managing high-risk processes. As indicated at the 
start of Chapter 4, Statoil’s Safety Behaviour Programme (Statoil, 2002) 
apparently made an impact on ZPT’s current executive team and all other 
employees that attended this safety workshop in 2004. The soft barriers to 
safety behaviour, which were the basic tenants of this Safety Behaviour 
Programme, are very similar to Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2007) principles for high-
reliability organisations (HRO). Although ZPT’s management team is unaware 
of these HRO principles, they have installed and supported these principles 
over the last decade.  
Although Weick and Sutcliffe do not explicitly mention the concept of 
communication that constitutes an organisation, all the HRO principles are 
rooted in “a capacity to anticipate unexpected problems” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007; p. 17) by their efforts to act mindfully. Weick and Sutcliffe describe 
mindful as a “striving to maintain an underlying style of mental functioning that is 
distinguished by continuous updating and deepening of increasingly plausible 
interpretations of the context, what problems define it, and what remedies it 
contains” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 18). In a prior theoretical paper (Weick 
et al., 1999) introducing the high reliability principles, Weick and his colleagues 
argue, “collective mindfulness is a complex and rare mix of human alertness, 
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experience, skill, deference, communication, negotiation, paradoxical action, 
boldness, and caution” (Weick et al., 1999; p. 105-106). In other words, this 
continuous updating and deepening of plausible interpretations of the context 
through a set of personal skills is not only an individual mental act, but also an 
interactive act in which two or more people mutually adjust their contextual 
insights. This set of interpersonal skills is what Weick and Robberts (1993) refer 
to when they introduced the concept of ‘heedful interrelations’.  
Weick and Roberts (1993) define this mutual interactive process as “heedful 
interrelations of actions in a social system”, a collective investment in “time and 
effort to organise for controlled information processing, mindful attention, and 
heedful action” (Weick and Roberts, 1993, p. 357). Therefore, this mutual 
adjustment through interpretative heedful interrelation is a relational and, in the 
moment, adjustment to situations that change through communication. It is 
more an interactive process, rather than a top down communication aiming to 
standardise safety behaviour. Although Weick never explicitly referred to CCO, 
it might be argued he adheres to this view on communication which constitutes 
organisations as he asserted, “the communication activity is the organization” 
(Weick, 1995; p. 75).  
Finally, Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) forewarn that routines and plans might lead 
to a certain form of complacency in which “people assume that the world today 
is pretty much like the world that existed at the time the routine was first 
learned” (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 26). This attitude is basically the 
opposite of mindful action and might bring an organisation into jeopardy. 
However, this research indicated how ZPT continuously adapts its operating 
procedures and guidelines based on various safety conversations, formal safety 
reports, and discussions in the daily safety meetings and management 
meetings. Therefore, the ‘traditional’ communication that focuses on a mere 
transfer of safety guidelines and procedures is but a part of the full story on risk 
communication. There is also a constitutive form of communication present at 
ZPT, one that coordinates safety behaviour and that seems to lead to accident 
free operations.  
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5.3 From a process ontological point of view 
Putnam and Nicotera (2010) described a constitutive view of ‘communication-
as-verb’, hence emphasising the process oriented ontological perspective of 
communication. This interpretivist view of communication, and thus of 
organisation as communication (Blaschke et al., 2012), is apparent at ZPT. 
Despite the fact all employees have divergent perceptions of risk (see Part III of 
this thesis) they have a unique way of interacting with each other with regard to 
safety and risk aversive behaviour. The extensive links among all organisational 
members concerning the initiating of safety conversations, as presented in the 
previous chapter, illustrate how this safety dialogue has pretty much become 
second nature to all ZPT staff. Through these continuous interactions they have 
learned to express their thinking, to share their expertise, and to be reluctant to 
simplification and preoccupation with failure.  
Therefore, from a process ontological point of view, it might be argued that ZPT 
(non-intentionally) created a form of ‘communication-as-verb’ (Putnam and 
Nicotera, 2010) which is focused on the creation of mutual understanding 
concerning risks, the avoidance of unsafe behaviour, and the elimination of 
potentially risky situations through a continuous safety dialogue. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
In this chapter I will link the findings of this research to the literature that was 
discussed in Chapter 2 (on pages 231-234). I will also touch on a personal 
appeal to demolish the theoretical wall between the two distinctive views on 
communication, the informational and the constitutive view, when it comes to 
support safety behaviour in organisations managing high-risks. I will then 
highlight two major contributions to the existing literature on HROs. The chapter 
will end with limitations to the research, and recommendations for practice and 
further research. 
6.1 Introduction 
This empirical research offers substantial answers to the research question. It 
indicates how all employees engage in an organisation-wide conversation on 
safety and risk avoidant initiatives. These conversations are supported and 
made possible by the management team, and through these ongoing 
conversations, all employees constitute a culture that allows to discuss, criticise, 
and challenge current practices that might have a negative impact on the 
organisation’s safe operations. Furthermore, the operations and maintenance 
staff have been given the space, time and resources to focus their ‘activity 
coordination’ (McPhee and Zaug, 2001) to a permanent level of preoccupation 
with failure while being reluctant to accept simplifications (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007). By doing so, they voluntarily create a continuous mode of anticipating 
exceptions and problems, and in this continuously coordinate adjustment, not 
out of the ordinary as Perrow (1967) indicated, but rather as the result of the 
constitutive communication process that creates coordinated behaviour and 
safe operations.  
6.2 Mutual adjustment  
In the introduction chapter I referred to Mintzberg’s concept of ‘mutual 
adjustment’ as one of five coordinating mechanisms in organisations. According 
to Mintzberg, “mutual adjustment achieves the coordination of work by the 
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simple process of informal communication” (Mintzberg, 1993; p. 4). This 
research suggests that mutual adjustment is more than a “simple process of 
informal communication”, it is more a complex interactive process supported by 
the management team, based on an ongoing constitutive conversation about 
safety and risks, and rooted in the basic principles of HRO (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2007). In that sense the interpretation of ‘mutual adjustment’ in HROs is more a 
real time conversation in a complex work environment that is not only changing 
the situation (Denyer et al., 2011) but one that is constituting the work 
processes itself. The findings of this research indicate how all employees report 
to have an open dialogue on safety and risks. In doing so, they not only 
concentrate on observing “early warnings of the unexpected” (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2007; p. 57), they constantly interact in an attempt to articulate their 
interpretations and experiences concerning potential risks and safety more 
clearly. These real time conversations create the work process, and thus, 
coordinate behaviour itself.  
6.3 Interactive process 
The constitutive view of communication approaches its informational 
counterpart as a mere product of communication (Putnam et al., 2009) in which 
messages are transferred between a sender and one or more receivers, and 
key messages are created with the aim to inform or convince, but not to 
constitute the reality of the organisation or parts of it.  
Still, Blaschke and his colleagues argue, “all communication processes are 
embedded in a wider societal context from which they can draw on readily 
available templates of meaning” (Blaschke et al., 2012; p. 883). From that 
perspective, this research (in combination with the results of P2) supports this 
view as it indicates how maintaining safe operations, which is grounded in a 
constitutive form of communication, seems to be viable when it is underpinned 
by known safety procedures and guidelines. Although it might be argued that 
the conception of procedures and guidelines fits the constitutional view of 
communication (see McPhee and Zaug, 2001; p. 588, on how policies, 
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procedures and manuals are media for ‘organisational self structuring’, which is 
one of the four flows in their proposed CCO framework), the dissemination of 
those documents is a typical example of the informational view of 
communication. This argument might be illustrated by the following example. 
During one of the interviews with an Operation Supervisor, he recalled a recent 
minor incident that happened over the weekend.  
“During the night and over the weekend, it’s just me and my adjunct who 
are on the plant. When something happens, we can rely on the on-call 
duty manager. That particular weekend we had an alert in the LVS, the 
land valve station, (this is the station outside the ZPT premises where the 
sea pipe comes on land, note researcher). My adjunct went to the LVS 
and detected a burning smell. We called the on-call duty manager and 
for more than half an hour we had a conversation on how to solve the 
issue. Immediately we were on the same ‘wavelength’. We went through 
the procedures, examined plausible actions, and tried to make sense of 
the situation. At the end we jointly agreed to diminish the pressure in the 
LVS, keep a close eye on the conditions of the LVS, and bring in an 
external technical team in the morning. Although the procedures didn’t 
give us a ready-made answer to the problem, they helped us to achieve 
agreement through a common vision, call it a knowledge base. A couple 
of days later, we discussed how to adapt a few procedures based on this 
experience.” (OS2) 
This conversation, based on knowledge from description (procedures) and 
knowledge from acquaintance (Baron & Misovich, 1999), and coordinated 
collective interactions between team members (Weick, 2011), is what McPhee 
and Zaug (2009) call ‘activity coordination’. In that perspective, this minor 
incident, as recalled by Interviewee OS2, is illustrative for what McPhee and 
Zaug describe as members that “are working not just on related tasks but within 
a common social unit with an existence that goes beyond the work 
interdependence itself” (McPhee and Zaug, 2009; p. 39). 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the barriers between both views on 
communication are predominantly theoretical and therefore not really helpful 
when applied in an organisational context such as ZPT. High-reliability 
organisations might benefit from applying a more integrated approach of 
communication in which this ‘activity coordination’ (McPhee and Zaug, 2009) 
translates both views of communication to a rather ‘interactive process’ for 
obtaining safe operations. This would be more in line with Process Organisation 
Studies (Langley and Tsoukas, 2010) that focus on inter-actions to analyse 
coordinated behaviour, and emphasises narrative forms of knowing.  
6.4 Contribution 
This research project offers two major theoretical contributions: 
First of all, it empirically indicates how Weick and Roberts’ concept of ‘heedful 
interrelations’ (1993) might operate in an organisation managing high-risk 
processes. When Weick and Roberts (1993) introduced the concept of ‘heedful 
interrelations’, their arguments were based on extensive qualitative research in 
military organisations (more specifically nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) 
(Roberts et al., 1994). However, the focus of their research was not coordinated 
behaviour, it was based more on the cognitive factors that affect the decision 
processes. Therefore, Weick and Roberts did not indicate how these ‘heedful 
interrelations’ lead to collective coordinated safe operations in organisations 
managing high risks. They demonstrate how pilots of aircraft carriers develop 
mental processes that allow them to take the right decisions in milliseconds, 
based on controlled information processing, mindful attention and heedful action 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993). This research, as distinct from Weick and Robberts 
(1993), shows how heedful interrelations encourage employees to engage in an 
organisation-wide conversation on safety and risk avoidant initiatives, which in 
turn leads to maintaining safe operations in a high-reliability organisation.  
Second, this research is the first of its kind that empirically demonstrates the 
constitutive role of communication for maintaining safe operations in a high-
reliability organisation. A couple of similar studies have been published or 
 278 
presented, but all with a different approach concerning the type of organisation 
or theoretical approach. One of the studies close to my topic is Jody Jahn’s PhD 
dissertation (2012) on team coordination among wild land fire fighters by using 
a CCO lens. However, her study was based on critical incident narratives and 
workgroup-level safety climate among fire fighters. It might be argued that a fire 
fighter team is a distinct kind of organisation that is not comparable to a gas-
receiving terminal, as the latter works on a normal routine aiming to prevent 
malicious events, while the former is predominantly working on solving 
malicious events.  
Another domain of research that is close to my topic is an ongoing debate on 
how to apply the CCO view to study clandestine organisations, such as al 
Qaeda, as an organisational phenomenon that exists under extreme 
circumstances (Schoeneborn and Scherer, 2010; Stohl and Stohl, 2011; 
Schoeneborn and Scherer, 2012). However, these kinds of terrorist 
organisations clearly distinguish themselves from legitimate organisations such 
as ZPT as they lack a reflexive self-structuring way of organising (McPhee and 
Zaug, 2009), and they are not exactly in the same business of provision of 
services as ZPT is in. 
A final piece of empirical research in the domain of coordinated behaviour 
based on a communicative approach is the work of Amanda Porter (2012). She 
studied the experiences of volunteers as part of an emergent organisation at a 
shelter during the response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, August 2005. 
Still, Porter did not approach this research through a CCO lens, but through a 
situational boundary-making approach. Furthermore, it could be argued that a 
group of volunteers in a temporary organisation trying to mitigate the effects of a 
disaster is thoroughly different from a group of employees working together for 
almost two decades in the same organisation managing high-risk technologies.  
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6.5 Limitations 
Although all efforts were made to present a well-structured and underpinned 
empirical research project, I am very well aware of the fact it contains multiple 
limitations. 
First of all, the research was done in a very small organisation (30 employees). 
Although ZPT has all the functions and structures of a larger company, and it is 
part of a large state-owned company in Norway, the findings are not necessarily 
replicable to other similar organisation.  
Secondly, for this research project the content of Statoil’s Safe Behaviour 
Programme (2002) was evaluated through conversations with various ZPT 
employees who participated at that particular event in 2004 and through 
archival data. I also had the opportunity to examine the programme’s brochure 
and five DVDs that explained the aforementioned ‘soft barriers’ and the setup of 
the programme. I was , however, not able to examine the body of knowledge 
and the underlying rationale for these workshops. Therefore, it would be of 
great value to attend this Safe Behaviour Programme, even ten years on, have 
a conversation with the programme’s sponsors, and examine the content, 
structure, and theoretical as well as the practical underpinning of this seminar.  
And finally the mixed use of various data sets, such as ethnographic data, 
qualitative data, social network data, and archival data, sometimes offers too 
complex a picture in which it is almost impossible to combine, link or extract the 
right data in the right circumstances. I observed people saying A in the network 
analysis, while doing B in their daily work. Therefore it might be argued that in 
this type of research the use of a single method for retrieving data only offers 
indicative answers. While a mixed use of data collection methodologies might 
blur a correct interpretation.  
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6.6 Recommendations for practice 
The findings and discussion section of this research offer two distinct types of 
recommendations: for ZPT in particular, and for the wider industry. 
6.6.1 Recommendations for ZPT 
As mentioned earlier in the findings chapter, the management team facilitates 
what they call ‘an open safety dialogue’. This dialogue is well supported by the 
HESQ manager and the CEO. The question could be raised what would happen 
when one will be replaced by someone who is not that familiar with this specific 
safety culture and with the way all staff maintain safe operations through 
organisation-wide conversations? Knowing that the CEO will retire in a couple 
of years, this might be a strong recommendation in the search for succession.  
When it comes to the HSEQ manager, he has a key role in ‘feeding’ this safety 
conversation. One interviewee mentioned: 
“He has a massive knowledge of risk aversive measures, procedures, and 
technical insights. And moreover, he always challenges us to reflect on 
how to do things in a better and safer way.” 
Currently, the HSEQ manager is training an Adjunct Operations Supervisor as 
his deputy. It is of crucial importance that this trainee will assimilate the ongoing 
organisational safety conversation over the next couple of years. 
For the rest of the organisation, it might be recommended to redesign a ‘Safety 
Behaviour Programme’, similar to the one ZPT employees attended in 2004. 
This programme apparently made a massive impact on the employees’ safety 
awareness. Having a regular refresher of this programme might give all ZPT 
staff an extra boost for further improvement of their safety dialogue based on 
clear, collaborative, and forward-looking leadership (Gassco, 2013). 
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6.6.2 Recommendations for the industry 
Based on my personal experiences as a risk and crisis management consultant 
in organisations managing high-risk processes, I predominantly encounter 
executive teams that are convinced of an informational approach on 
communication. Based on the findings of this research, I will argue that this is 
only a part of an approach to collectively maintain safe operations in these 
types of organisations. Therefore it would be recommended to create and 
support a safety culture based on an open safety dialogue concerning the HRO 
principles as presented by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), while being vigilant to 
plan, design, install, and disseminated rigorous and tested safety procedures 
and guidelines. A culture that encourages an open safety dialogue has to be 
supported by the management team, in which they challenge staff to be 
preoccupied with failure, support critical thinking that is reluctant to simplify, give 
deference to expertise in the organisation, and through leading by example.  
6.7 Recommendations for further research 
This research project indicates how a constitutive form of communication that 
underpins coordinated safety behaviour is viable on the sole condition that 
existing procedures and guidelines are disseminated and known. Therefore it 
would be highly recommended to examine the most favourable balance 
between both forms of communication, the informational and the constitutional, 
for maintaining safe operations in HROs.  
As mentioned earlier in the limitations section, the findings of this research are 
not necessarily replicable to other similar organisation as the research was 
done in a small division of an international company. Therefore it would be 
worthwhile to expand this current research to large size HROs in multiple 
sectors. One of the starting points might be to examine whether this coordinated 
safety behaviour, based on a constitutive form of communication, is the same at 
Gassco’s Headquarters in Norway. According to multiple interviewees at ZPT, 
this ‘safety dialogue’ as they call it, is represented even stronger in Norway than 
in any other affiliate of the company. 
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Appendix A List of secondary sources of published 
academic research and practitioner-oriented insights 
and data  
 
 
 
Author(s) Title Year Publisher
Breakwell, G. M. The psychology of risk 2007 Cambridge University 
Press
Daiton, M., Zelley, E. D. Applying communication theory for professional 
life - A Practical Introduction - Second Edition
2011 Sage Publications
Groeneweg, J. Controlling the controllable - Preventing business 
upsets - Fifth Edition
2002 Global Safety Group 
Publications
Hübner, H. The communicating company: Towards an 
alternative theory of corporate communication
2007 Physica-Verlag, 
Heidelberg
Marynissen, H., Pieters, S., 
Van Dorpe, S., van het Erve, 
A., Vergeer, F.
Geen commentaar! Communicatie in turbulente 
tijden (No comment! Communication in times of 
turbulence)
2010 Houtekiet / 
BusinessContact, 
Antwerp – Amsterdam
Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., 
Bostrom, A., Atman, C. J. 
Risk communication. A mental models approach 2002 Cambridge University 
Press
Perrow, C. Normal Accidents - Living with high-risk 
technologies
1999 Princeton University 
Press, N.J.
Reason, J. Managing the risks of organizational accidents 1997 Ashgate, UK
Regtvoort, F., Siepel, H. Risico & crisiscommunicatie. Succesfactor in 
crisissituaties (Risk & Crisis communication. 
Success factor in crisis situations)
2007 Coutinho, Amsterdam
Slovic, P. The perception of risk 2000 Earthscan Publications, 
UK
Slovic, P. The feeling of risk. New Perspectives on risk 
perception
2010 Earthscan Publications, 
UK
Waring, A., Glendon, A. I. Managing risk - Critical issues for survival and 
success into the 21st century
1998 Thomson
Weick, K. E. Making sense of the organization 2001 Blackwell Publishing, 
UK
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. Managing the unexpected. Resilient performance 
in an age of uncertainty
2007 John Wiley & Sons
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Appendix B List of academic journals 
 
  
List of academic journals
Journal Rating(*)
Academy of Management Journal 4
Academy of Management Review 4
Accident Analysis and Prevention none
Applied and Preventive Psychology none
Ergonomics none
Group and Organization Management 3
Human Relations 4
Journal of Applied Psychology 4
Journal of Business and Technical Communication none
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 1
Journal of Risk Research none
Journal of Safety Research none
Judgment and Decision Making none
Management Science 4
Personnel Review 2
Risk Analysis 3
Safety Science 2
Work and Stress 2
(*)According to Journal Recommendations for Academic Publications, Cranfield 
University SoM, Eighth Edition, April 2011
Journal Rating(*)
Academy of Management Journal 4
Academy of Management Review 4
Group and Organization Management 3
Journal of Applied Psychology 4
Journal of Risk Research none
Journal of Safety Research none
Management Science 4
Risk Analysis 3
Safety Science 2
(*)According to Journal Recommendations for Academic Publications, Cranfield 
University SoM, Eighth Edition, April 2011
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Year Author(s) Title Publication *
1992 S. B. Sitkin & A. L. Pablo Reconceptualizing the determinants of risk behavior Academy of 
Management Review
4
1995 R. L. Klein, G. A. Bigley & K. H Roberts Organizational culture in high reliability organizations: An 
extension
Human Relations 4
1995 S. B. Sitkin & L. R. Weingart Determinants of risky decision-making bahavior: A test of the 
mediating role of risk perceptions and propensity
Academy of 
Management Journal
4
1996 B. A. Sauer Communicating risk in a cross-cultural context: A cross-
cultural comparison of rhetorical and social understanding in 
US and British mine safety training programs
Journal of Business and 
Technical 
Communication
1999 G. I. Rochlin Safe operation as a social construct Ergonomics
2000 G. Grote & C. Künzler Diagnosis of safety culture in safety management audits Safety Science 2
2000 S. M. Houghton, M. Simon, K. Aquino 
& C. B. Goldberg
No safety in numbers: Persistence of biases and their 
effects on team risk perception and team decision making
Group and Organization 
Management
3
2001 E. S. Geller Behavior-based safety in industry: Realizing the large-scale 
potential of psychology to promote human welfare
Applied and Preventive 
Psychology
2001 J. Harvey, H. Bolam, D. Gregory & G. 
Erdos
The effectiveness of training to change safety culture and 
attitudes within a highly regulated environment
Personnel Review 2
2002 J. Harvey, G. Erdos, H. Bolam, M. A. A. 
Cox, J. N. P. Kennedy & D. T. Gregory
An analysis of safety culture attitudes in a highly regulated 
environment
Work and Stress 2
2005 A. Zacharatos, J. Barling & R. D. 
Iverson
High-performance work systems and occupational safety Journal of Applied 
Psychology
4
2006 C. Burns, K. Mearns, P. McGeorge Explicit and implicit trust within safety culture Risk Analysis 3
2006 S. M. Conchie & I. J. Donald The role of distrust in offshore safety performance Risk Analysis 3
2006 S. M. Conchie, I. J. Donald & Paul J. J. 
Taylor
Trust: Missing piece(s) in the safety puzzle Risk Analysis 3
2006 J. H. Michael, Z. G. Guo, J. K. 
Wiedenbeck & C. D. Ray
Production supervisor impacts on subordinates' safety 
outcomes: An investigation of leader-member exchange and 
safety communication
Journal of Safety 
Research
2006 M. Specht, F. R. Chevreau & C. Denis-
Rémis
Dedicating management to cultural processes: Toward a 
human risk management system
Journal of Risk 
Research
 
2008 S. M. Conchie & C. Burns Trust and risk communication in high-risk organizations: A 
test of principles from social risk research
Risk Analysis 3
2008 R. L. Dillon & C. H. Tinsley How near-misses influence decision making under risk: A 
missed opportunity for learning
Management Science 4
2008 Y. Ganzach, S. Ellis, A. Pazy & T. Ricci-
Siag
On the perception and operationalization of risk perception Judgment and Decision 
Making Journal
2008 T.-O. Nævestad Safety cultural preconditions for organizational learning in 
high-risk organizations
Journal of 
Contingencies and 
Crisis Management
1
2009 S. M. Conchie & C. Burns Improving occupational safety: using a trusted information 
source to communicate about risk
Journal of Risk 
Research
2009 D. A. Lombardi, S. K. Verma, M. J. 
Brennan & M. J. Perry
Factors influencing worker use of personal protective 
eyewear
Accident Analysis and 
Prevention
2009 T.-O. Nævestad Mapping research on culture and safety in high-risk 
organizations: Arguments for a sociotechnical understanding 
of safety culture
Journal of 
Contingencies and 
Crisis Management
1
2010 J. M. Beus, S. C. Payne, M. E. 
Bergman & W. Arthur Jr.
Safety climate and injuries: An examination of theoretical 
and empirical relationships
Journal of Applied 
Psychology
4
2010 L. M. Kath, K. M. Marks & J. Ranney Safety climate dimensions, leader–member exchange, and 
organizational support as predictors of upward safety 
communication in a sample of rail industry workers
Safety Science 2
2011 R. Hambach, P. Mairiaux, G. François, 
L. Braeckman, A. Balsat, G. Van Hal, 
C. Vandoorne, P. Van Royen & M. van 
Sprundel
Workers’ perception of chemical risks: A focus group study Risk Analysis 3
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gs
 o
n 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 
se
rv
ey
Fa
ct
or
 a
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
ev
al
ua
tio
n 
of
 o
ffi
ci
al
 
sa
fe
ty
 a
ud
it 
re
po
rts
Th
e 
au
th
or
s 
ap
pl
y 
th
e 
so
ci
ot
ec
hn
ic
al
 
sy
st
em
s 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 g
et
 a
n 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f p
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 re
ga
rd
in
g 
sa
fe
ty
 a
nd
 
pe
rs
on
al
 jo
b 
ne
ed
s 
in
 p
et
ro
ch
em
ic
al
 
pl
an
ts
. T
hi
s 
st
ud
y 
im
pr
ov
es
 m
y 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 th
is
 th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 a
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 d
ig
no
se
 s
af
et
y 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
en
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
id
es
 p
ro
pe
r c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
on
 
th
e 
to
pi
c
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e,
 m
ea
su
re
, m
et
ho
d,
 a
nd
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 e
ns
ur
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
ex
te
rn
al
 v
al
id
ity
. T
he
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
ar
e 
 u
se
d 
co
rr
ec
tly
 a
nd
 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
ly.
 T
he
 m
aj
or
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 
of
 th
e 
st
at
is
tic
al
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 w
el
l 
m
et
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 o
ffe
rs
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r a
dd
in
g 
on
 to
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
th
eo
ry
. T
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
 d
is
cu
ss
 th
e 
ne
ed
 
fo
r a
dd
iti
on
al
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 to
 
fin
d 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 o
f s
af
e 
be
ho
vi
ou
r a
nd
 
at
tit
ud
s.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r m
ak
es
 a
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
th
eo
ry
, e
m
pi
ric
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e,
 a
nd
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
e.
H
ou
gh
to
n 
et
 a
l.
N
o 
sa
fe
ty
 in
 n
um
be
rs
: 
P
er
si
st
en
ce
 o
f b
ia
se
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r e
ffe
ct
s 
on
 te
am
 ri
sk
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
an
d 
te
am
 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g
G
ro
up
 a
nd
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
20
00
N
ot
 s
pe
ci
fie
d
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 in
di
ca
te
s 
th
at
 th
e 
la
w
 o
f 
sm
al
l n
um
bb
er
s 
bi
as
 a
nd
 il
lu
si
on
 o
f 
co
nt
ro
l d
ec
re
as
e 
th
e 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
at
 b
ot
h 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
nd
 te
am
 le
ve
l. 
Th
e 
la
w
 o
f s
m
al
l n
um
be
rs
 h
ad
 a
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 g
re
at
er
 e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
te
am
 ri
sk
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
th
an
 o
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 ri
sk
 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s
In
di
vi
du
al
 a
nd
 te
am
 
ba
se
d 
se
rv
ey
s 
am
on
g 
M
B
A
-s
tu
de
nt
s,
 b
as
ed
 
on
 a
 H
B
R
-c
as
e 
st
ud
y
Th
e 
pa
pe
r e
xt
en
d 
th
eo
ry
 to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
bi
as
es
, r
is
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 a
nd
 d
ec
is
io
n 
m
ak
in
g.
 T
he
 
su
pp
or
ts
 m
y 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
of
 p
rio
r 
re
se
ar
ch
 in
 th
is
 a
re
a.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
id
es
 p
ro
pe
r c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
on
 
th
e 
to
pi
c.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
st
ud
y 
am
on
g 
M
B
A
-
st
ud
en
ts
 fr
om
 fi
ve
 d
iff
er
en
t c
la
se
s 
at
 a
 
U
S
 s
ta
te
 u
ni
ve
rs
ity
. T
he
 s
am
pl
e,
 
m
ea
su
re
s,
 m
et
ho
ds
, o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
, a
nd
 
an
al
ys
es
 e
ns
ur
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 e
xt
er
na
l 
va
lid
ity
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 h
yp
ot
he
se
s,
 a
nd
 o
ffe
rs
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t e
m
pi
ric
al
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r 
co
un
te
rin
g 
ex
is
tin
g 
th
eo
ry
.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ou
nt
er
s 
th
e 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
ns
 o
f s
om
e 
sc
ho
la
rs
 w
ho
 
su
gg
es
te
d 
th
at
 a
dd
in
g 
pe
ao
pl
e 
to
 a
 
de
ci
si
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
 is
 li
ke
ly
 to
 p
ro
te
ct
 
ag
ai
ns
 b
ia
se
s.
H
ar
ve
y 
et
 a
l.
Th
e 
ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
of
 
tra
in
in
g 
to
 c
ha
ng
e 
sa
fe
ty
 
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 a
tti
tu
de
s 
w
ith
in
 
a 
hi
gh
ly
 re
gu
la
te
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
P
er
so
nn
el
 R
ev
ie
w
20
01
N
uc
le
ar
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 p
la
nt
 
in
 th
e 
U
K
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 s
ho
w
s 
th
at
 s
af
et
y 
tra
in
in
gs
 h
av
e 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 im
pa
nc
t 
pr
ed
om
in
an
tly
 fo
r m
an
ag
m
en
t, 
no
t 
fo
r s
ho
p 
flo
or
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s
Q
ua
nt
iti
at
iv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s
S
er
ve
y 
of
 6
0 
Li
ke
rt-
st
yl
e 
ite
m
s 
(6
 a
ns
w
er
 
po
in
ts
), 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
on
 
tw
o 
oc
ca
si
on
s 
16
 
m
on
th
s 
ap
ar
t
Th
e 
pa
pe
r t
es
ts
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f t
ra
in
in
g 
to
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
, a
tti
tu
de
s 
an
d 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
in
 n
uc
le
ar
 p
ow
er
 p
la
nt
s 
in
 
th
e 
U
K
. 
Th
e 
pa
pe
r o
ffe
rs
 e
xt
en
si
ve
 in
si
gh
ts
 in
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
on
 ri
sk
 ta
ki
ng
, r
is
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 c
ul
tu
re
.
Th
e 
la
rg
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
d 
in
 th
e 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
su
rv
ay
 e
ns
ur
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 
ex
te
rn
al
 v
al
id
ity
. T
he
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 a
re
 u
se
d 
co
rr
ec
tly
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
aj
or
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 w
el
l m
et
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 h
yp
ot
he
se
s,
 a
nd
 o
ffe
rs
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t e
m
pi
ric
al
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r a
dd
in
g 
on
 to
 e
xi
st
in
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e.
 Q
ue
st
io
ns
 
co
ul
d 
be
 ra
is
ed
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
m
et
ho
d 
ch
os
en
. A
s 
th
e 
au
th
or
s 
in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 
ris
k 
m
ay
 b
e 
se
en
 a
s 
pa
rtl
y 
so
ci
al
ly
 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 (p
. 6
18
) i
t w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 to
 c
on
bi
ne
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 m
et
ho
ds
 w
ith
 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
m
et
ho
ds
.
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 m
ak
es
 a
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
bo
th
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
e.
H
ar
ve
y 
et
 a
l.
A
n 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
 a
tti
tu
de
s 
in
 a
 h
ig
hl
y 
re
gu
la
te
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
W
or
k 
an
d 
S
tre
ss
20
02
N
uc
le
ar
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 p
la
nt
 
in
 th
e 
U
K
Th
e 
co
nc
lu
si
on
 o
f t
hi
s 
st
ud
y 
is
 th
at
 
th
er
e 
ar
e 
tw
o 
or
 m
or
e 
sa
fe
ty
 c
ul
tu
re
s 
in
 a
n 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n.
 In
 th
is
 c
as
e,
 th
re
e 
cu
ltu
re
s 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
am
on
g 
th
re
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
 g
ro
up
s.
Q
ua
nt
iti
at
iv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s
S
er
ve
y 
of
 6
0 
Li
ke
rt-
st
yl
e 
ite
m
s 
(6
 a
ns
w
er
 
po
in
ts
), 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
in
 
2 
U
K
 p
la
nt
s
G
oo
d 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
, s
af
et
y 
va
lu
es
, a
nd
 th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 c
ul
tu
re
 c
an
 d
iff
er
 
am
on
g 
te
am
s 
in
 o
ne
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
n.
 L
in
k 
to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 le
ad
er
sh
ip
 s
ty
le
s.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
re
le
va
nt
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
id
es
 p
ro
pe
r c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
on
 
th
e 
to
pi
c
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e,
 m
ea
su
re
s,
 m
et
ho
ds
, 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
, p
ro
ce
du
re
s,
 a
nd
 
st
at
is
tic
al
 a
na
ly
se
s 
al
l e
ns
ur
e 
in
te
rn
al
 
an
d 
ex
te
rn
al
 v
al
id
ity
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 th
e 
hy
po
th
es
es
, a
nd
 
su
ffi
ci
en
t e
m
pi
ric
al
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r a
dd
in
g 
on
 to
 e
xi
st
in
g 
th
eo
ry
.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r m
ak
es
 a
 n
ew
 a
nd
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e.
Za
ch
ar
at
os
 e
t 
al
.
H
ig
h-
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 w
or
k 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l 
sa
fe
ty
Jo
ur
na
l o
f A
pp
lie
d 
P
sy
ch
ol
og
y
20
05
C
an
ad
ia
n 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 +
 
te
le
co
m
 a
nd
 
pe
tro
le
um
 
in
du
st
ry
Tr
us
t i
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 p
er
ce
iv
ed
 
sa
fe
ty
 c
lim
at
e 
ar
e 
fo
un
d 
to
 m
ed
ia
te
 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
hi
gh
-
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 w
or
k 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
, m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 p
er
so
na
l s
af
et
y 
or
ie
nt
at
ie
n 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 in
ci
de
nt
s
Q
ua
nt
iti
at
iv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s
S
er
ve
y 
am
on
g 
H
R
 
pr
ac
tit
io
ne
rs
 (s
tu
dy
 1
) 
an
d 
op
er
at
or
s 
in
 th
e 
pe
tro
le
um
 a
nd
 
te
le
co
m
 in
du
st
ry
Th
e 
pa
pe
r i
nv
es
tig
at
es
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
hi
gh
-p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 w
or
k 
sy
st
em
s 
an
d 
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l s
af
et
y.
 M
aj
or
 c
on
ce
pt
s 
ar
e 
cl
ea
rly
 e
la
bo
ra
te
d 
an
d 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
re
le
va
nt
 a
nd
 e
xc
el
le
nt
 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
es
 p
ro
pe
r c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
on
 th
e 
to
pi
c
R
es
ea
rc
h 
ba
se
d 
on
 to
 s
tu
di
es
: i
n 
S
tu
dy
 
1,
 d
at
a 
w
as
 o
bt
ai
ne
d 
fro
m
 c
om
pa
ny
 
hu
m
an
 re
so
ur
ce
 a
nd
 s
af
et
y 
di
re
ct
or
s 
ac
ro
ss
 1
38
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
. S
tu
dy
 2
 u
se
d 
da
ta
 fr
om
 1
89
 fr
on
t-l
in
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
in
 2
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
.
Th
es
e 
2 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
co
nf
irm
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 ro
le
 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l f
ac
to
rs
 p
la
y 
in
 e
ns
ur
in
g 
w
or
ke
r s
af
et
y
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 in
di
ca
te
s 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(i.
e.
, 
sa
fe
ty
 k
no
w
le
dg
e,
 s
af
et
y 
m
ot
iv
at
io
n,
 
sa
fe
ty
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e,
 a
nd
 s
af
et
y 
in
iti
at
iv
e)
 
an
d 
m
od
er
at
or
s 
(i.
e.
, i
nj
ur
ie
s 
re
qu
iri
ng
 
fir
st
 a
id
 a
nd
 n
ea
r m
is
se
s)
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ris
k 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n.
B
ur
ns
 e
t a
l.
E
xp
lic
it 
an
d 
im
pl
ic
it 
tru
st
 
w
ith
in
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
R
is
k 
A
na
ly
si
s
20
06
U
K
 g
as
 p
la
nt
Tr
us
t a
nd
 d
is
tru
st
 a
re
 fi
nd
 to
 b
e 
se
pa
ra
te
 c
on
st
ru
ct
s.
 W
or
ke
rs
 
ex
pr
es
se
s 
ex
pl
ic
it 
tru
st
 fo
r t
he
ir 
w
or
km
at
es
, s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 a
nd
 s
en
io
r 
m
an
ag
er
s,
 b
ut
 o
nl
y 
im
pl
ic
it 
tru
st
 fo
r 
th
ei
r w
or
km
at
es
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
 a
nd
 
pr
im
in
g 
ta
sk
O
ne
-o
n-
on
e 
m
ee
tin
gs
 
w
ith
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 in
 a
 
pr
iv
at
e 
ro
om
, 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
by
 a
 
re
se
ac
he
r
Th
e 
ar
tic
le
 p
ro
po
se
s 
a 
m
od
el
 th
at
 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
iz
es
 e
xp
lic
it 
tru
st
 a
s 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
su
rfa
ce
 le
ve
ls
 o
f s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 
im
pl
ic
it 
tru
st
 a
s 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
de
ep
er
 le
ve
ls
 
of
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r d
oe
sn
't 
m
ak
e 
fu
ll 
us
e 
of
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
s 
of
 tr
us
t, 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 a
nd
 s
af
et
y 
be
ha
vi
ou
r.
Th
e 
au
th
or
s 
ba
se
d 
th
ei
r r
es
ea
rc
h 
on
 a
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
 a
nd
 a
 
pr
im
in
g 
ta
sk
. T
he
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s 
ar
e 
co
rr
ec
tly
 u
se
d,
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
aj
or
 
as
su
m
pt
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 w
el
l m
et
. 5
3 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
(+
/- 
50
%
 o
f t
he
 w
or
kf
or
ce
) p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 
in
 th
e 
st
ud
y.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
hy
po
th
es
es
, a
nd
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 g
ro
un
ds
 fo
r 
ad
di
ng
 o
n 
to
 e
xi
st
in
g 
th
eo
ry
. T
he
 
pr
im
in
g 
te
st
 is
 a
 g
oo
d 
m
et
ho
d 
to
 
ad
dr
es
s 
th
e 
im
pl
ic
it 
tru
st
, b
ut
 n
ot
 to
 
ev
al
ua
te
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
sa
fe
ty
 c
ul
tu
re
 
(th
at
 w
as
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 re
se
ar
ch
 
ob
je
ct
iv
e!
)
Th
e 
au
th
or
s 
cl
ai
m
 to
 p
re
se
nt
 a
 m
od
el
 o
f 
tru
st
 w
ith
in
 s
af
et
y 
cu
ltu
re
, u
nf
or
tu
na
te
ly
 
th
ey
 d
on
't.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 p
ap
er
 m
ak
es
 a
n 
in
te
re
st
in
g 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
e.
C
on
ch
ie
 a
nd
 
D
on
al
d
Th
e 
ro
le
 o
f d
is
tru
st
 in
 
of
fs
ho
re
 s
af
et
y 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
R
is
k 
A
na
ly
si
s
20
06
U
K
 o
ffs
ho
re
 g
as
 
pl
an
t
A
tti
tu
de
s 
to
w
ar
d 
of
fs
ho
re
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
th
e 
st
ro
ng
es
t p
re
di
ct
or
 o
f s
af
et
y 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 a
t a
n 
in
du
st
ry
 le
ve
l. 
A
t 
in
st
al
la
tio
n 
le
ve
l, 
sa
fe
ty
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
w
as
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 b
y 
at
tit
ud
es
 to
w
ar
d 
co
nt
ra
ct
or
s 
an
d 
w
or
km
at
es
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
se
rv
ey
lo
gi
st
ic
 re
gr
es
si
on
 
an
al
ys
is
Th
e 
pa
pe
r t
es
t t
he
or
y 
to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
tru
st
 a
nd
 ri
sk
 p
er
ce
pt
io
n.
 M
aj
or
 
co
nc
ep
ts
 a
re
 c
le
ar
ly
 e
la
bo
ra
te
d 
an
d 
ex
pl
ai
ne
d.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 in
 
th
e 
fie
ld
s 
of
 tr
us
t, 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
se
fe
ty
 b
eh
av
io
ur
.
Th
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
 o
f t
he
 s
tu
dy
 d
on
't 
fu
lly
 
en
su
re
 e
xt
er
na
l v
al
id
ity
; t
he
 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
s 
w
er
e 
di
st
rib
ut
ed
 b
y 
of
fs
ho
re
 o
ffi
ce
rs
, a
nd
 a
fte
r t
hr
ee
 w
ee
ks
 
co
lle
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
er
s.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e,
 n
o 
pr
op
pe
r e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
or
 
gu
id
el
in
es
 c
ou
ld
 w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 th
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s.
Th
e 
m
et
ho
d 
ch
os
en
 (q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e)
 is
 
no
t r
ea
lly
 in
 li
ne
 w
ith
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
ru
st
.
A
lth
ou
gh
 th
e 
de
si
gn
 o
f t
he
 re
se
ar
ch
 is
 
di
sc
us
sa
bl
e,
 it
 is
 th
e 
fir
st
 s
tu
dy
 th
at
 
ex
am
in
es
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f d
is
tru
st
 o
n 
sa
fe
ty
 
be
ha
vi
ou
r. 
M
ic
ha
el
 e
t a
l.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
or
 
im
pa
ct
s 
on
 s
ub
or
di
na
te
s'
 
sa
fe
ty
 o
ut
co
m
es
: A
n 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
of
 le
ad
er
-
m
em
be
r e
xc
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Jo
ur
na
l o
f S
af
et
y 
R
es
ea
rc
h
20
06
W
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
in
 th
e 
U
S
A
Th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f l
ea
de
r-
m
em
be
r 
ex
ch
an
ge
 is
 g
re
at
er
 th
an
 th
at
 o
f 
sa
fe
ty
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
 p
re
di
ct
in
g 
sa
fe
ty
-r
el
at
ed
 e
ve
nt
s.
 A
ls
o 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
jo
b 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n,
 g
en
de
r a
nd
 a
ge
 
ha
ve
 s
af
et
y 
im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
se
rv
ey
59
8 
w
or
ke
rs
 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
d 
in
 a
 
se
rv
ey
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
LM
X
, s
af
et
y 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 jo
b 
sa
tis
fa
ct
io
n 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
-r
el
at
ed
 e
ve
nt
s.
R
es
ea
rc
h 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
LM
X
-th
eo
ry
 a
s 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 G
re
an
 &
 U
hl
-B
ie
n 
(1
99
5)
 to
 
st
ud
y 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
LM
X
 a
nd
 
sa
fe
ty
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
G
oo
d 
ci
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
on
 L
M
X
 
an
d 
pr
op
er
 c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
, b
ut
 p
oo
r r
ef
fe
re
nc
in
g 
to
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 in
 
th
e 
fie
ld
 o
f r
is
k 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
at
 fi
ve
 w
oo
d 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 c
om
pl
et
ed
 a
 s
ur
ve
y 
du
rin
g 
th
ei
r w
or
k 
sh
ift
. T
hi
s 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 
da
ta
 o
n 
LM
X
, s
af
et
y 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n,
 
an
d 
sa
fe
ty
-r
el
at
ed
 e
ve
nt
s.
 A
rc
hi
va
l d
at
a 
on
 O
S
H
A 
re
co
rd
ab
le
s 
w
er
e 
al
so
 
ob
ta
in
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
er
s'
 h
um
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
s 
da
ta
ba
se
. 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 o
ffe
rs
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r a
dd
in
g 
on
 to
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
th
eo
ry
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 s
af
et
y 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
LM
X
.
R
es
ul
ts
 fr
om
 th
is
 s
tu
dy
 fu
rth
er
 e
m
ph
as
iz
e 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
or
s 
an
d 
ill
us
tra
te
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l r
ol
e 
of
 le
ad
er
-
m
em
be
r e
xc
ha
ng
e 
in
 e
nh
an
ci
ng
 
w
or
kp
la
ce
 s
af
et
y.
 313 
 
 
Q
ua
lit
y 
ap
pr
ai
sa
l o
f 
th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 p
ap
er
s
2
C
on
ch
ie
 a
nd
 
B
ur
ns
Tr
us
t a
nd
 ri
sk
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
in
 h
ig
h-
ris
k 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
: A
 te
st
 o
f 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 fr
om
 s
oc
ia
l r
is
k 
re
se
ar
ch
R
is
k 
A
na
ly
si
s
20
08
H
ea
lth
 (U
K
)
Th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 tr
us
t b
el
ie
fs
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
op
en
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
is
 w
ea
ke
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 tr
us
t f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
a 
la
ck
 
of
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
Th
e 
le
ve
l o
f t
ru
st
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
(o
r l
ac
k 
of
) i
nf
lu
en
ce
d 
th
e 
w
ay
 th
at
 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 ri
sk
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 
pr
oc
es
se
d.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
se
rv
ey
 o
f 3
93
 
st
ud
en
t n
ur
se
s
A 
m
ix
ed
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
su
rv
ey
 d
es
ig
n:
 b
as
ed
 
on
 b
et
w
ee
n-
 a
nd
 w
ith
i-
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s
Th
e 
pa
pe
r t
es
t t
he
 tr
us
t a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 
pr
in
ci
pl
e,
 a
s 
de
sc
rib
ed
 b
y 
S
lo
vi
c 
(1
99
3)
Th
e 
pa
pe
r c
ite
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
.
I'm
 s
til
l s
ur
pr
is
ed
 w
hy
 re
se
ar
ch
er
s 
ke
ep
 
on
 te
st
in
g 
ty
pi
ca
l s
oc
ia
l c
on
st
ru
ct
s 
su
ch
 
as
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
tru
st
 w
ith
 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
m
et
ho
ds
.
A
n 
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l s
ur
ve
y 
of
 s
tu
de
nt
 
nu
rs
es
 is
 n
ot
 e
xa
ct
ly
 a
n 
ex
am
pl
e 
of
 a
 
H
R
O
!
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 s
ug
ge
st
s 
th
at
 o
ne
 w
ay
 to
 
in
cr
ea
se
 tr
us
t w
ith
in
 h
ig
h-
ris
k 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 is
 th
ro
ug
h 
op
en
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 
D
illo
n 
an
d 
Ti
ns
le
y
H
ow
 n
ea
r-m
is
se
s 
in
flu
en
ce
 
de
ci
si
on
 m
ak
in
g 
un
de
r r
is
k:
 
A 
m
is
se
d 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 fo
r 
le
ar
ni
ng
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
S
ci
en
ce
20
08
N
A
S
A 
(U
S
)
N
ea
r-m
is
se
s 
ar
e 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
as
 
su
cc
es
se
s,
 a
nd
 th
is
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
le
ad
s 
pe
op
le
 to
 c
ho
os
e 
a 
ris
ki
er
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 a
 lo
w
er
 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d 
ris
k 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ne
ar
-m
is
s 
ev
en
ts
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
se
rv
ey
 a
m
on
g 
st
ud
en
ts
 a
nd
 
N
A
S
A 
st
af
f b
as
ed
 
on
 a
 fi
ct
iv
e 
sc
en
ar
io
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
an
al
ys
is
 
of
 th
e 
da
ta
.
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 e
xt
en
d 
th
eo
ry
 to
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ris
k 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
in
 a
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l w
ay
. I
t 
ex
pl
ai
ns
 w
hy
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 d
on
't 
le
ar
n 
fro
m
 n
ea
r-m
is
se
s.
G
oo
d 
ci
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 
an
d 
pr
op
er
 c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
, c
or
re
ct
ly
 a
pp
lie
d 
an
d 
m
aj
or
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 o
f t
he
 s
ta
tis
tic
al
 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 a
re
 re
as
on
ab
ly
 w
el
l m
et
.
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 m
ak
es
 a
 n
ic
e 
sy
nt
he
si
s 
of
 
th
e 
lin
k 
be
tw
ee
n 
fo
rm
al
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
al
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 
an
d 
w
hy
 th
is
 o
fte
n 
fa
ils
 in
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r m
ak
es
 a
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l 
co
nt
rib
ut
io
n 
to
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
em
pi
ric
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
e.
C
on
ch
ie
 a
nd
 
B
ur
ns
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
oc
cu
pa
tio
na
l 
sa
fe
ty
: u
si
ng
 a
 tr
us
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ur
ce
 to
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
e 
ab
ou
t r
is
k
Jo
ur
na
l o
f R
is
k 
R
es
ea
rc
h
20
09
O
ne
 s
in
gl
e 
U
K
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n 
si
te
Tr
us
t i
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fro
m
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
m
an
ag
er
, s
af
et
y 
m
an
ag
er
, U
K
 H
S
E
 
an
d 
w
or
km
at
es
 is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
so
ur
ce
’s
 a
cc
ur
ac
y,
 w
hi
le
 tr
us
t i
n 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fro
m
 s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 is
 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
ei
r d
em
on
st
ra
tio
ns
 o
f 
ca
re
. T
he
 U
K
 H
S
E
 a
nd
 s
af
et
y 
m
an
ag
er
 e
m
er
ge
d 
as
 th
e 
m
os
t 
tru
st
ed
 s
ou
rc
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
m
os
t 
in
flu
en
tia
l i
n 
sh
ap
in
g 
w
or
ke
rs
’ r
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
be
ha
vi
ou
ra
l i
nt
en
tio
ns
.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
se
rv
ey
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
Li
ke
rt-
ty
pe
 
qu
es
tio
nn
ai
re
C
od
in
g 
of
 d
at
a 
on
 a
 
si
x-
po
in
t s
ca
le
, w
ith
 
ea
ch
 p
oi
nt
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
by
 in
cr
em
en
ts
 o
f 2
0%
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
th
eo
ry
 in
 
th
e 
fie
ld
 o
f t
ru
st
, t
ru
st
w
or
th
in
es
s,
 a
nd
 
tru
st
 in
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ur
ce
s.
Th
e 
pa
pe
r d
oe
sn
't 
m
ak
e 
fu
ll 
us
e 
of
 th
e 
ex
is
tin
g 
lit
er
at
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
s 
of
 tr
us
t, 
ris
k 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n,
 a
nd
 s
af
et
y 
be
ha
vi
ou
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
 th
e 
do
m
in
an
t a
ut
ho
rs
 in
 th
e 
fie
ld
 a
re
 c
ite
d 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 u
nd
er
pi
n 
th
ei
r 
cl
ai
m
s.
Q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
m
on
g 
13
1 
w
or
ke
rs
 fr
om
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
in
du
st
ria
l 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n 
si
te
. T
he
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 a
re
 
st
at
is
tic
al
ly
 w
el
l e
xa
m
in
ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
ns
lu
ci
on
s 
w
el
l i
nt
er
pr
et
ed
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
do
es
 n
ot
 re
ve
al
 b
ig
 
su
rp
ris
es
; M
ay
er
 e
t a
l (
19
95
) a
nd
 
S
ch
oo
rm
an
 e
t a
l (
20
07
) a
lre
ad
y 
in
di
ca
te
d 
th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
of
 tr
us
tw
or
th
in
es
s.
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f t
hi
s 
st
ud
y 
ca
n 
he
lp
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
ns
 to
 d
es
ig
n 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 
sa
fe
ty
 c
am
pa
ig
ns
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 to
ne
 o
f 
vo
ic
e 
an
d 
th
e 
se
nd
er
 o
f t
he
 m
es
sa
ge
.
Lo
m
ba
rd
i e
t a
l.
Fa
ct
or
s 
in
flu
en
ci
ng
 w
or
ke
r 
us
e 
of
 p
er
so
na
l p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
ey
ew
ea
r
A
cc
id
en
t A
na
ly
si
s 
an
d 
P
re
ve
nt
io
n
20
09
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g,
 
co
ns
tru
ct
io
n,
 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
e/
re
ta
il 
in
du
st
ry
 in
 
M
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
 
U
S
A
La
ck
 o
f c
om
fo
rt/
fit
, a
nd
 fo
gg
in
g 
an
d 
sc
ra
tc
hi
ng
 o
f t
he
 e
ye
w
ea
r w
er
e 
su
gg
es
te
d 
as
 th
e 
m
os
t i
m
po
rta
nt
 
ba
rri
er
s 
to
 p
er
so
na
l p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
ey
ew
ea
r (
P
P
E
) u
sa
ge
. Y
ou
ng
er
 a
ge
 
an
d 
la
ck
 o
f s
af
et
y 
tra
in
in
g 
w
er
e 
ot
he
r 
im
po
rta
nt
 fa
ct
or
s 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
us
e 
of
 
P
P
E
.
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 b
as
ed
 
on
 7
 fo
cu
s 
gr
ou
ps
N
ot
 e
xp
la
in
ed
Th
e 
pa
pe
r i
de
nt
ifi
es
 a
nd
 d
es
cr
ib
es
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
th
at
 in
flu
en
ce
 a
 w
or
ke
rs
’ d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 w
ea
r p
er
so
na
l p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
ey
ew
ea
r a
nd
 
th
e 
ba
rri
er
s 
th
at
 e
xi
st
 in
 p
re
ve
nt
in
g 
th
ei
r 
us
e.
G
oo
d 
ci
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 li
te
ra
tu
re
 
an
d 
pr
op
er
 c
re
di
t t
o 
ex
is
tin
g 
w
or
k 
in
 th
e 
fie
ld
.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
se
rie
s 
of
 fo
cu
s 
gr
ou
ps
 e
nr
ol
le
d 
w
or
ke
rs
 a
nd
 
su
pe
rv
is
or
s 
pr
im
ar
ily
 fr
om
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g,
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n,
 o
r 
se
rv
ic
e/
re
ta
il 
in
du
st
rie
s 
th
at
 h
ad
 
po
te
nt
ia
l e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 e
ye
 in
ju
ry
 
ha
za
rd
s 
in
 th
ei
r j
ob
 ta
sk
s.
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
pr
ov
id
es
 a
 g
oo
d 
te
st
 o
f t
he
 
th
eo
ry
 a
nd
 o
ffe
rs
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 e
m
pi
ric
al
 
gr
ou
nd
s 
fo
r a
dd
in
g 
on
 to
 e
xi
st
in
g 
th
eo
ry
. T
he
 m
et
ho
d 
ch
os
en
 
(q
ua
lit
at
iv
e)
 is
 v
er
y 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 fo
r t
he
 
re
se
ar
ch
 q
ue
st
io
n 
an
d 
th
eo
ry
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
y 
do
 n
ot
 d
is
cl
os
e 
th
e 
w
ay
 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
da
ta
 w
er
e 
an
al
ys
ed
.
S
ev
er
al
 p
ot
en
tia
lly
 m
od
ifi
ab
le
 fa
ct
or
s 
ar
e 
id
en
tif
ie
d 
th
at
 le
ad
 to
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
w
or
ke
rs
’ p
er
so
na
l p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
ey
ew
ea
r 
(P
P
E
) u
se
 . 
In
 d
oi
ng
 s
o,
 th
e 
pa
pe
r m
ak
es
 
a 
m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l c
on
tri
bu
tio
n 
to
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Appendix F Overview of risk elements 
 
Risk types (8) Risk groups (42)
Fires & leaks Explosion Explosion Outburst
Gas explosion
Gas leak Gas leak Containment of gas
High pressure gas leak Complete rupture
Gas leak in pipe line Escape of gas
Gas leak (not ignited) Gas leak at terminal
Gas leak in train nr. 1 Major gas leak
Leak
Minor gas leak Minor leaks Minimal gas leak
Small gas leak
Gas fire Fire (Gas) fire
Gas fire
Fire in process area
Fire (not linked to gas) Fire Electrical fire
Fire (general) Minor fire
Damage onshore pipeline Damage onshore pipeline
Domino effects Domino effects
Injuries & illness Maintenance on plant Labour in pit Labour using heat sources on plant
Maintenance back-up electricity group
A piece that needs to be maintained, but not free of gas
Contractors Contractors Accident with contractor
Contractor not wearing personal protection
Contractors neglecting safety rules
Vehicle on the plant
Personal Protection Systems (PPS) Cut wounds Minor eye injury
Working without gloves
Not wearing appropriate gloves
Not wearing protection clothes
Sickness Illness Sickness operator
Staff's well-being
Sickness staff
Human error with Someone hurts him/herself To fall
physical consequences Stumbling danger Personal accident
Bruises Burn
Electrocution Falling from scaffolding
Small personal injuries
Serious personal accident
Badly stored items
Death Deadly accident
Emissions Chemical incident Leak in water glycol system Working with chemicals
Inerting' with nitrogen Contamination in the system
Water Glycol leak
Glycol leak
Noise pollution Noise pollution
Criminal acts Criminal acts Terrorism Burglary
Bomb warning Letter bomb
Hacker Attack
Hacking of leased lines ZB-DT
External threat (Terrorism)
Financial Financial Bribary
Risks (168)
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External factors Image Bad publicity
Closing down plant Closing down plant
Airplane crash Airplane crash
Facilitating Equipment Inspection of equipment Mal-functioning chromatographs
systems Broken air compressor Us of ladders
Ordering tools without valid certifications
Mal-use of equipment
Working with non-approved equipment/tools
Access Access badges
Access Dunkirk (DTDA)
Technical problems with HVAC offices (=airco) LAN rupture
IT/non operating systems Cooler failure Electricity rupture
Electricity black-out (no operations possible)
Heavy PCDA problems (=computer screens)
Lost of communication between ZPT and DTA
Black-out of crucial systems
Rupture of telephone lines
Heating of server room
Banalities Broken chair in the meeting room
Broken coffee machine
Maintenance Drainage of metering tubes 
Gassco specific Pressure in pipe system Pressure in pipeline Differences in pressure in tubes
process Making the terminal pressure free
Mechanical problem Mechanical problem Malfuctionings
Mechanical defect
Technical error on installation Technical errors
False alarm False alarm False process shut down
Failure of safety systems Fire water 
Black-out safety systems
Testing smoke alarms
Failure of process systems Rupture of safety electric group
Rupture DCS (controle system)
Redundant equipment failure
Meters vent-installation Unplanned shutdown
Quality Control No follow-up of gas quality
Contamination in gas
Problems with pipes Major Accident Potential
Behavioural issues Work permits contractors No timely execution of work orders on utilities
No follow-up of work permits
No returned work permits
Processing of work permits
Working without a work permit
No response to alarms No response to alarms
Strikes Strikes
Lack of experience Lack of experience among new employees
Safety on excursions Safety on excursions
Human error with technical consequences Minor accident
No timely reporting of malfunctionings No execution of preventive maintenance + fieldlogging OPS
Not acting according procedures Not acting according procedures
Unsafe operations
Bad communication Bad communication
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Appendix G Overview of constructs 
 
Construct types (7) Construct groups (36) Construct left Construct right
Tangible & non Image & media No reputational damage Major reputational damage
tangible damage No media-impact / awareness Major media-impact / awareness
No image damage Major image damage
No media-attention Lots of media-attention (front-page news)
Reputational damage No impact on reputation
Tangible & non Environment Low impact on environment Major impact on environment
tangible damage No danger for the environment Danger for the environment is massive
Very dangerous products involved No dangerous products involved
No impact on environment Causes environmental damage
No impact on environment Impact on environment
No impact on environment Maximal impact on environment (environmental disaster)
No impact on environment 100% environmental impact
No impact on environment Major impact on environment
No impact on environment Impact on environment
Nothing to do with chemical substances 100% linked to chemical substances
No ecological impact High ecological impact
No environmental impact Major environmental impact
Tangible & non Material damage No damage on installation Major damage on installation
tangible damage Minimal damage Maximal damage
No material damage Large material damage
No material damage Lots of material damage
The installation continious its production Complete shut down of installation
No damage of installation Damage of installation
Tangible & non Duration of consequences Consequences on short term Consequences on the long term
tangible damage Can be quickly fixed It takes a while to fix it
Tangible & non Clients Little economical impact (damage) for Gassco & clients Major economical impact (damage) for Gassco & clients
tangible damage No impact on supply to clients Supply to clients stops
No impact on supply to clients Major impact on supply to clients
Tangible & non Financial impact Low financial impact High financial impact 
tangible damage Low costs High costs
Little financial damage Large financial damage
No financial lost Financial lost
No economical impact Major economical impact
Tangible & non Scale of impact The consequences are minimal (can be fixed)) The consequences are disastrous
tangible damage Minimal impact Large scale impact
Minimal consequences for ZPT Major consequences for ZPT
It is really bad It looks worser than it really is
No impact on Gassco Major impact on Gassco
Minimal consequences for ZPT Large consequences for ZPT
Impact on the entire organisation No impact at all on the organisation
Potential consequences are small Potential consequences are large
Plant & process Production process The consequences on production are small The consequences on production are large
related No operational consequences Massive operational consequences
100% linked to the production process on the plant Nothing to do with the production process on the plant
No lost of production Major lost of production
No impact on production Massive impact on production
No operational consequences Lots of operational consequences
Production will never stop Production wil definitely stops
Production is not involved Production stops
No impact on production Production stops
No impact on systems The system brakes down
Nothing to do with our installation Everything to do with the installation
No impact on continuity of the plant The plant is out
Production continious Production stops
No impact on production Major impact on production
Plant & process Gas related Gas related Not gas related
related Linked to gas Not linked to gas
Has something to do with gas Has nothing to do with gas
Not gas related Entirely gas related
100% related to gas Has nothing to do with gas
Plant & process Pipe pressure Doesn't lead to a high pressure gas leak Definitely leads to a high pressure gas leak
related Not related to pressure Pressure related
Plant & process Physical location Inside the control room Outside the control room
related Independent of location Dependent of location
Has in every aspect to do with the plant Has nothing to do with the plant
Happens outside the process area Happens inside the process area
Has nothing to do with the design of the plant Has to do with the design of the plant
Happens on the plant Happens in the building
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Outcome probability Internal or external The outside world is not affraid The outside world is definitely affraid
consequences Major consequences for the neighbourhood Minor consequences for the neighbourhood
Impact solely on ZPT Impact on neighbouring companies
No danger for neighbouring companies Danger for neighbouring companies is large
Doesn't activate an incident immediately (fire / explosion)Immediately activates an incident (fire / explosion)
Might lead to fire Will never lead to fire
Doesn't lead to an explosion Will certainly lead to an explosion
Has nothing to do with fire Has definitely to do with fire
Doesn't lead to an accident Will definitely lead to an accident
Outcome probability Probability The chance it happens is non existing The chance it happens is certain
The impact of the risk is quasi non existent (neglectable)The impact of the risk is very large (100%)
Certain risk Uncertain risk
The chance it happens is high, consequences are low The chance it happens is small,  consequences are high
Chance there will be a fire is 0% Chance there will be a fire is 100%
The chance an accident will happen is zero 100% certainty an accident will occur
It never occured to Gassco It already happened to Gassco
It seldom happens It fequently happens
0% chance it will happen The chance it happens is real
Non human Internal or external Happens outside our will (little influence on Gassco) Happens among us (large influence on Gassco)
root causes cause External factor that leads to a crisis is non-existant External factor that leads to a crisis is 100% certain
Root cause is outside Gassco Root cause is inside Gassco
External cause Internal cause
No physical presence Physical presence
External factors Internal factors
Unknown Known
Danger is inside Gassco Danger is outside Gassco
Internal root cause External root cause
Non human Work permits No work permits required Always work permits required
root causes Nothing to do with work permits Everything to do with work permits
Non human Scale of situation Safe situation (enough staff) Risky situation
root causes Not really a dangerous situation Definitely a dangerous situation
Non human Flaws, mechanical, Problems due to electronics Mechanical problems
root causes electronics Not related to defects 100% related to defects
Non human Various parameters Products Materials
root causes Has nothing to do with ladders Has always to do with ladders
Always fire-related Always gas-related
Factors external to pipelines Factors inside the pipelines
Nothing to do with cooling mechanisms It has to do with cooling mechanisms
Nothing to do with electricity Exclusively to do with electricity
Nothing to do with air Exclusively to do with air
No quality Quality
Silence Extremely loud noice
Nothing to do with heat Exclusively to do with heat
Nothing to do with leaks Exclusively to do with leaks
Nothing to do with fire Exclusively to do with fire
Human factors Experience Experience will allert in time No experience will not allert at all
Gassco has nothing to learn Gassco (still) has a lot to learn
Routine Experience does not sounds an alarm
Human factors Human or technical error Human error Technical error
Internal threat External threat
Human factor Technical factor
The risk is linked to processes The risk is linkded to individuals
No impact of a mechanical problem Major impact of a mechanical problem
100% computer driven 100% manual
Technical error Human error
Human failure No human failure
Human cause Technical cause
No systems error 100% Systems error
There are always humans involved There are never humans involved
No error made by staff Error made by staff
No human error 100% human error
Human factors Material vs. Human Impact on the individual Impact on the entire plant
consequences No consequences for humans and organisations Destroys humans and installation
Linked to tools Personal injuries
Human factors Physical damage to Consequences on human level are little Consequences on human level are severe
humans No injuries Heavy injuries (that might lead to dead)
Might cause severe burns Will not cause burns
No damage to humans Damage to humans
No consequences for humans Consequences for humans
No victims Many victims
Potentially few (severe) victims Potentially many (severe) victims
No bruces and injuries Many bruces and injuries
Will lead to an accident with physical injuries Doesn't lead to an accident with physical injuries
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Will lead to severe sickness Will not lead to severe sickness
Individual danger Danger for the entire community
No injuries Heavy injuries 
No fractures Many fractures
No life-danger You are dead for sure
No impact on human damage You will be dead
Does not cause human suffer Causes great human suffer
No wounds Severe wounds
Causes no human suffering Causes lots of human suffering
Human factors Emotional impact to Little impact on personal and social life Major impact oon personal and social life
humans Low individual stress level High individual stress level (adrenaline takes it over)
I will feel safe I will feel unsafe
Emotionally close to owv staff This has no emotional bond with me
Creates no stress for OPS and Maintenance Creates a lot of stress for OPS and Maintenance
Emotional vulnerable No emotional vulnerability
People won't worry People will feel worried
No impact on staff's safety feeling Major impact on staff's safety feeling
No stress Collective stress
Human factors Communication Good communication can avoid problems Communication doesn't help
Has nothing to do with communication Has to do with communication
Has nothing to do with transfer of information Has to do with transfer of information
Human factors Intention Accidential Intentional (on purpose)
By accident On purpose
Organisational Impact on my job No impact on ZPT's existence Existence ZPT stops
relation structures No consequences for staff High consequences for staff
You can still do your job You can't come to work
No impact on staff's ergonomics Major impact on staff's ergonomics
Office work Physical work
Organisational Internal or external staff Risk is among own staff Risk is external (to staff)
relation structures Own staff External staff
Organisational Alarming the hierarchy Management will be alerted and will solve the problem We will solve the problem
relation structures It will not be reported to Norway It will allways be reported to Norway
No report to Norway Always reported to Norway
Doesn't have to be treated in synergie Has to be treated in synergie
No notification audit -> SMART Notification audit -> SMART
Organisational Operations vs. Organisational problem Production-technical problem
relation structures Management Operations decides Management decides
Organisational Operations vs. Operations Maintenance
relation structures Maintenance
Risk & crisis Procedures 100% follow-up of procedures No follow-up of procedures
containment Strictly follow-up of procedures is required Procedures are not absolutely not required
100% prepared (we have a scenario) We are not prepared (we have no scenario)
Can be solved with procedures Procedures won't help
Not related to procedures Totally related to procedures
Concrete Abstract
No corrective intervention Altijd correctieve interventie
Has to do with not following procedures Has nothing to do with procedures
Following procedures Not following procedures
Has nothing to do with procedures Has exclusively to do with procedures
Has nothing to do with procedures Has everything to do with procedures
Risk & crisis Help required? No external help required to solve the problem External help required to solve the problem
containment We can solve it We can't solve it
We can't intervene Early intervention might prevent worser things
Gassco will solve the problems Emergency services will solve the problem
We can solve it We need external help to solve it
Gassco can solve it External help is required to get things under control
We solve it (no help required) The emergency services will be allerted
We have to rely on contractors to solve it No contractors required
Police will be allerted We don't call the police
The public safety plan will not be activated Full deployment of the public safety plan
We solve it Only third parties can solve this
Risk & crisis Prevention We can take precautionary measures We can't take precautionary measures
containment Preventive intervention is possible Preventive intervention is not possible
Planning can keep it under control You can't plan this, it's out of control
Awareness for prevention will lead to minor danger No awareness for prevention will lead to severe danger
Preventive testing Execute
You can protect yourself You can't protect yourself
Is avoidable Is unavoidable
No detection systems required Detection system required for safe work conditions
Nothing to do with safety behaviour 100% linked to safety behaviour
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Risk & crisis Control Controllable Definitely not controllable 
containment 100% control of the risks No control of the risks
100% control 0% control
We have a full and clear view on this We have absolutely no clear view on this
We fully control this We have no control whatsoever
The risks can be well assessed We can't fully assess the risks
As a company you can keep this under control As a company you can't keep this under control
Having a clear vier You can't see anything
100% measurable and under control Not measurable nor under control
Controlled Not controlled
Risk is well manageable Risk is not manageable
Nothing to do with lack of control Lack of control
Passive Intervening actively
Risk & crisis Escalation Evolution of impact (can increase) Impact is immediately maximal and not under control
containment Kan escalate / evolve Can not increase
Processes in a sequence Isolated processes
No domino-effect Domino-effect
No impact on other systems Major impact on other systemens
Will lead to a domino-effect Doesn't lead to a domino-effect
Can not escalate It wil escalate for sure
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Appendix H Social network datasets 
H.1 Question 1.1 
 
H.2 Question 1.2 
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H.3 Question 2 
 
H.4 Question 3 
 
H.5 Question 4 
 
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$7 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
OS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
MT$2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
OS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
OS$7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 323 
H.6 Question 5.1 
 
H.7 Question 5.2 
 
H.8 Question 6 
 
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
AOS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
OS$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
OS$8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
AOS$4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 324 
H.9 Question 7 
 
H.10 Question 9 
 
H.11 Question 10.1 
 
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
AOS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
ADM$1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
MT$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$6 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
MT$1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 325 
H.12 Question 10.2 
 
H.13 Question 11 
 
H.14 Question 12 
 
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
MT$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AOS$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
MT$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OS$6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MT$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
ADM$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
MT$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
MT$5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AOS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
AOS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
OS$8 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OS$7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
AOS$4 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
AOS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
OS$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
MT$6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
OS$8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
AOS$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
OS$7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
AOS$4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 326 
H.15 Question 13 
 
 
MNG$3 AOS$7 MT$3 MNG$2 ADM$1 AOS$6 OS$4 MNG$1 ADM$2 OS$1 MT$2 OS$5 AOS$5 OS$6 MT$1 MT$4 ADM$3 MNG$4 MT$6 MT$5 AOS$1 OS$2 AOS$3 OS$3 OS$8 AOS$2 OS$7 AOS$4 C
MNG$3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$7 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$6 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ADM$3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MNG$4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
MT$6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MT$5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OS$8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
OS$7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AOS$4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
